The aff’s model of debate is neoclassical economics par excellence. The simplification of the entire 1AC down to the plan causes “meaningless results.” Epistemology should come first. Anything else is the worst form of climate policymaking, whereby theories no longer need to be “continually tested against observation.”
Roo and Hoffart 20 – Dr. Michael Roos is a professor and researcher in the field of green technology and economics; Dr. Franziska Hoffart is an economic transition researcher interested in energy transition, hydrogen, climate crisis, and scenario analysis at DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research, [“What’s Problematic About Mainstream Climate Economics?” Chapter from “Climate Economics”, Palgrave Macmillan, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-48423-1_4]RA
Neoclassical economists believe in the existence of universally applicable economic laws. In order to discover them, abstraction and stylisation are justified and even necessary. The abstractions can go to the point where they are in open contrast to reality. The usefulness of this approach is often claimed without further proof by reference to the plausibility of unrealistic assumptions as reasonable first approximations and the predictive success of the approach. One of the main problems of this approach is that it is strongly driven by the aim of stating the economic laws in precise mathematical equations, for which often strong simplifying assumptions are necessary. Without simplifying assumptions, the mathematical models are not tractable and the desired “theorems” cannot be derived. But as we argue below, the simplifications are not harmless in many cases and lead to meaningless results. The very core of DICE and similar models is the maximisation of the intertemporal welfare function (equation [1] in Chap. 3). The whole purpose of the model is to find the optimal, welfare-maximising price that should be imposed on carbon emissions in order to eliminate the externality problem. The approach of maximisation the welfare function is flawed for several reasons. Nordhaus and others use the conventional social planner approach to find the societal optimum. Since there is no global social planner, this method is defended by the argument that it is equivalent to a decentralised economy with intertemporally optimising households and profit maximising firms in a perfectly competitive market equilibrium. Yet these conditions are not met either. There is considerable evidence from behavioural economics that the conventional discounted utility model, which is the core of the Ramsey growth model, is not a good description of households’ intertemporal consumption choice. Frederick et al. (2004, p. 201) conclude their review article as follows: The DU model, which continues to be widely used by economists, has little empirical support. Even its developers—Samuelson who originally proposed the model, and Koopmans, who provided the first axiomatic derivation—had concerns about its descriptive realism, and it was never empirically validated as the appropriate model for intertemporal choice. Indeed, virtually every core and ancillary assumption of the DU model has been called into question by empirical evidence collected in the past two decades. In addition, consumers are heterogeneous and differ considerably in their planning behaviour (Ameriks et al. 2003; van Rooij et al. 2012) and in their desire to use a maximising or a satisfying decision-making style (Parker et al. 2007). Due to the heterogeneity of consumers, it is not surprising that the empirical support for the neoclassical model of intertemporal consumption choice is rather weak (D’Orlando and Sanfilippo 2010). In a similar vein, complexity economists reject the assumption that firms maximise profits (Beinhocker 2007). While sufficient profitability is a necessary condition for firms to endure, the objectives of firms are multidimensional and include the interest of many different stakeholders apart from the owners. Post-Keynesian economists share the view that the management of firms pursues multiple objectives, of which firm survival is an important one (Lavoie 2006). In order to survive, firms have to grow and to acquire power, for example, by larger market shares. Finally, evolutionary economists in the tradition of Nelson and Winter (1982) would also agree that firms do seek profits, but that the maximisation of profits is impossible due to uncertainty, bounded rationality and organisational complexity. A related point is that most non-mainstream schools reject the assumption of perfect competition and price-taking behaviour as an adequate description of the real world. Firms permanently strive for monopoly and price-setting power and many markets are oligopolies with rather small numbers of strategic competitors. In most countries, there are also various forms of state intervention in markets that prevent perfect competition. If neither households nor firms maximise their objective functions and if markets are not characterised well by a perfectly competitive equilibrium, the market outcome will most likely be different from what a social planner would have done in order to maximise social welfare. But then climate models using the social planner approach are purely theoretical exercises with little external validity. One might argue that models built on these stylised and unrealistic assumptions still capture many observed facts of the real economy. Even if this were true, there is no basis for the claim that the market outcome is maximising societal welfare. A final problem applies to the interpretation of the utility and the welfare function. Nordhaus (2013) stresses that the utility levels of each period concern the respective generation or cohort of people on earth. Hence, the welfare function is a social welfare function, which relates the welfare of different generations to one another over time. As a consequence, he does not consider the key parameters α and ρ as psychological characteristics of individuals but rather as social parameters that refer to large groups of people. This interpretation is in contrast to the usual interpretation of the utility function describing the utility of the representative agent, in which an explicit connection between the aggregate social level and the individual level is made. In line with textbook treatments and the usual approach in the literature, Nordhaus (1992, p. 1315) says that “the DICE model treats the world as a single economic entity and analyses the optimal policy for the average individual”. In the representative agent framework, it is assumed that the utility function describes the preferences of individuals such that the parameters of the utility function are psychological traits of persons that could in principle be measured. The individual preferences are then aggregated into social preferences of society assuming that the social preferences are equal to the preferences of the “average individual”. Although Kirman (1992), Hartley (1997) and others have shown long ago that the use of representative agents in macroeconomics is fundamentally flawed, they are still widely used in macroeconomic models. Blanchard (2009, p. 208) claims that “the state of macro is good” and the main merit of macro models with microfoundations is that welfare analysis with the correct welfare criterion is possible. Kirman (1992) demonstrates with a simple example that the interpretation of the representative agent as an average of different individuals does not make sense, because aggregating the revealed preferences of two individuals between two options into the choice of one representative agent can lead to the opposite choice of the representative agent relative to the choices of both individuals. Hartley (1997) shows that the representative agent constructed from individual choices in general is not stable if there is income redistribution. Only if all individuals have identical homothetic preferences generating parallel linear Engel curves, consistent aggregation is possible. Furthermore, they must have identical incomes in order to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a general equilibrium (Kirman 1992). Assuming that all individuals have very specific and identical utility functions and identical incomes is clearly counterfactual. Yet, if the utility function and the welfare function are not the result of the aggregated individual’s preference, it is unclear what the welfare levels of generations might be and how they could be measured. Nordhaus (2013) tries to argue that a descriptive approach of determining the social preference parameters could be used. Under the assumptions of utility and profit maximisation in a competitive equilibrium, the Ramsey Equation should hold: r∗=ρ+αg∗. (18) The Ramsey Equation relates the equilibrium real interest rate r∗ to the equilibrium long-run growth rate g∗ and the two preference parameters. Even if the two equilibrium levels of the interest rate and the growth rate could be observed, which is questionable, one of the two parameters remains undetermined. As Nordhaus (2013) demonstrates himself, the choice of the two parameters has a strong impact on the estimated social cost of carbon. Because there is no objective way of measuring or estimating the free parameter of the hypothetical social welfare function, the neoclassical approach of climate economics does not meet its own epistemological requirement according to which “[t]heories … are continually tested against observation. … The process of testing and refining theories is central to the development of economics as a science” (Robert and Rubinfeld 2018, p. 28). Because of the discussed epistemological problems of the neoclassical approach, we doubt that mainstream climate economics can achieve its goal of deriving optimal policies to respond to climate change in a meaningful way.