Courts rely on the Insular cases to maintain racial discrimination that puts territorial residents in a perpetual state of limbo through a double move that denies territories BOTH sovereignty AND equal rights. Vaello doubled down by rendering the rational basis test functionally meaningless as applied to territories.
Gomez-Velez 23 [Natalie Gomez-Velez is a Professor of Law at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law, where she served as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs from 2007- 2010. She is a graduate of New York University School of Law where she was an Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Fellow; “SYMPOSIUM: An Anomalous Status: Rights and Wrongs in America's Territories: DE JURE SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. TERRITORIES, 91 Fordham L. Rev. 1727”; Fordham Law Review; April 2023; Lexis]//eleanor
Justice Sotomayor's dissent also shows the bankruptcy of the majority's "rational basis" rationale. The majority decision not only reinforced second-class citizenship for residents of Puerto Rico, but also weakened equal protection under the Fifth Amendment by rendering the rational basis standard almost meaningless in this context.
Justice Sotomayor's dissent concluded by getting to the heart of the matter when it comes to territorial status: "The Constitution permits Congress to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations' respecting the Territories. That constitutional command does not permit Congress to ignore the equally [*1740] weighty constitutional command that it treat United States citizens equally."90
Vaello Madero provides a clear and understandable example of the implications of colonial status and the significant consequences of the refusal to redress patently unequal and subordinate status. As long as the Insular Cases remain good law, lower federal courts will continue to rely on them:
[B]ecause they remain on the books, lower courts continue to rely on the Insular Cases to deprive residents of U.S territories of rights and constitutional safeguards they almost surely enjoy. Further, beyond their doctrinal impact, the Insular Cases also continue to implicitly serve as a basis for Congress to maintain discriminatory laws that treat residents of the territories as second-class citizens, much as Plessy did for laws that discriminated against African Americans.91
The impacts are significant for citizenship, voting rights, and equal protection, among other rights not to mention sovereign identity and basic human dignity. Worse yet, the Court not only repeatedly declined to overrule the Insular Cases, but also continues to shift its rationale for permitting separate and unequal treatment to continue this time by citing the Territorial Clause without referencing the Insular Cases.92
B. The Territorial Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution and the Insular Cases
The United States includes five populated territories: American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The United States has indefensibly held some of these territories in second-class status for more than a century.93 The United States's claimed authority for what can only be described as colonial possession of its territories is the Territorial Clause of the Constitution, along with the notorious and judicially invented94 "distinction between 'incorporated' and [*1741] 'unincorporated' territories."95 This justification, known as the "territorial incorporation doctrine," was established in the Insular Cases.96
The Territorial Clause of the Constitution states that Congress may "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States."97 As Justice Kavanaugh asserted in Vaello Madero, "[t]he text of the Clause affords Congress broad authority to legislate with respect to the U.S. Territories."98 The Territorial Clause, however, does not authorize Congress to exercise power over U.S. territories indefinitely and requires constitutional safeguards.99
The Territorial Clause is part of Article IV of the Constitution, which provides for the admission of new states100 and the treatment of territories or other "property" belonging to the United States.101 It gives Congress plenary power over U.S. territories only pending their admission as states.102 And this understanding of the clause as affording Congress temporary plenary power over inhabited U.S. territories prevailed in law and fact with respect to incorporated territories.103 It also was understood at the time that full constitutional rights and principles of justice extended to all territories under U.S. dominion.104 But this understanding changed with the signing of the [*1742] Treaty of Paris of 1898,105 which ended the Spanish-American War and ceded several noncontiguous territories to the United States.106
The Territorial Clause's original meaning conceived of territorial status as temporary, with the eventual goal of statehood or deannexation.107 Territorial acquisition was understood to be part of a process toward incorporation into the United States, not a process of indefinite (or permanent) colonization.108
Moreover, reading the Territorial Clause as permitting Congress to exercise perpetual plenary power over the territories with limited constitutional application is incompatible with the Constitution's structure. The Supreme Court articulated the notion in Reid v. Covert109 that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."110 Those restraints should safeguard the principles of individual liberty, separation of powers,111 an independent judiciary, federalism, and state sovereignty. Thus, both a so-called "originalist"112 view and a structural understanding of the Territorial Clause support decolonization.113
[*1743] Other scholars agree.114 For example, Judge Torruella noted:
[The Supreme Court] clearly expressed the lack of constitutional authority for the United States to rule as a colonial power in Scott v. Sanford [sic] . . . .
. . .
