The alternative is to reject previous forms of exchange in favor of a cultural critique of Western gender hierarchies
Joy 99 [Morny Joy is a Professor of Classics and Religion at the University of Calgary. “Beyond the given and the all-giving: extraneous speculations on women and the gift,” Vol. 17 No. 1 (1999): Approaching Religion, https://doi.org/10.30674/scripta.67247] //VDR
4. Beyond the Token of the Gift The reaction of women theorists to this phenomenon has not been without its problems. The early work of Luce Irigaray with her use of the term iouissance, and of Hélène Cixous with her deployment of the term l'écriture féminine, demonstrate that both these French women theorists were disposed to the notion of woman as a term that eluded, in its expansiveness, "phallogocentric" confinement/repression. Both waxed lyrical, in a quasi-deconstructive style (and here the influence of Derrida is evident), about the possibilities of female recalcitrance to control and the exorbitance of female sexuality. Cixous contrasted the debased form of exchange economy that has been exploited by men in the past, with that of women (such in the figure of Ariadne) who lives "without calculating, without hesitating, but believing, taking everything as far as it goes, giving everything, renouncing all security " (Cixous and Clemént 1986: 75). Cixous obviously believes that there is a inordinate mode of "feminine" economy, that can be distinguished from that of the manipulative and calculating "masculine" formula.' In this capacity Cixous observes it is possible for a woman to give of herself without reserve, but, in this proposed model, she is never taken advantage of, never despoiled. If there is a self proper to women, paradoxically, it is her capacity to depropriate herself without self-interest: endless body, without 'end,' without Principal `parts'; if she is a whole, it is a whole made up of parts that are whole, not simple, partial objects but varied entirety, moving and boundless change, a cosmos where eros never stops travelling, vast astral space. (1986: 87) Cixous' vocabulary of immoderation, however, is reminiscent of the prodigality endorsed by Bataille, where woman offers herself as a gift which is not in need of recompense. I think such utopian alternatives require extremely careful contextual scrutiny by women before they are unhesitatingly adopted (even as a disruptive strategy), or women will only too easily still find themselves at the mercy of a system, that while paying lip-service to a nomenclature of freedom from constraint, simply conducts business as usual. Cixous does allow, however, that it is possible for men to have "feminine" as well as "masculine" attributes, just as women may have "masculine" as well as "feminine" ones. BEYOND THE GIVEN AND THE ALL-GIVING 119 Irigaray, influenced by Lacan as well as Derrida, sought initially to affirm jouissance both as a mode of excess sexual pleasure and also as a tactic of textual sedition, disruptive of the patriarchal symbolic system: Turn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. Rack it with radical convulsions, carry back, reimport, those crises that her "body" suffers in her impotence to say what disturbs her... Not by means of a growing complexity of the same, of course, but by the irruption of other circuits, by the intervention at times of short-circuits that will disperse, diffract, deflect endlessly, making energy explode sometimes, with no possibility of returning to one single origin. (1985a: 142) Though these various images of refractory women are galvanized in the service of dismantling the foundations of both the philosophical and social order, something could easily go awry in these programmes Irigaray's endless diffusions initially seemed to run a similar risk as Cixous' of playing into the hands of entrenched structures. The question needs to be asked to whom, and for what purpose, does woman give (of) herself without reserve? Is it for subversion, for self-affirmation, or in the service of others? Unless women are clear about their motivation, it is too easy for women's munificence, viewed as a reckless abandonment, to be rendered ineffective by a system finely tuned to neutralize any wayward impulses. Still trapped by the ubiquitous binary structures, which remain unaffected by magnanimity, women may continue to represent an excessiveness which is the obverse of a capitalistic accumulation and exploitation. I believe that this aspect of both Cixous' and Irigaray's work, though reformatory in its motives, flirts with the danger of simply reinforcing women's eccentricity and incapability of challenging in any practical way the sacrificial nature of women's situation. There is, however, a change in the direction of Irigaray's work from approximately the late 1980s, when she began to reflect on the work of Hegel and Levinas. Aware that deconstructive excesses were not sufficient for a new order, she began to seek a position that would not simply be a reactive move within a restrictive dialectic formula: If neither absolute spirit nor the traditional Western monotheistic God seem to be the paths of a becoming, how can we ensure that the negative does not entail martyrdom? (1996: 13) This search marks a rejection of the previous rules of exchange, whether of a binary or dialectical mode, where "the sacrifice of sexed identity to a universal [was] defined by man with death as its master" (1996: 26). This introduces a further exploration by Irigaray of the possibility of a non-coercive, non-retributive exchange. In the social domain, Irigaray's utopian vision of a new order is based on a new mode of relationship beyond the enslavement to property, beyond the subjects' submission to the object...[it seeks] a new economy of existence or being which is neither that of mastery nor that of slavery but rather of exchange with no preconstituted object — vital exchange...an exchange able to communicate, at times commune, beyond any exchange of objects. (1996: 45)
Though these exhortations of Irigaray are extraordinarily powerful, and her assertions regarding women's suppression by religion and its substitutes in the West are valid, they are perhaps in need of some cautionary restraints. Just as the male theorists have made false universalizations regarding women and the gift, I believe it is incorrect to assume, as Irigaray does, that such restrictions have been ubiquitously imposed on women throughout all histories and cultures.
