The US uniquely needs to practice degrowth – it benefits the Global South
Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification.” https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222 ==MJ
Some people worry that proponents of degrowth want to see degrowth universally applied, in all countries. This would be problematic, because clearly many poor countries in fact need to increase resource and energy use in order to meet human needs. In reality, proponents of degrowth are clear that it is specifically high-income countries that need to degrow (or, more specifically, countries that exceed per capita fair-shares of planetary boundaries by a significant margin; see Hickel, 2019), not the rest of the world. Again, because degrowth is focused on reducing excess resource and energy use, it does not apply to economies that are not characterized by excess resource and energy use. This brings us to an important implication of degrowth policy. The vast majority of ecological breakdown is being driven by excess consumption in the global North, and yet has consequences that disproportionately damage the South. We can see this in terms of both emissions and material extraction. (1) The North is responsible for 92% of global CO2 emissions in excess of the safe pla- netary boundary (Hickel, 2020a), and yet the South suffers the vast majority of climate change- related damages (in terms of both monetary costs as well as loss of life). (2) High-income countries rely on a large net appropriation of resources from the rest of the world (equivalent to 50% of their total consumption). In other words, resource consumption in the North has an ecological impact that registers largely in the South (Dorninger et al., 2020). In terms of both emissions and resource use, then, excess consumption in the North relies on pat- terns of colonization: the appropriation of the South’s fair share of atmospheric commons, and the plunder of Southern ecosystems. From this perspective, degrowth in the North represents a process of decolonization in the South, to the extent that it releases communities in the South from the press- ures of atmospheric colonization and material extractivism. Still, some worry that degrowth in the North might have a negative impact on economies in the South. After all, many global South economies rely heavily on exports of raw materials and light manufactures to the North. If Northern demand declines, where will they get their revenues? This might seem like a reasonable question on the face of it, but it rests on a problematic logic, namely, that excess consumption in the North must continue to rise, even if it causes ecological breakdown that disproportionately harms the South, because it is necessary for the South’s development and is ulti- mately for the South’s own good. This argument echoes arguments that were regularly made under colo- nialism, namely, that extraction and exploitation by the colonizer is ultimately good for the colonized. For instance, Nicholas Kristof, in a New York Times column titled ‘Three cheers for sweatshops’ has argued that sweatshops are the best way to get people out of poverty, so we need more of them: if we care about the poor, we should not boycott sweatshop products but rather consume more of them. The fallacy in this argument shouldn’t need to be pointed out. Obviously, the best way to reduce poverty isn’t more exploitation, but more economic justice: the South should receive fair prices for the labour and resources they render to the global economy. No one would ever suggest that an American company paying American workers $2 a day is a good way to reduce poverty in America; we would insist that reducing poverty requires paying a living wage. But for some reason this logic is not applied to workers in the South, likely because it would reduce the rate of surplus accumulation among Northern companies and countries that rely on Southern labour and resources. In other words, justice for the South (fair wages for labour and fair prices for resources) would entail degrowth in the North. We should embrace this outcome. In fact, abandoning the pursuit of growth in the North would be salutary inasmuch as it would remove the constant pressure applied by North- ern governments and companies to depress the costs of labour and resources in the South. This brings us to another, related point. Degrowth in the North creates space for Southern econ- omies to shift away from their enforced role as exporters of cheap labour and raw materials, and to focus instead on developmentalist reforms: building economies focused on sovereignty, self- sufficiency, and human well-being. This was the approach pursued by most global South govern- ments in the immediate post-colonial decades, during the 1960s and 1970s, before the imposition GLOBALIZATIONS 5 6 J. HICKEL of neoliberal structural adjustment from the 1980s onward (Hickel, 2018b). Structural adjustment sought to dismantle developmentalist reforms across the South in order to create new frontiers for Northern accumulation. In a degrowth scenario the pressure for this ‘fix’ would be ameliorated, and Southern governments would find themselves freer to pursue a more human-centered econ- omics (Hickel, 2020b; Nirmal & Rocheleau, 2019). Here too, it becomes clear that degrowth in the North represents decolonization in the South. Of course, the global South need not and should not wait for decolonization; they can cast off the chains themselves. Here I have in mind Samir Amin’s notion of ‘delinking’: the refusal to submit national development policy to the imperatives of Northern capital. For instance, global South gov- ernments could organize collectively to increase the prices of their labour and resources, and could mobilize to demand fairer terms of trade and finance, and more democratic representation in global governance (as they did with the New International Economic Order in the early 1970s). These ideas are today represented in the discourse of post-development. In addition to rejecting the tenets of neoliberal globalization, post-development thought also rejects the notion (introduced by colonizers and international financial institutions) that GDP growth should be pursued for its own sake, pre- ferring instead a focus on human well-being (Escobar, 2015; Kothari et al., 2019). Either way, decolonization in the South along these lines would likely cause degrowth in the North. This is true in a very concrete sense. Right now, high-income nations maintain high levels of income and consumption through an ongoing process of net appropriation (of land, labour, resources and energy) from the South, through unequal exchange: in other words, they seek to depress the prices of labour and resources to below the global average price (Dorninger et al., 2020). This is a continuation of the basic tenets of the colonial relationship, although (in most cases) without the occu- pation. Ending this exploitative relationship would mean either ending the pattern of net appropriation or ending unequal exchange, both of which would likely result in a reduction in the rate of surplus accumulation by economic elites, and a reduction in the growth driven by this accumulation in the North, but to the benefit of communities and ecologies in the global South.