Yet, in its treatment of the territories acquired after the Spanish-American War, the United States has followed the colonial formula to this very day, a path authorized by the Supreme Court's unwarranted reversal of established constitutional and historical precedent in the Insular Cases.115
Whereas the Insular Cases' subject matter varied, taken together, they stand for the proposition that overseas territories were unincorporated and not destined for statehood.116 Suffice it to say that the Insular Cases not only invented an incorporation doctrine with absolutely no grounding in the U.S. Constitution,117 but they also determined that, under that doctrine, the Constitution did not apply in full to the unincorporated territories on a racist and arbitrary basis.118 Residents of the territories were not guaranteed, for [*1744] example, constitutional tax uniformity,119 jury trial rights,120 voting rights,121 or full constitutional citizenship.122
The Insular Cases' description of the scope of Congress's power and the application of the Constitution in the territories is intolerably ambiguous. Indeed, the Insular Cases do not "provide any analytical framework much less a principled one on how to determine which constitutional provisions are 'fundamental' enough to apply in unincorporated territories."123 The Insular Cases thus placed unincorporated territories in a perpetual state of limbo,124 often with a "heads I win, tails you lose"125 mentality favoring the [*1745] United States while offering limited local leeway in matters regarding taxes, trade, voting, statutory citizenship, legal proceedings, and territorial governance.126 That leeway allowed for local governance and some territorial constitutions to establish a kind of "spectral sovereignty" while also allowing for continuous "status manipulation" to keep the territories in check and operating in satisfaction of U.S. prerogatives.127 Professor Sam Erman describes the doctrine as reminiscent of an "Alice in Wonderland" experience:
Rather than decide how constitutional rights operate in a territory, the Court focuses on what is insulated from their operation: colonial governance. Formally, this what is really a where: unincorporated territory. And that where is at bottom a who. Ultimately, colonized people are the ones who lack rights, and it is the ostensible nature of a population that drives Congress' decisions to incorporate and admit to statehood. The process is not reversible. Knowing what, where, and who does not reveal how citizenship, juries, equal protection, and other important constitutional guarantees will operate. The applicability of such guarantees remains largely unsettled where colonized people subject to colonial governance in unincorporated territories are concerned.128
Thus, the Insular Cases invented the territorial incorporation doctrine, which is the idea that the U.S. territories are subject to Congress's plenary power indefinitely and that certain constitutional rights do not apply to their residents.129 The Insular Cases' racist premises and flawed reasoning, and the resulting colonial condition of the territories, have been strongly criticized by scholars,130 advocates,131 politicians,132 and, at times, even by the Supreme Court. Reid v. Covert provides an example:
[*1746] [I]t is our judgment that neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government.133
Later, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court clarified that it has "read the Insular Cases to teach that whether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect depends on the 'particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives that Congress had before it.'"134 And, quoting from Reid, the Court noted that the extraterritorial question depends in particular on "whether judicial enforcement of the provision would be 'impracticable and anomalous.'"135 This perplexingly ambiguous "impractical and anomalous" standard has been used to determine whether a particular constitutional guarantee applies outside of the mainland United States.136 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reiterated this test in Fitisemanu v. United States137 and characterized it as the "lodestar of the Insular framework."138 The court then said that, "[a]s with all extraterritoriality questions, the answer turns on 'objective factors and practical concerns,"' such as "whether the circumstances are such that recognition of the right to birthright citizenship would prove impracticable and anomalous, as applied to contemporary American Samoa."139 This standard is so ambiguous as to be no standard at all. It simply gives power to a reviewing court to decide whether and when to extend full constitutional guarantees to U.S. territories and their residents.
The endurance of the Insular Cases under current law is an affront to core constitutional notions of equal protection and fair treatment, as well as to basic principles of human dignity and self-determination.140 While the [*1747] Supreme Court has explicitly overruled or minimized other cases rooted in racism and a national self-conception deemed intolerable today most recently Korematsu v. United States141 the Insular Cases remain "good law."142 Indeed, in October 2022, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in Fitisemanu, avoiding a clear opportunity to overrule the Insular Cases.143
Worse yet, while repeatedly declining to overrule the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court appears to be shifting the doctrinal bases for maintaining the colonial subordinated status of the U.S. territories under the Territorial Clause and other constitutional doctrines. For example, in Vaello Madero, the Court not only ignored the Insular Cases' influence on its interpretation of the Territorial Clause, but also interpreted the clause to permit a form of rational basis review so weak as to render the Equal Protection Clause meaningless as applied to the U.S. territories.144 Under this approach, the Court accepts whatever justification the U.S. government offers for its differential treatment of the territories as rational simply because it applies to the territories. It is unclear whether this is an intentional or subliminal adoption of the perpetual plenary power doctrine established under the Insular Cases' incorporation framework.145 Either way, the rational basis standard applied in Vaello Madero is unsound and should be abandoned as being no standard at all.
C. The Supreme Court's Arbitrary and Irrational Treatment of Puerto Rico Under a Colonialist Territorial Framework
Vaello Madero is just one of several recent decisions in which the Supreme Court simultaneously ignored and doubled down on Puerto Rico's colonial status146 to the extreme political, social, and economic detriment of the territory and its residents. A sampling of these cases reveals the arbitrary, unequal, and indeed, irrational treatment of Puerto Rico under U.S. colonial rule.
To begin, in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,147 the Court determined that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign for constitutional double jeopardy [*1748] purposes.148 The opinion by Justice Kagan notes (without irony) that "Congress granted Puerto Rico additional autonomy" by statute in 1917 and that, "later, Congress enabled Puerto Rico to embark on the project of constitutional self-governance."149 Justice Kagan seems to acknowledge the "faux" sovereignty "allowed" to Puerto Rico while glibly concluding that because Puerto Rico was a colony "under Spanish sovereignty,"150 its prosecutorial "authority derived from, rather than pre-existed association with, the Federal Government."151 Without addressing parallels with the U.S. states' previous status as British colonies, she goes on to dismiss the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico by stating that, "[b]ack of the Puerto Rican people and their Constitution, the 'ultimate' source of prosecutorial power remains the U.S. Congress."152 Thus, the Sanchez Valle Court, in a 7-2 decision, blithely ignored historical facts and mutually agreed upon laws and structures including the determination of sovereignty with respect to local criminal law in Puerto Rico's constitution to determine that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.153