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The perm upends cooperative federalism – it’s funding schemes are non-cooperative

Cross and Welton 21 (Jesse Cross; Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Shelly Welton; Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; “Making Federalism Work: Lessons from Health Care to the Green New Deal”; Scholar Commons; University of South Carolina Law School; pp. 765-826; 2021; https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2489&context=law_facpub) [DTD] GND = Green New Deal

To navigate the entrenched cooperative federalist structures that pervade U.S. energy and environmental law, 209 and which are now complicated by many "uncooperative" states,210 attention must be devoted to how to map the GND's substantive priorities onto the structure of the modern administrative state. Today, U.S. energy and environmental law are both deeply federalist in their structures. In environmental law, "cooperative federalism" predominates,211 in which the federal government sets certain minimum standards for environmental quality and then allows states flexibility in planning for how to meet those standards. 212 In energy law, the other body of U.S. law central to efforts at rapid decarbonization, 213 jurisdiction is less cooperative, but also shared.214 The Federal Power Act ("FPA"), which has structured relations between the federal and state governments in the field of electricity since 1935, gives the federal government control over the pricing of interstate, wholesale electricity sales and interstate transmission lines, but leaves to states control over the retail electricity sector (that is, utility sales of electricity to end-use consumers) and over electricity generation. 215 Similarly, laws about infrastructure siting give states considerable authority over where and when to approve new transmission lines, oil pipelines, and electric generation facilities.216 Many states have used their authority under the FPA to respond aggressively to climate change, filling the federal climate change policy lacuna with a range of state-level policies. 217 A growing number of states now have laws that require decarbonization of the electricity sector on the same aggressive scale contemplated by the GND. 218 However, other states remain intransigent on climate, or continue to take steps in the wrong direction-such as Ohio's July 2019 legislation actively promoting coal.219 All to say, hyperpartisanship persists in state climate politics, much as it does in health care. One central challenge confronting the architects of the GND will be how to structure a successful program that takes advantage of these longstanding federalism arrangements, without succumbing to their weaknesses. 220 On these questions, we believe the ACA offers substantial lessons regarding whether and how-in our contemporary, hyperpartisan times-to effectively build states into major federal social justice legislation. 221 B. Applying the Lessons 1. Federal Funding There are good reasons-perhaps political above all else-that the GND might choose to use conditional funding to induce states to achieve certain priorities, including affordable housing, clean energy infrastructure development, job creation, and living wages. Yet, just as in the health care context, there are real costs to such arrangements for a program centered on tackling inequality as a core mission. The same states that would likely prove non-cooperative even in the face of overwhelmingly rational incentives are the ones where low-income communities and communities of color may most need assistance. 222

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