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Arnsperger and Varoufakisv 2006 - University of Louvain, Belgium and University of Athens, Greece

Christian Arnsperger and Yanis Varoufakis “What Is Neoclassical Economics?

The three axioms responsible for its theoretical oeuvre, practical irrelevance and, thus, discursive power” Panoeconomicus, 2006, 1, pp. 5-18

5. Three axioms, one neoclassical economics

It is hard to imagine how any standardly trained economist could deny that her theoretical practices digress from the three methodological moves mentioned above: Methodological individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological equilibration. For simplicity we shall henceforth refer to them as the neoclassical meta-axioms. Whether it is general equilibrium theory, evolutionary game theory, non-Walrasian equilibrium theory, social choice theory, industrial economics, economic geography, new political economy, analytical Marxism, public choice economics etc., all mainstream approaches in these fields remain loyal to the three meta-axioms above.

In fact, the meta-axioms are beginning to develop much closer, almost symbiotic, links with one another than was the case until fairly recently. Take for in-stance, the attempts by psychological game theorists to create a sophisticated model of men and women, capable of drawing utility not only from socio-economic outcomes but also from the means that bring them about. When homo economicus learns that the ends do not necessarily justify the means, he develops a welcome capacity to ponder, prior to acting, what others expect of him so that he can decide how much he values the various alternative outcomes.

For example, when deciding on whether to act bravely in defence of some-one in need, his second order beliefs (i.e. his beliefs regarding what others ex-pect of him) influence his estimate of the (psychological) cost of acting selfishly. To put it simply, his utility function cannot be defined independently of (a) the structure of the strategic interaction and (b) the beliefs that all participants would have in equilibrium. In this sense, methodological equilibration is no longer prior to methodological instrumentalism (as is the case in standard con-sumer or game theory): the axiomatic imposition of equilibrium is not only nec-essary in order to predict the interaction’s outcome but it is also essential in or-der to define the instrumentally rational agents’ preferences! (See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, Ch. 7 and Fehr and Gächter, 2000)

It is, therefore, uncontroversial to state that every aggregate phenomenon scrutinised by neoclassical minds is explained increasingly and exclusively as some axiomatically imposed equilibrium emerging from the interaction of in-strumentally rational individuals who are either optimising consciously (as in rational choice or game theory) or are drawn to such behaviour through a proc-ess of ‘natural selection’ (as in, for instance, evolutionary game theory). The bottom line, then, is clear: despite all denials, there is such a thing as a body of social theory that subscribes to the three meta-axioms above and which we can legitimately, for want of a better term, label neoclassical.

At this juncture, there is one move open to neoclassical economists who still insist that what they are doing ought not be labelled as anything other than scientific economics: they need to persuade us that the neoclassical method, i.e. models based on the three meta-axioms, is the only proper method; which obvi-ously implies that there is no distinctly neoclassical method after all, even once that method has been characterised as above.

Effectively, they would have to adopt a rather extremist defensive posture: to claim that the combination of the three meta-axioms above is indispensable to any economic theory worth its salt; that the neoclassical method, as founded on the triptych of individualism, instrumentalism and equilibration, is not just one possible analytical strategy but that it is somehow uniquely and ontologically grounded in social reality. It would amount to a claim to the effect that all other economic approaches, including for instance Adam Smith’s, is not in the same scientific league as their own. Undoubtedly, many neoclassical economists think that (although few would state it in polite conversation.)

Nonetheless, the truth status of that defence must be an empirical matter rather than a methodological one, and the defender of neoclassisism has to pro-vide hard evidence concerning the actual, material processes of (a) how prefer-ence orderings determine actions uniquely, and (b) how their reasoning skills, or social/natural selection, slice through indeterminacy to bring about an equilib-rium. Needless to say, such extreme naturalism has no chance of being empiri-cally supported. Even sophisticated empiricists like Karl Popper rejected the idea that the joint hypothesis of individualism and equilibrium can be tested empiri-cally; they are, he rightly claimed, preconditions for knowledge rather than ob-jects of knowledge. Hence there is no such thing as a ‘natural method’. The very thrust of the Enlightenment project rules it out of court.

The last resort of the mainstream economist, who wants to defend the pre-sumption that the three neoclassical meta-axioms are essential to any scientific analysis of the social economy, is to argue that the neoclassical method of ex-planation, while not being a ‘natural method’, has nevertheless evolved histori-cally as the most adequate method for studying a society of free, enlightened individuals. That it is, in short, the only non-contradictory embodiment of the Enlightenment project itself. That, just as representative liberal democracy is a bad system of government but remains the best one available, neoclassicism has evolved as the best economic analysis that is consistent with the liberal human condition.

However, such a rhetorical strategy can only work if it is accompanied with a sound evolutionary argument depicting the three meta-axioms as the unique ‘attractor’ of liberal social science. Unfortunately, no such argument seems to be forthcoming. Instead, mainstream economics is perpetually reproducing itself through a series of metamorphoses that Ovid would have been jealous of. The resulting models gain in complexity, expand in scope, and move into areas hith-erto untainted by the economist’ inquiring gaze. Nonetheless, all these models, in all their multiplying guises, share a well hidden, and almost completely un-spoken of, foundation: the three meta-axioms above. The radical absence of a debate about them is, we shall argue below, essential to the discursive power of neoclassical economics. As for the latter’s aversion to pluralism, it is a natural by-product of this dance of veils whose purpose is to maintain neoclassicism’s discursive edge by keeping our eyes off the theory’s meta-axioms.

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