Tons of clear transition proposals.
Parrique 21
(Timothée Parrique holds a PhD in economics from the Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement (University of Clermont Auvergne, France) and the Stockholm Resilience Centre (Stockholm University, Sweden). Titled “” (2019), his dissertation explores the economic implications of degrowth. “A response to Kenta Tsuda: Welcome to degrowth” 09/08/21 https://timotheeparrique.com/a-response-to-kenta-tsuda-welcome-to-degrowth/)
Questions of policy design and transition management “What does the administration of a planned contraction look like?” (p.119). Kenta Tsuda complains about the inexistence of “clear administrative proposals.” This is indeed a naïve complaint because there are many. In my , I counted a total of 232 policy proposals in the degrowth literature. If anything, the problem of degrowth is not that it lacks proposals but that it has too many of them. In the third part of my dissertation, which I titled “Recipes for degrowth,” I tried to articulate these changes together, ending up with a programme made of 9 goals, 32 objectives, and a number of policy instruments. Kenta Tsuda writes a bit fast when he claims that “degrowthers fail to describe how they will administer the managed economic contraction.” There is a growing scholarship on the matter, with events dedicated to this very question like the degrowth conference of Spring 2020 in Vienna, which was themed “.” There are good reasons to question the division between degrowth and the Green New Deal that makes. Several degrowth scholars are actively engaged with the question and have proposed degrowth-oriented Green New Deals. For example, Riccardo Mastini, Giorgos Kallis, and Jason Hickel participated in the crafting of the DiEM25’s , injecting degrowth policies into the agenda. A year later, the three same authors published , a paper arguing that “degrowth policies could be incorporated into a ‘Green New Deal without growth.’” Degrowth does not call for making tabula rasa of every single institution existing today. Rather, it points to a number of instruments in order to make the economy more sustainable, more just, more effective in delivering well-being, and more democratic. The proposed strategy might be different, but these end goals are similar to what you would read in a Green New Deal agenda. Of course, one should unbundle social policy and environmental protection (here Kenta Tsuda makes the mistake of reducing degrowth to an ecological concern only). But degrowth is about more than just ecological sustainability – only of the four essential features of degrowth, among social justice, democracy, and well-being. There is no silver bullet policy to such a broad agenda; complex and diverse issues require complex and diverse interventions. The diversity of policy goals and instruments in the degrowth literature is a reflection of that approach. Even though discussing the design of the transition matters, one should be careful that calls for policy precision do not come to be perceived as valid delay for action. It would be a mistake to think that any complex transition should be perfectly crafted on paper before it can start in reality. Degrowth is a political project, not a spaceship. Most of what a democratic transition is about should be figured out during the transition. This is why it is futile to plan an entire itinerary to a distant, precise destination; rather, we should be focusing on how to take the first couple of steps. For example, the author worries that “any calibration error will have grave consequences. Undershoot, and humanity experiences the strife of contraction but still ends up with an uninhabitable, wasteland Earth. Overshoot and the Earth remains habitable, but with a ‘deadweight loss’ paid in unnecessary human suffering, mostly by the poor, and a foregone alternative future of social investment and scientific developments” (p.118). Here, he falls back into the (this comes on top of another prior confusion between GDP growth and living standards). But, in the affluent countries concerned by degrowth, economic growth is no longer coupled with well-being. If fluctuations in GDP have no effect whatsoever on well-being, then where would the “human suffering” come from? Economic growth currently widens inequality, and it has been shown many times that it is possible to degrow and reduce inequality at the same time (; ; ; ). Besides, let us not forget that many developed countries are already experiencing a lack of growth, the so-called “secular stagnation.” In this situation, the ideal of post-growth (an economy that can thrive without growth) is rather timely. Another risk of perfectionist decision-making is to confuse the tool with the task.- Focusing too much on policy details runs the risk of letting the how question smother the questions of the why and what. It is important to make degrowth administratively viable, but not if it means giving up on what degrowth is about (sustainability, justice, well-being, and democracy). In fact, it is a good thing that degrowth is considered unrealistic. If everyone was on board with it, the degrowth agenda would probably bear little change to the status quo. Degrowthers can be called utopian only because they explore the borders of the unimaginable. They think and act as if it was possible for degrowth to exist and through opposition and brave leaps of social eccentricity, they create the conditions of its own feasibility. Degrowth is, in that sense, an impossible goal but an impossible goal worth having. Kenta Tsuda points out, with some justice, that the degrowth literature has remained silent about issues of international coordination. “International coordination of degrowth, however, threatens to reproduce the domestic coordination problem within the anarchic dynamics of inter-state politics” (p.122). But this is true for anything. International politics is famously complicated, whether we are talking about international trade, the management of the Euro, or the mitigation of climate change. But again, degrowth is not a great reset of everything. There is no need to launch a whole new process leading to a “Global Degrowth Pact,” as the author suggests. Instead, let us use the mechanisms that already exist: the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement, the Biodiversity Convention, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, the European Green Deal, etc. See degrowth as a more ambitious set of objectives – and sometimes a more radical design – for each of these initiatives (compare for the example the with the more radical, degrowth-inspired ). The risks that the author foresees, degrowth falling “into a spiral of bureaucratic mismanagement and international conflict,” are unjustified. If anything, imagine how less bureaucratic and conflictual the global economy would be if rich countries decided to limit their consumption of natural resources, thus putting an end to the patterns of neo-colonial extractivism and unequal exchange that enable the “” of a minority of rich people.