No grey zone conflict in the SCS — Southeast Asian countries are fighting back now.
Koh 23 — Collin Koh, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2023 ("David vs. Goliath: Southeast Asia Can Resist China’s Gray Zone Aggression in the South China Sea . . . with Help," US Naval Insitute, Available Online at https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/david-vs-goliath-southeast-asia-can-resist-chinas-gray-zone, Accessed 07-29-2023) AJH
The stereotypical image of Southeast Asian nation responses to China’s maritime coercion in the South China Sea is one of meekness or, at worst, submission. While sometimes true, this view is based on the fact that Southeast Asian countries are smaller and weaker than China and that their economic dependence must limit their responses to Beijing’s aggression. Compounding this perception, several regional capitals frequently send mixed signals, creating the impression of policy confusion or paralysis. The reality, however, is nuanced. These states exercise agency and assert their interests when possible, including by directly pushing back against China’s coercive behavior. Whether their responses are optimal is debatable, but the image of weak nations not willing to push back is often incorrect or at least incomplete. As the United States seeks to coalesce a regional response to thwart China’s gray zone efforts to dominate the South China Sea, it should tap into and bolster this “David vs. Goliath” spirit and courage.
Gray Zone Situations
RAND offers a useful definition of the “gray zone,” referring to “an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events.”1 In this respect, gray zone situations typically include: 1) faits accompli; 2) deterrent ambiguities; and 3) proxy warfare.2 Southeast Asian nations that border the South China Sea have encountered all three types dealt by China.
The first, fait accompli, is best exemplified by China’s massive island-building and fortification work in the South China Sea. The reason it is a fait accompli is because it entails a permanent change to the status quo. Rivals are unable to reverse the situation unless they destroy or occupy these artificial outposts, which would mean entering a full-blown armed conflict with Beijing. The second, deterrent ambiguities, is a series of below-the-threshold actions, some of which may appear innocuous or trivial, that, over time, erode the victim’s power or position. Beijing has passed new domestic maritime laws that seek to strengthen its administration in the South China Sea, even though they violate international law. The Coast Guard Law promulgated in January 2021 is a notable example.3 Finally, China’s proxy warfare in the South China Sea is best exemplified by the activities of its People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which has been known to “swarm, ram, and sink foreign vessels in disputed waters and high seas.”4
Pushing Back
Even though China possesses the advantage in terms of physical force, Southeast Asian codisputants are not meekly conceding ground. While they are hamstrung by capacity shortfalls, several claimants actively are pushing back against Chinese maritime coercion. Vietnam has led the pack in standing up to Beijing’s actions, with the months-long standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime forces over the Chinese oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 off the Paracel Islands in 2014 being a noteworthy instance.5 But Vietnam is not the only South China Sea claimant that has had the gumption and endurance to engage with China.
Save for Brunei, which has yet to be embroiled in any significant maritime standoff with China, the other Southeast Asian parties have put up their fair share of resistance against Beijing’s maritime coercion. For instance, during the February 2020 standoff over the drillship West Capella working in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Malaysians deployed at least one ship—usually a naval vessel—to counter the larger China Coast Guard (CCG) presence.6 Similarly, in June 2021, after a CCG vessel appeared in Indonesia’s EEZ to monitor the energy exploration activities of the semisubmersible rig Noble Clyde Boudreaux, the Indonesians immediately dispatched naval and coast guard assets to the area.7 Both Malaysia and Indonesia have continued to maintain counterpresence operations against China’s coercive actions in the South China Sea.
The Philippines is perhaps the most interesting case. In the early days of the administration of then-President Rodrigo Duterte, Philippine policy toward the South China Sea disputes and China in general was characterized as appeasement. Duterte manifested this approach by traveling to Beijing not long after winning the election, announcing his government would “set aside” the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea, axing or downscaling some bilateral military exercises with the United States, engaging in joint energy exploration talks with China, and downplaying instances of belligerent Chinese behavior toward Filipino fishermen.
It was not until after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Chinese boat swarm incident at Whitsun Reef that there was a significant change in the
Duterte administration’s policy. In early 2021, following reports of more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels moored at Whitsun Reef and the emergence of numerous Chinese vessels, including naval and coast guard, in the Philippine EEZ, Manila began responding with uncharacteristic vigor. Notwithstanding capacity limitations, the Philippine Navy, Coast Guard, and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources mobilized assets and manpower to monitor the situation.8 In some instances, the Philippine maritime forces boldly challenged their Chinese counterparts, despite concerns that the latter could use China’s Coast Guard Law for retaliation. For example, in April 2021, the Philippine Coast Guard challenged a group of Chinese fishing vessels, some of which were believed to be PAFMM, off Sabina Shoal and expelled them without further incident.9 In July of the same year, the Philippine Coast Guard vessel Cabra confronted and challenged the PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet tug Nantuo 189 in waters near Marie Louise Bank (well within the Philippine EEZ). The Nantuo 189 departed the area without further incident.10 The situation has remained dynamic in Philippine waters under the current Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration, with the Philippine Coast Guard at the forefront of faceoffs with the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia—especially following a February 2023 laser-pointing incident.
Maritime Domain Awareness
One way to improve Southeast Asian parties’ ability to push back against China’s maritime coercion would be to enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA). For many Southeast Asian countries, constrained by limited assets and manpower, better MDA would enable more effective and efficient ways to deploy forces where they would matter most. Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has been a primary beneficiary of U.S.-sponsored maritime security capacity-building assistance, which in large part focuses on MDA. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam have received ScanEagle unmanned aerial systems that have been helpful in plugging MDA gaps and facilitating the optimal deployment of limited maritime capacities for sovereignty assertion in the vast South China Sea.
The China Coast Guard is now the largest such force in the world. It is equipped with a number of ships that are frigate-size and up, including this 12,000-ton Zhaotou-class patrolcutter Haijing 3901. MILITARYCNR. CN
Given that China has committed its coast guard as the spearhead on the South China Sea front line, there is an impetus for Southeast Asian countries to spruce up their civilian maritime law enforcement agencies instead of devoting attention to their navies. This assumes Beijing will commit only the CCG and PAFMM to South China Sea operations. Within the CCG, however, there appears to be growing concern about the efficacy of this approach to maritime sovereignty and rights protection. The first issue pertains to the lack of a comprehensive, unified maritime legislation that would pull together the disparate laws for specific maritime functions (e.g., marine environmental protection and fisheries management), with the other being the use of naval forces by Southeast Asian rivals.11