Basic income good – ensures all those who choose not to work, or are constrained, have alternatives they would not have under a capitalist system.
Panitch 11 [Vida Panitch *Associate Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University, Canada. She has published many article on concepts of commodification and exploitation, including “Transnational Surrogacy and the Justice Condition of Non-Exploitation” in the American Journal of Bioethics (2014). “Basic income, decommodification and the welfare state.” Philosophy & social criticism, 2011 - journals.sagepub.com ] AZHS
Van Parijs’ proposal entails the transfer of a minimum income to all members of society regardless of their willingness to work, no matter whom they live with, or whether they are rich or poor.3 He defends this proposal on the grounds that an unconditional income would provide people with the freedom to choose not only what to buy but how to spend their time, and hence with the opportunity to do whatever it is they might want to do with their life. He argues that even Malibu surfers should be entitled to the basic income to pursue their particular lifestyle, despite the fact that they are perfectly able to contribute productively to the economy and pay taxes to the state from which they obtain support. 4 In response to this claim he has encountered the following challenge: In granting a basic income that is not conditioned on the willingness of the able to work, the UBI promotes freedom without responsibility, and thereby both offends and undermines the ideal of social obligation that undergirds the [liberal] welfare state. A UBI would not only inspire a segment of the able population – largely young, healthy, unattached adults – to abjure work for a life of idle fun. It would also depress the willingness to produce and pay taxes of those who resent having to support them. . . . The social insurance programs that form the foundation of modern welfare states constitute the terms of a great social con- tract. Like any insurance, they purchase a right to provision from others conditional on a willingness to provide for others, if one is able. . . . The contract is thus sustained and legitimated only by a recognition on the part of the able of an obligation to work and pro- vide for the dependent and those who care for them. It is hard to see how such a contract can be sustained by a system that advertises as one of its virtues that it would free the able to live in idleness. 5 This criticism stems from the liberal view that, insofar as society constitutes a coopera- tive venture for mutual advantage, the benefits of cooperation should be reserved for those who participate in this venture, or at least for those who are willing, if unable, to do so. What this critique of Van Parijs’ project misses, however, is that while he tries (appar- ently unsuccessfully) to make his view palatable to liberal theorists by appealing to the concepts of freedom and neutrality, he does not attempt to offer justificatory grounds for the liberal welfare state. Indeed, on his view, liberal schemes are eminently unfair, not simply because of their limited and conditional nature, but because they make social 2 Philosophy and Social Criticism 000(00) entitlement entirely dependent on a citizen’s willingness to participate in the capitalist market economy. Van Parijs criticizes John Rawls, for example, for restricting mem- bership in the worst-off group to the working poor by including leisure time among the primary goods (calculated as 24 hours minus a standard working day). On Rawls’ scheme, the more leisure time one has, the higher the index of primary goods one can be said to hold; someone who does not work a standard working day (for whatever reason) will not qualify as among the worst-off and will thus be ineligible for welfare benefits. In a similar critique of Ronald Dworkin’s scheme, Van Parijs argues that since the choice not to work could be understood as precisely that – a choice (as opposed to a circumstance) – any shortfalls suffered as a result of this choice would have to be borne by the individual alone. 6 Unlike liberal theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin, Van Parijs is clearly not con- cerned to justify welfare programs reserved for those unable rather than unwilling to work, but rather to ensure that all those who choose not to work, or are constrained by a lifestyle that does not include (well-paid) wage-labor, are provided with genuine alternatives they would not otherwise have under a capitalist economic system. And the liberal criticism that his scheme permits and encourages young, healthy, unattached adults to abjure productive work for a life of idle fun has somewhat less bite when we consider the extent to which a basic income might be particularly beneficial, not so much to Malibu surfers, but to students, single mothers and artists, who would no longer be required to support themselves by taking jobs that would prevent them from pursuing the very lifestyles they were seeking to support, and to the working poor, who would no longer be forced to take the most menial, alienating and exploitative of jobs simply to survive. The foundational idea of the basic income, for Van Parijs, is thus not to encourage idleness and free-riding, but to separate social entitlement from labor market participa- tion, and to ensure that social freedom is not conditional on the individual’s willingness to sell her or his labor power like any other marketable commodity. His defense of a UBI, he states, reflects ‘a key component of the old critique of capitalism by ‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘utopian’’ socialism alike: the revolt against proletarian subjection to the wage relation- ship, and hence to the capitalists’ rule’. 7 The institutionalization of a UBI would thus constitute a profound moral reform, for Van Parijs, not because it realizes the liberal ideal of reciprocity, but because it liberates individuals from market dependency and thereby decommodifies labor.