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The 1AC’s intervention against “global conflict” is ideologically fragile and an analytic failure. Their elegant orthodox economic explanation of conflict is nothing more than a mask for material interests at play. Their absurd simplicity and rationality are a veneer, priming the citizenry to engage in normalized armed conflict. Cramer 02

[Cramer, Christopher is an . "Homo economicus goes to war: methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war." World development 30.11 (2002): 1845-1864. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X02001201]

2. OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEOCLASSICAL MODELS OF CONFLICT Rational choice, methodologically individualist models of conflict typically build on the idea of two groups or ‘‘players.’’ In some the game pits a ruler or incumbent against a rival. Others (Grossman, 1991; Azam, 2001) have the state in conflict with subject-rebels. In each case there is little or no disaggregation or stratification of the players. 4 In some models outcomes (in terms of social waste and political instability) may depend on whether the incumbent or state has an edge (Mehlum & Moene, 2000); in others, e.g., Collier (various), the presumption is that wars start with the decision of rebels and the analysis abstracts from much of state policy and from state violence. There is no discussion of where the ‘‘players’’ come from other than as the product of relevant economistic calculations, to be discussed below. While in some models the players are simply rivals for the rent associated with power, in most they are granted some social or collective identity, typically in the form of ethnic or religious labels. This is discussed further, below; but it might be noted that in Hirshleifer (1994), for example, collective identity is regarded as a residue of Darwinian survival processes generating durable animosities, rather than having modern, political and ideological roots and influences. Both players or organizations are assumed to be maximizing agents and the paucity of discussion of either group leads to a common elision between these agents and ‘‘individuals.’’ Typically, they are driven by the urge (this seems to be the only occasion where compulsion is relevant, all else being decided in the realm of choice) to maximize power or windfall gains from victory (or just from conflict itself). This is particularly stark in Collier and Hoefflers models, stressing as they do greater predictive power in the causation of civil war for ‘‘loot’’ than for ‘‘justice,’’ for ‘‘greed’’ than ‘‘grievance,’’ but actually the same core reasoning holds in all such models, including those from which their work is derived. For the common key to these models is the idea of a tradeoff. For Hirshleifer people face a choice between producing and appropriating. If the opportunity cost of appropriative activity, i.e. violence and conflict, is not prohibitive then violence will ensue; put differently, actors choose conflict where this is more profitable at the margin than exchange. Grossman (1991), Azam (2001), and others similarly focus on a risk versus payoff tradeoff: conflict is dangerous but if the payoff outweighs calculated risk, war is chosen or more time is allocated to insurgency. Conflict, civil war, or insurrection is then an investment or resource allocation designed to raise the probability of toppling the government or of drawing monopoly profits from the loot or instant taxation of primary commodities. Rebellion is thus clearly akin to rent seeking (Neary, 1997): it is a distortionary devotion of resources to the pursuit of the fruits of imperfect competition. 5 The occurrence and implications of conflict may be influenced by the symmetrical or asymmetrical features of the strategic ‘‘game,’’ e.g., by whether the incumbent powerholder has an ‘‘edge’’ (Mehlum & Moene, 2000). If this tradeoff is the basic premise of models of conflict, then it is necessary to determine the factors that might trip the switch activating the choice of war. In other words, under what circumstances do groups develop ‘‘mutually inconsistent opportunity sets’’ (Hirshleifer, 1994) that make fighting more profitable on the margin than peaceable exchange? One of the most basic circumstances is poverty or slow growth. Poverty may ‘‘cause’’ conflict in various ways, but the clearest expression of its treatment in neoclassical models of conflict is Hirshleifers argument that the poor have a comparative advantage in violence. While it seems obscene in the light of the widespread and persistent evidence of coercive recruitment of children and young adults into military groups in, e.g., Sierra Leone or Angola, the argument is nonetheless made that the opportunity cost of insurgency for, especially, young males in poor countries where there are few alternative opportunities for gainful employment is clearly low. Essentially, this is simply a formal version of the widespread common sense assumption that in poor countries ‘‘life is cheap.’’ There are other factors, however, affecting the probability of the relative profitability of violent conflict. For example, Azam (2001) claims that the likelihood of war turns on whether there are credible signals of inter- and intraethnic redistributive resource allocations, given an initial endowment of ‘‘ethnic capital.’’ Redistributive mechanisms may take various forms. For example, high public sector wages for officials drawn from across ethnic groups, enabling an intra-ethnic trickle down, might be more effective in keeping the peace than relatively anonymous provision of public goods (Azam, 2001). Collier (Collier & Hoeffler, 1996, 1998) begins by stressing the gains from victory and the governments potential expenditure on defence as the factors determining the utility of rebellion. The calculation by prospective rebels is mediated by how easy it will be to mobilize support, i.e. by the characteristics of the collective action challenge in a given society. As shown in greater detail below, this is understood principally in terms of ‘‘ethno-linguistic fragmentation.’’ Later versions of Colliers models (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 1999, 2001), placing less emphasis on the probability of victory, highlight the availability of lootable primary commodities and the availability or otherwise of peaceable economic activities to young males. So-called greed variables such as these are found by Collier and Collier & Hoeffler to be far more robust predictors of civil war than ‘‘grievance’’ factors such as repression or exclusion, somewhat contrarily to Azams (2001) otherwise analytically related model. The orthodox economists toolkit has other compartments too, yielding nuanced variations around this basic model. Hirshleifer (1987), for example, wields diminishing returns, comparative advantage, and Cobb–Douglas production functions as relevant to the incidence and outcomes of conflict. Thus, production functions may relate fighting inputs on two sides to outputs in the form of victories and defeats. Azam (2001, p. 432) introduces the assumption that there are ‘‘locally increasing returns to scale in rebellion, such that there is a critical mass of resources to be invested in rebellion activity before there is any chance of overthrowing the government.’’ Few would argue with this probably: though this is insufficient to legitimate the overall model. Meanwhile, another compartment of the toolkit reveals a kind of adhesive holding the model together, i.e. ‘‘uncertainty.’’ Imprecision and inconsistency in the application of this variable in the models suggests that it is something of a residual used to patch up the holes in a model and stop it from collapsing. Hirshleifer (1994, p. 5) suggests that ‘‘uncertainty on the conflict side swamps that on the side of co-operation;’’ but acknowledges that it is not clear how exactly uncertainty will affect the likelihood of conflict as an outcome of the interaction of opportunities and preferences (on preferences, see below). Finally, again in the more applied models there is more attention to collective action problems and varieties of market failure. For example, Colliers (2000) explanation for his empirical findings that greed variables predict civil war better than do grievance variables turns on these issues. Rebellion against injustice has something of the qualities of a public good and, therefore, will also display the weaknesses of a public good, primarily susceptibility to free riders: hence, injustice might exist but will not produce sufficient conflict. Similarly, there is a time-consistency problem in that actors of violence are presumed not to trust the promises of leaders, reasonably expecting them to renege on their mobilizing pledges to put right a range of social wrongs or sources of grievance. On the other hand, appealing to peoples demand for instant gratification through loot nicely overcomes these difficulties. Such are the axioms, assumptions and logic that have informed much recent thinking on the economics of war, particularly of so-called civil wars in developing countries. They have also filtered into policy debates, especially through their influence on the research initiative of the World Bank on the economics of civil war, crime and violence. 6 (The debate has in some arenas been reduced to the overly simplistic ‘‘greed versus grievance’’ dichotomy.) This kind of explanation of conflict has a wider appeal too, perhaps for three main reasons. Firstly, many of those concerned by a high prevalence of civil conflict––a crude term used here simply for convenience––tend to recoil in righteous horror from the implications of the widely cited new barbarism thesis associated with Robert Kaplan. 7 Kaplan (1994) suggested that West African and Yugoslav wars manifested a problem of ‘‘loose molecules’’ stirred into a frenzy of violence by, essentially, Malthusian pressures and the nightmare of urbanization. The rational choice theory of conflict offers an analytical godsend to those made viscerally anxious by the ‘‘senseless anarchy’’ story. 8 Second, neoclassical economic explanations of conflict offer a corrective to the assumption that inequality produces resistance and conflict. Since Plato at least it has often seemed obvious that injustice and gross inequality would produce conflict. Much work on Central American conflicts prioritises the causal role of inequality (Boyce, 1996; Booth, 1991), while others find a more general significance (albeit probabilistic and along with other factors) of income inequality in the origins of ‘‘complex humanitarian emergencies’’ (Nafziger, 1996). But, as Trotsky and others have suggested, if the objective conditions of revolution were sufficient to cause revolutions, then much of the world would be in a more or less permanent condition of revolution. Moreover, it has become clearer that injustice and inequality do not inevitably or in any direct, functional sense produce conflict. 9 Grenier (1996), for example, shows well how structural injustice explanations tally weakly with the incidence, timing and outcomes of Central American conflicts. 10 In another example, from the Jubba Valley in southern Somalia, the question is how to understand Gosha peoples choices to participate within and actively seek incorporation into a society which subjugated them, and how to understand their creative ability to manage the juxtaposition of domination and accommodation (Besteman, 1999, p. 9). Third, the appeal of the new economics of conflict lies in the fact that it is a materialist explanation of conflict. Whatever else contemporary armed conflicts are about, powerful material interests clearly are significant in shaping the conflicts and in their causation. This dimension was often neglected in overdependence on global ideological explanations of Cold War conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 11 It has also been sidelined in the more naïve explanations of more recent conflicts in terms of primordial ethnic antipathies, in which this rigid hatred was seen as more important than any other factor. Yet there is no denying the significance of material interests in the origins of conflicts, even if at times (e.g., in Colombia) it is difficult to separate their role in the origins of conflict from their influence on the characteristics and durability of conflict. Timber and diamonds in Liberia and Sierra Leone, opium in Afghanistan, coca in Colombia, land and qat in Somalia, oil and diamonds in Angola, tropical hardwoods in Cambodia, and so on all feature large in any understanding of conflict. Arguably, pressure of population on land combined with collapse of international coffee prices was critical to the background to the Rwandan genocide (Andre & Platteau, 1998; Austin, 1996). Vicious processes of asset transfer are common to the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and many other places (Besteman, 1999; Duffield, 1994; Ndikumana, 1998, p. 32). Meanwhile, conflict in the Kivus (north and south) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been driven to a significant extent by a contest for control over the profitable local section of the ‘‘marketing chain’’ for tantalite, the heat-resistant metal used in space craft, mobile phones and computer game consoles (Jackson, 2001; Moore, Nabudere, & Kibasambi, 2001). Time preference and credibility problems do seem to be overcome where, as is extremely common, there is evidence of instant gratification by soldiers in the form of looting. The capacity of orthodox economic theory to make of these material issues something more than the stuff just of rich description or of consumer campaign morality has given them considerable advantage. Despite the apparent appeal and formal elegance of orthodox economic explanations of violent conflict, there are strong grounds for arguing that these explanations are extremely reductionist, highly speculative, and profoundly misleading. For example, the presence of primary commodities in an economy or their ease of lootability is an absurdly simplistic, overly direct rationalization of the role of material resources in conflict. This approach may be contrasted, e.g., with analyses of the origins of three distinct and competitive liberation movements in Angola fighting for independence from Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s and laying the basis of the MPLA/UNITA war since independence. 12 For these analyses stress different material interests underlying political mobilization and ideology in each of the parties contending to dominate the anti-colonial war and post-independence politics: the FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA (Clarence-Smith, 1980; Birmingham, 1992). Relevant interests included the frustration of dispossessed northern Angolan coffee farmers (in the area providing most support to the FNLA) whose farms were expropriated by Portuguese settlers and whose prospects of wage employment were cut short by settler use of migrant labor from the Ovimbundu highlands. They included these migrant laborers and the farmers of the central highlands plateau (the heartland of UNITA support). And they included the interests of those employed in manufacturing and clerical positions in and around Luanda (the MPLAs domain). To reduce the role of the material to the lootability of primary resources (and therefore the profitability at the margin of conflict and violence over co-operation and exchange) conjures up Gramscis definition of economism, in which by an economic fact it means the self-interest of an individual or small group, in an immediate... sense... [it] is content to assume motives of mean and usurious self-interest, especially when it takes forms which the law defines as criminal (Gramsci, 1971, p. 163). Gramsci defined economism as presenting causes as immediately operative that in fact only operate indirectly, overestimating mechanical causation and indulging in ‘‘doctrinaire pedantry’’ (p. 178). The economism and reductionism of these models is certainly worse than anything to be found in Marxism, other than in its most vulgar forms. Even if axiomatic abstractions are merged with variables imported by selection from stylised facts, neoclassical economic theories of conflict remain, as theories, abstract. They are completely speculative until some empirical content is added. Given that the social, the cultural, the historical, etc. are left out of the initial framework, when they are brought back in later (which is inevitable) their incorporation is arbitrarily selective. What is the basis for assuming that people everywhere experience a choice of conflict or co-operation defined solely in terms of profitability, where historical evidence suggests that conflict often is institutionalized (i.e. the rules of the game are conflictual) and that the conditions of cooperation and exchange are typically forged, often slowly, out of conflict (Tilly, 1992; Howard, 2001)? What is the basis for deciding that people cannot be mobilized by ideology or promises of change (including change in material conditions of employment or production) because of time-preference or leadership credibility problems, when history and contemporary democratic politics are virtually defined by political enthusiasm for all manner of pledges despite their frequently being unfulfilled? 13 What is the basis for deciding that collective action is necessarily framed in terms of historically fixed ‘‘ethnic capital’’ or scores of ethno-linguistic fragmentation, where evidence suggests that ethnicity is commonly historically dynamic and far from even in its organizing hold on people, and where there is no evidence that ethnic affiliation is always prioritized over other sources of collective identity, including class? Moreover, why must it be accepted that social phenomena are best apprehended through individual rational choice (and a very narrow notion of rationality) rather than relational rationality and social and historical constraints on choice? 14 On what grounds should we ignore the gray areas between choice and compulsion in human activities including conflict? For fear and obeisance to de facto authority––as well as acquiescence with strong mobilizing ideologies not through acceptance but through desperate efforts to resist local structures of oppression––are motivations that might be more significant than either greed or grievance, individual choice or unambiguous coercion, in some circumstances. 15 Building on these doubts, the rest of this paper introduces three main sources of weakness in orthodox economic theories of conflict and their relevance to contemporary ‘‘civil wars.’’ The first weakness lies in the choice of proxies used in attempts to add empirical content to the theoretical postulates: these proxies are empirically and conceptually fragile. Second, theories of conflict rooted in micro-foundations of methodological individualism and rational choice cannot avoid somehow bringing in ‘‘the social’’: yet this endeavor is, again, empirically and analytically a failure. Third, even if these orthodox economic theories and econometric applications might capture a portion of the reality of conflicts, albeit crudely, they completely fail to capture one of the most significant features of all conflicts, i.e. structural and relational change.

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