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Arnsperger and Varoufakisv 2006 - University of Louvain, Belgium and University of Athens, Greece
Christian Arnsperger and Yanis Varoufakis “What Is Neoclassical Economics?
The three axioms responsible for its theoretical oeuvre, practical irrelevance and, thus, discursive power” Panoeconomicus, 2006, 1, pp. 5-18
6. Some thoughts on neoclassicism’s discursive power and its aversion to pluralism
What does an intelligently dispassionate observer of neoclassical economics see? She sees an ever expanding technical literature, most of which she cannot com-prehend. She sees an almost infinite series of mathematical models that explain diverse socio-economic phenomena as part of some equilibrium scenario which posits autonomous actors bringing on the phenomenon under study, often supra-intentionally, through choices that are rational given everyone’s beliefs (even when the actions are self-defeating). She sees a series of career paths that are made generously available to those who participate in this global research pro-ject. She sees economists the world over being taken seriously only to the extent that they speak this particular ‘language’. She sees the powers-that-be speak this very ‘language’. Finally, she sees enterprising academics in other social sciences adopting this ‘language’, in a transparent bid to share into neoclassicism’s dis-cursive success. In short, the onlooker sees, correctly, power oozing out of the mainstream economists’ theoretical practices. There is only one thing she does not see: the three meta-axioms, none of which are visible to the naked eye.
Note how instrumental to the discursive power of neoclassicism is the fact that its three foundational axioms are hidden from our onlooker’s view. For if they were evident, she might start asking difficult questions for which, as we argued above, neoclassicism has no real answers (except to re-phrase its axioms). This helps explain, in more than one ways, the authoritarian dynamics and the disdain shown toward pluralism of Economics Departments which have either managed to rank highly within mainstream economics or are striving to do so.
We suggest that there are two equally important types of explanation of neoclassicism’s evolution into an authoritarian research project that discourages pluralism: One is a type of intentional explanation while the second is a func-tional explanation. The intentional explanation is simple enough and runs as fol-lows: When an inquisitive graduate student, or academic, who has mastered neo-classical technique but has started developing doubts, starts questioning the meta-axioms, she is effectively questioning the hegemony of her profession. At best, her queries and arguments are met with sympathetic nods, at worst with a great wall of dogmatic put down lines and an avalanche of advice to the effect that these are matters that she ought to worry about after retirement. Publishing in the ‘good’ journals is hard enough. Publishing articles which question the meta-axioms is even harder. Indeed, it takes a foolhardy young soul to jeopard-ise a hard-earned career path in pursuit of the truth-status of one or more of the meta-axioms which allow the profession to flood the journals with mathematical models that are so highly regarded and so little discussed. And as is so often the case with dominant paradigms, self-censorship is the predominant vehicle for neoclassicism’s unimpeded march.
The functional explanation adds an interesting twist to the same tale of in-tellectual authoritarianism. If phenomenon X is functionally to explain the oc-currence of phenomenon Y, this explanation has merit if and only if the follow-ing four conditions are met (see Elster, 1982): (1) Y must be beneficial for some group of agents Z. (2) Members of group Z must be responsible for the practices that cause X but must not intend to bring Y about through practices that result in X; indeed, Z members must remain innocent of the causal link between X and Y. Lastly, (3) phenomenon Y, which is caused by X, must be shown to reinforce X through a feedback mechanism involving, unintentionally, members of group Z.
In our case, Y is the discursive power of neoclassical economics, X are the practices which keep neoclassicism’s meta-axioms hidden, and Z is the set of neoclassical economists. Can a convincing functionalist explanation of how X causes Y be built along the lines sketched above? If it can, then we shall have an interesting (and possibly correct) explanation of why pluralism is absent from Economics Departments: its radical absence, which is guaranteed when an eerie silence engulfs the three neoclassical meta-axioms, emerges as a prerequisite for neoclassicism’s dominance. Let us now put together the basic elements of such an explanation. Before we proceed further, it is important to note that the merit of this func-tional explanation is that it is entirely consistent with a distaste for conspiracy theories. As it will transpire shortly, the offered explanation does not presume neoclassical economists in cynical pursuit of discursive power; no theorists are imagined who silence subversive voices within the profession so as to preserve the power vested in them by their models [see part (2) of the argument above which rules out such intentional cynicism]. In fact, our explanation works better when most neoclassical economists would have been (honestly) appalled at the thought that we suspect their practices as driven by anything other than scientific rigour. From experience, we can confirm that most neoclassicists believe strongly in the theoretical superiority of their models and may even have a moral commitment to pluralism. Nevertheless, even if we accept that these fine senti-ments are all pervasive in the economics profession, our argument still stands.
To render coherent the functional explanation of neoclassicism’s discursive power as the result of a general ‘silence’ regarding the three meta-axioms at the bottom of all neoclassical theory, we needed three arguments: The first [see (1) above] is that neoclassicism’s power is beneficial for neoclassical economists (this is self evident). The second [see (2)] is that neoclassical economists are in-nocent of the charge that they are keeping quite on the three meta-axioms inten-tionally, so as to enhance their method’s discursive power (we accept, therefore, their own denials that they would have conceivably done such a thing). The third piece of the jigsaw [see (3)] is the crucial one: we must now demonstrate that “phenomenon Y, which is caused by X, reinforces X through a feedback mecha-nism involving, unintentionally, members of group Z”.
In other words, it must be argued convincingly that the enhancement of neoclassicism’s discursive power, which is largely due to the hidden nature of its three meta-axioms, makes it even less likely that neoclassical economists will be open to a pluralist debate on their meta-axioms. Anyone who has worked in an Economics Department has surely experienced such a feedback mechanism. Re-search funding in economics is vast compared to the trickle that finds its way to the ‘other’ social sciences. It would not be forthcoming if economists regularly experienced philosophical angst regarding the axiomatic foundations of their wares. Naturally, the bulk of the profession’s funding goes to practitioners who do not indulge in methodological debates; who simply ‘get on with the job’. No one wants to keep quite on the meta-axioms. They are just too busy building magnificent edifices on top of them, and being magnificently rewarded for it.
Nobel laureate Vernon Smith almost apologised, in a recent article (see Smith, 2002), for entering into a methodological discussion of the work he de-voted an extremely productive life to. This is typical of the fear of methodologi-cal discussion instilled in the best and even the most liberal minds in the eco nomics profession. By whom? By no one is the honest answer. The death of plu-ralism in economics is a crime without a criminal. It died long ago as a result of a particular dynamic within the profession which, operating behind the backs of even neoclassical economists, encourages them to produce all sorts of models (even of altruism and revolution, see Roemer, 1985) but surreptitiously penalises any deviation from, or even explicit discussion of, the three meta-axioms.
Of course, the pressing question is: Why are public and private funds so uncritically lavished upon what turns out to be no more than a religion with equations? Alas, this is a question that the present chapter cannot answer within a purely methodological context. For such an explanation we need to venture into political economy (see Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2005, for an attempt).