Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Recessions cause austerity and the defense budget is inevitably cut putting a hold in international rivalries.

Clary 15, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, Christopher Clary is an Assistant Professor of Political Science. His research focuses on the sources of cooperation in interstate rivalries, the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, U.S. defense policy, and the politics of South Asia, April 21, 2015, Date Accessed: 07/01/23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2597712 (GMF)

Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost invariably assumes growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597712 Updated April 21, 2015 Clary 5 sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7 Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending At a minimum, the political costs of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures alone make such a path unappealing. In practice, this can spur policymakers to curtail national security spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil. There is often more discretion over defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so defense expenditures are doubly costly since they 6 Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 7 Paul Pierson, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics 48, no. 2 (January 1996): 145. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597712 Updated April 21, 2015 Clary 6 both take up valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas, rather than constituencies at home. Pursuing defense cuts may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector, which shows a strong aversion to military conflict even if that means policies of appeasement and conciliation.8 During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs associated with defense expenditure—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—are real but acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different types of spending. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and arms industries, but even in militarized economies this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller than those that favor social and economic expenditures over military ones. Defense Cutbacks Encourage Rapprochement An interest in defense cutbacks can lead to conciliatory behavior through two paths. First, the cutbacks themselves serve as a concrete signal to adversaries that the military threat posed by the economically distressed state is declining. This permits the other state to halt that portion of defense spending dedicated to keeping up, breaking the back of ongoing arms races through reciprocated, but non-negotiated moves. Unilateral conventional force reductions were a major element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in the late 1980s, alongside negotiated strategic arms control, and diplomatic efforts to achieve political understandings with the United States.9 Gorbachev similarly used force reductions in Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Far East to signal to China in 1987 8 Jonathan Kirshner, Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 9 Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s,” NIE-11-14-89, February 1989. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597712 Updated April 21, 2015 Clary 7 that he was serious about political negotiations.10 Elsewhere, non-negotiated, tit-for-tat military redeployments facilitated Argentina-Brazil rapprochement.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.