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No war – Noko knows its outmatched technologically and economically, and deterrence solves

David C. Kang & Victor Cha 18. Kang is Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California; Cha is Director for Asian Affairs in the White House's National Security Council, with responsibility for Japan, North and South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. 2018. “THREATENING, BUT DETERRENCE WORKS.” Nuclear North Korea, Columbia University Press, pp. 41–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cha-18922.8.

This raises another question: does North Korea have legitimate security fears? In a nutshell, the problem is this: the United States refuses to give security guarantees to North Korea until it proves it has dismantled its weapons program. The North refuses to disarm until it has security guarantees from the United States. Hence, stalemate. The key issue is whether North Korea has legitimate security concerns. If it does—and I will argue that this is the case—we can explain the pattern of North Korean behavior and also point to a solution. North Korea’s nuclear weapons, missile programs, and massive conventional military deployments are aimed at deterrence and defense. If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons for offensive purposes, it would have done so long ago. Even if the North develops nuclear weapons, it will not use them because of a devastating U.S. response. The North wants a guarantee of security from the U.S., and a policy of pressure will only make North Korea feel even more insecure. Even isolation is at best a holding measure, while economic sanctions—or even economic engagement alone—will be unlikely to get North Korea to abandon its weapons program. Without movement toward resolving the security fears of the North, progress in resolving the nuclear weapons issue will be limited. The United States and North Korea are still technically at war—the 1953 armistice was never replaced with a peace treaty. The U.S. has been unwilling to discuss even a nonaggression pact, much less a peace treaty or normalization of ties. With the U.S. calling North Korea a terrorist nation and Donald Rumsfeld discussing the possibility of war, it is no surprise that North Korea feels threatened. Upon closer examination, North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.- ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. So the real question has not been whether North Korea would prevent or preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell farther and farther behind. To paraphrase William Wohlforth, “theorists tended to concentrate on dynamic challengers and moribund defenders. But in Korea the North was the moribund challenger, and the South was the rising defender.”7 If North Korea was so weak, why did so many people conclude that North Korea was the likely instigator of war? Since North Korea was not powerful, scholars and policymakers hypothesized extreme psychological tendencies to North Korean leaders. That is, if the material conditions such as military or economic power did not lead logically to a conclusion of North Korean threat, then the leadership’s psychology was what must matter. These ancillary and ad hoc psychological assumptions range from an irrational North Korean leadership to an extremely strong preference for invasion. Most theories of war focus on material conditions such as relative power, but in the case of North Korea, the real analytic lifting has been done by psychological assumptions about intent. As I will show, none of these assumptions are tenable.8 The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works. Since 1953 North Korea has faced both a determined South Korean military, and more importantly, U.S. military deployments that at their height comprised 100,000 troops and more than 100 nuclear-tipped Lance missiles aimed at North Korea. Even today the United States maintains bases in South Korea that include 38,000 troops, nuclear-capable airbases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any conflict on the peninsula. While in 1950 there might have been reason for confidence in the North, the war was disastrous for the Communists, and without massive Chinese involvement North Korea would have ceased to exist. Even during the cold war, North Korea’s leadership never challenged this deterrence on the peninsula. As I will show, the attempted assassinations of South Korea’s authoritarian leaders during the 1970s and 1980s have stopped because they would be clearly counterproductive in a democratic South Korea, and will not begin again. Given the tension on the peninsula, small skirmishes have had the potential to spiral out of control, yet these incidents on the peninsula have been managed with care on both sides. The peninsula has been stable for fifty years because deterrence has been clear and unambiguous. The end of the cold war marked a major change in North Korea’s security position. The past fifteen years have seen the balance of power turn sharply against the North. What was stable deterrence during the cold war by both sides has swung quickly in favor of the West and South Korea.19 In the 1990s North Korea lost its two cold war patrons, experienced economic and environmental crises, and fell far behind the South. Although during the cold war the North was the aggressor, this shift in power put it on the defensive. It was only when the balance began to turn against the North that it began to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Both the weapons program and the bellicose nature of its rhetoric are an attempt to continue to deter the U.S. from taking any preemptive moves against it. North Korea has the worst public relations in the world. The North’s anachronistic cold war rhetoric and seeming inability to present itself reasonably make it difficult for even impartial people in the West to make sense of its actions. This chapter is aimed at providing an explanation. As history has shown, pressure only exacerbates North Korean security fears. Since North Korea does not pose the threat many analysts think it does, the United States may be wasting resources aimed at the North, and may also be unnecessarily raising tensions throughout the region. I want to emphasize that I am neither defending nor justifying North Korean behavior. Much of the regime’s actions are abhorrent and morally indefensible. However, sound foreign policy is built upon clear and objective analysis of the conditions at hand. Emotion and ideology have often interfered with the reasoned study of North Korea, and this has led scholars and policymakers to consistently overestimate the North Korean threat and to misunderstand the motivations behind North Korea’s actions. This chapter is focused on explaining the pattern of North Korea’s military and security policies. A complete picture of North Korea must also include the dramatic steps taken in the past decade to reform and open up its economy. In chapter 4 I will discuss North Korea’s economy and what it tells us about their foreign policy. In this chapter I perform four tasks. First, I show why North Korea is not a threat. Second, I explain why deterrence has worked for fifty years, and show that the changing balance of power has increased North Korea’s security fears. Third, I show why, even if North Korea develops a nuclear weapons capability, it will not use them, and also why North Korea is unlikely to engage in terrorism. Finally, I examine the “madman hypothesis” to show how questionable assumptions can be smuggled into the analysis of North Korea, and show why assuming irrationality is unproductive. WHY NORTH KOREA IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT In explaining North Korea’s foreign policy, a useful place to begin is by exploring why North Korea has become weaker and what has deterred it from starting a war. North Korea chose not to attack the South during the cold war, even though it was at the height of its power and was supported by the PRC and the Soviet Union. The past fifteen years have led to severe economic and military decline in North Korea, and it is now much weaker than South Korea. Intuitively, it follows that this nation is fearful of the United States. The majority of international relations theories conclude that the source of threats is clear: power is threatening. Kenneth Waltz writes that “balance of power theory leads one to expect that states, if they are free to do so, will flock to the weaker side. The stronger, not the weaker side, threatens them. . . . Even if the powerful state’s intentions are wholly benign, less powerful states will . . . interpret events differently.”10 Because states are concerned primarily with their own survival, and since states are concerned about relative power, there always exists the possibility that a strong nation may decide to begin hostilities with a weaker nation. Viewed differently, “parity preserves peace.”11 Thus a potential aggressor will not initiate a conflict if it cannot win. Threats arise by the mere presence of capabilities. Even if a nation was peaceful when it was weak, changes in power can bring changes in goals. Robert Gilpin writes that “rising power leads to increasing ambition. Rising powers seek to enhance their security by increasing their capabilities and their control over the external environment.”12 In this sense intentions are not fixed, but instead flow from and respond to changes in capabilities. The obverse of Gilpin’s argument is that as a nation’s capabilities fall behind, as it grows relatively weaker, its fears about the external environment will increase. