Leakage affects the CP more than the aff
Murphy 12 (Robert Murphy; Senior Fellow with the Mises Institute; “Carbon ‘Tax Swap’ Deals: A Review and Critique”; Institute for Energy Research; November 2012; https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/IER-Murphey-Carbon-Tax-Swap-Deals-A-Review-and-Critique.pdf) [DTD]
4. Numerical Estimates of the Significance of Leakage Above we have laid out the theoretical problems with using estimates of the global SCC to calibrate a regional carbon tax. In this subsection we will provide some numerical estimates of the actual significance of this issue. Caron et al. (2012) analyzed the cap-and-trade program in the state of California. They summarized their results as follows: We estimate the impact of California’s cap-and-trade program on the leakage of emissions to other regions using a calibrated general equilibrium model. Sub-national policies can lead to high leakage rates as state economies are generally closely connected to other economies, including integration of electricity markets. Measures that will prevent leakage from California’s capand-trade program include requiring permits to be surrendered for emissions embodied in imported electricity and legislation banning “resource shuffling.” Under a cap-and-trade policy without measures to reduce leakage, the price of emission permits is $12 per ton of CO2 and emissions in other regions increase by 46% of the reduction in emissions in California. When imported electricity is included in the program and resource shuffling is banned, the carbon price is $65, there is negative leakage to regions exporting electricity to California, positive leakage to other regions and the overall leakage rate is 2%. We conclude that although there is potential for large increases in emissions elsewhere due to California’s cap-and-trade policy, enforcement of requirements for imported electricity will be effective at curtailing leakage. (Caron et al. 2012, emphasis added) Free-market conservatives who have applauded a revenue-neutral carbon tax should take note of the passages we have highlighted in the excerpt above. In the absence of other restrictions on commerce, a simple implementation of a cap-and-trade program in California—which does not set a marginal penalty on carbon emissions, but instead caps the total amount of permissible emissions in the state—would lead to an emission price ($12/ton) below what many analysts believe is the global social cost of carbon (SCC). The explanation for this result is that faced with higher costs of operation and with no other regulations on their activities, electricity providers in California would simply curtail production in-state, and turn to importing (cheaper) electricity produced in other U.S. states where California’s cap-and-trade program did not apply. This mechanism explains why 46 percent of the drop in California emissions would be offset by increased emissions in other regions. Thus, we see that Bauman and Hsu’s casual description of British Columbia’s $30 carbon tax as “the best climate policy in the world” was quite dubious, even on their own terms. Yet the excerpt from Caron et al. is even more revealing. Precisely because of this problem of leakage, the authors of this study were not content to consider merely a cap-and-trade program. Instead, they modeled the effects of the California state government imposing more regulations on the energy sector, namely, placing a tariff on electricity imported from outside the state and banning “resource shuffling.” By introducing these additional, top-down interventions in the economy, the authors were able to bolster the potency of a state-level cap-and-trade program, because now—by cracking down on “leakage” so that it is only 2 percent—they found the price of permits rising from $12 to $65/ton, a more than fivefold increase. As this example illustrates, free-market conservatives should be aware that, even on theoretical grounds, the so-called “market solutions” of a carbon tax or capand-trade program may not address the problems of climate change in the eyes of those most alarmed, making command-and-control regulations necessary to contain unintended consequences. Naturally, the estimates of leakage emanating from national carbon policies are lower than those associated with subnational policies. Caron and his co-authors themselves summarized the literature by reporting that “[g]eneral equilibrium assessments of leakage from federal policies commonly estimate leakage rates between 10% and 30%” (Caron et al. 2012, p. 2). Distinguished economist William Nordhaus, one of the pioneers of the economics of climate change—and himself a vocal proponent of carbon taxes—provided his own analysis of the importance of a worldwide policy: Our modeling results point to the importance of near-universal participation in programs to reduce greenhouse gases. Because of the structure of the costs of abatement, with marginal costs being very low for the initial reductions but rising sharply for higher reductions, there are substantial excess costs if the preponderance of sectors and countries are not fully included. We preliminarily estimate that a participation rate of 50 percent, as compared to 100 percent, will impose an abatement-cost penalty of 250 percent. Even with the participation of the top 15 countries and regions, consisting of three-quarters of world emissions, we estimate that the cost penalty is about 70 percent. (Nordhaus 2008, p. 19, emphasis added)