“Material throughput” is a fake metric that’s impossible to calibrate to.
Tsuda ‘21
[Kenta, University College London. 04/30/2021. “Naïve Questions on Degrowth”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3837997] pfox
Degrowthers do not specify a reliable measure of resource use to anchor ‘material throughput’. To the extent that they confront the measurement problem, they refer to proxies. Some discuss consumption mass as a proxy for material throughput—the aggregated weight of the physical materials consumed over time, already estimated at national level as domestic material consumption. They concede the measure is crude as a proxy for throughput, as the mass involved in an activity does not express its ecological impact. As a proxy, it fails to register the differential ecological harms of materials, for example, between a mercury-infused coal ash pile and an equal mass of food scraps in a compost bin. Furthermore, it is premised upon the capacity of statisticians to capture all sources and sinks touched by anthropogenic activity and render the effects on them legible as mass quantities—a daunting and, as far as I know, incomplete task. The alternative proxy is GDP growth itself, according to Daly ‘the best index we have of total resource throughput’. But this introduces a fatal ambiguity when degrowthers make claims about a ‘coupling’ between GDP growth and throughput: which proxy are they using for the latter? If the proxy is mass, the relationship has an unreliable empirical basis. If the proxy is GDP growth itself, the statement is meaningless.
In addition to these methodological problems of legibility, degrowthers have to confront questions of magnitude. They advocate shrinking GDP to slow material throughput. But addressing heterogeneous forms of damage—say, pollock overfishing in the Gulf of Alaska, deforestation in the Amazon—is unlikely to require the same reduction in throughput. The degrowth regime would need to be cautious, reducing throughput to the threshold necessary to safeguard the most sensitive natural systems. What is that threshold, and what GDP reduction do we need in order to achieve it? Does the answer to these questions change, depending on when we start degrowing? What is the slope at our current point on the growth-throughput curve?
The answers to these questions are vitally important, because any calibration error will have grave consequences. Undershoot, and humanity experiences the strife of contraction but still ends up with an uninhabitable, wasteland Earth. Overshoot and the Earth remains habitable, but with a ‘deadweight loss’ paid in unnecessary human suffering, mostly by the poor, and a foregone alternative future of social investment and scientific developments. In other words, accepting for sake of argument Degrowthers’ axiom that it is necessary to reduce throughput to save civilization, the degree of reduction matters—a lot.