Economic Growth increases the chances of war, rather than preventing it.
Boehmer 8 (Charles; is a Ph.D. in Political Science, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: 1875–1999, 6-30-2008)
The results again show that GDP growth appears to have a direct effect on the decisions to enter into war, which seems to support my theory that it affects decision‐makers’ views about national performance and hence resolve. This direct effect is notable relative to growth in military expenditures. Additionally, the only control variable that holds any explanatory power is major power status. The occurrence of war does not even appear to be a function of time; the Peace Years and spline variables are statistically insignificant. Although the magnitude and duration of GDP growth affects the occurrence of war, the time since a state’s past involvement in war has no effect on participation in future wars. War is a complex event to explain, and only the GDP growth variable offers any further explanation than simply that major powers are more war‐prone than minor power states. Table V presents the changes in the probability of a state entering into war as its economy fluctuates in its economic growth. Again, only GDP growth and Major Power are statistically significant. Being a major power increases the risk that a state will become involved in a war in a given year by 248% compared with minor powers. 12 12 If one divides the sample between major and minor powers, the effect of GDP growth affects positively participation in Fatal MIDs by both major and minor powers, although the effect is stronger for minor powers. The opposite is true, however, for participation in wars, where the effect of GDP growth is stronger for major powers relative to minor powers. This is logical given that these states possess the capabilities to sustain a conflict beyond 999 battle deaths compared with minor power states. A full standard deviation increase in economic growth (moving from 3.7% to 7.9%) increases the probability that a state will become involved in a war by 34.6%. Hence, the substantive effect of economic growth is not as strong as the effect of being a major power but it is important nonetheless and offers more explanatory power than the remaining covariates. The theory set forth earlier theorizes that economic growth increases perceptions of state strength, increasing the likelihood of violent interstate conflicts. Economic growth appears to increase the resolve of leaders to stand against challenges and the willingness to escalate disputes. A non-random pattern exists where higher rates of GDP growth over multiple years are positively and significantly related to the most severe international conflicts, whereas this is not true for overall conflict initiations. Moreover, growth of military expenditures, as a measure of the war chest proposition, does not offer any explanation for violent interstate conflicts. This is not to say that growth of military expenditures never has any effect on the occurrence of war, although such a link is not generally true in the aggregate using a large sample of states. In comparison, higher rates of economic growth are significantly related to violent interstate conflicts in the aggregate. States with growing economies are more apt to reciprocate military challenges by other states and become involved in violent interstate conflicts.