While I believe Irigaray's work has been helpful in indicating the compromised stereotypical sexual constructions that have reverber-ated in Eurocentric deliberations on the gift, her own solutions do not entirely escape their beguiling seductions, specifically on ques-tions of race, class and ethnicity. Irigaray does not criticize Levi- Strauss or Girard on any other grounds than their biased and inap- propriate treatment of women. There is no awareness that not just their analysis, but that the actual anthropological data may be flawed by the imposition of ethnocentric categories. Specifically, Iri- garay does not realize that her work may also be imposing inappro- priate generalizations on women in non-Western societies. Fortu- nately, in recent years, there have been women anthropologists who have since taken the male thinkers' classificatory systems to task, and their criticisms could also be a warning for Western women who are not sufficiently sensitive to issues of appropriation
Annette Weiner, in her own study of Trobriand society has demon- strated that not all women have been powerless: Beyond the ethnographic data, however, the "discovery" that Trobriand women have power and that women enact roles which are symbolically, structurally, and functionally significant to the ordering of Trobriand society, and to the roles that men play, should give us, as anthropologists, cause for concern... we have accepted almost without question the nineteenth century West- ern legacy that had effectively segregated women from positions of power. (Weiner 1976: 228)
In a similar vein, Eleanor Leacock criticizes Lévi-Strauss for erro- neous assertions and for the deliberate omission of such egalitarian people as the Iroquois who would have challenged his theories:
The stubborn fact remains that even in its own terms Levi- Strauss entire scheme founders on those societies that are mat- rilineal...and matrilocal...It is therefore not surprising that in the space of a page and a half in The Elementary Structures of Kinship, there are four (incorrect) statements about such forms as extremely rare and transitory (116-117). Although he dedi- cates his book to Lewis Henry Morgan, Levi-Strauss does not include the matrilineal-matrilocal Iroquois described by Morgan among his 'rare" examples. (Leacock 1981: 235)
The fact that there have been matrilineal and matrilocal peoples where the gift of women was never the basis of the social or relig- ious economy, questions the ubiquitous assumptions of women's lower status and lack of power. As Weiner describes it, women were not the pawns in the pervasive patriarchal exchange system that Malinowski and Mauss described:
Throughout the Pacific and other societies of similar political scale, women as sisters and spouses gain their own domains of power through controlling economic resources and protecting inalienable possessions and the various cosmological phenomena that provide authentication of historical, ancestral linkages. (Weiner 1992: 152)
Weiner's and Leacock's portraits of societies where women exert control over a sphere, both material and spiritual, upon which no man may encroach, and where "the female domain, the regenesis of human life, is accorded primary value" (Weiner 1989: 234), makes the automatic assignation of women to secondary status appear simplistic and insensitive. Perhaps a more thorough questioning of the implicit Western orientation involved would have revealed a far more complex set of structures to emerge not just in Melanesian so- ciety, but in those of other peoples where women both have and ne- gotiate social positions in ways that could inform Eurocentric blind- spots (Etienne and Leacock 1980). It could also point to models of exchange that would help Irigaray in her deliberations regarding a non-restrictive mode of exchange. However, this should not lead to unwarranted extrapolations of such examples as ideals for Western women, any more than to distortions by the imposition of artificial Western categories. As Marilyn Strathern warns:
The difference between Western and Melanesian (we/they) so- ciality means that one cannot simply extend Western feminist insights to the Melanesian case;...the difference between gift/commodity is expanded as a metaphorical base on which dif-ference itself may be apprehended and put to use for both an- thropologist and feminist purposes, yet remains rooted in West- ern metaphysics. (1988: 7)
Strathern's comments are indicative of the fact that the whole no-tion of difference needs to be faced squarely so that it can be recog- nized as that which provokes both idealizations and defence mechanisms, particularly on the part of a Western assimilative mindset. Difference, as it has functioned within a dialectic or binary format, is often disclosive of ingrained biases rather than an indica- tor of the need for a radical self-reflexive questioning of the actual system itself. Weiner's comments in his regard are salutary:
In weaving the "gift" myth, is not the anthropologist hiding a reality that concerns his or her role in his or her society? Is he or she not perpetuating and creating an image of "the primitive" as a person, or "primitive society" as a way of life, that has survived on some fundamental principle other than self-interest? (Weiner 1976: 221)
By simply embroidering such a fabrication, instead of questioning its basis and motivations (conscious or otherwise), Western scholar-ship continues to perpetuate the world in its own image. This ten-dency is strongly evident in the work of many theorists who, while they ostensibly display their distaste for the absolutes of Western metaphysics, also play fast and loose with questionable source ma-terial to support their disruptive models. In the same way, both Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, though they are critical of the male-centred Western adaptations, also seem circumscribed by the same Western parameters to which they are reacting. Thus, a dis-criminating cultural critique as well as a judicious self-reflexion would seem then to be a needed ingredient in any further discussion of the gift.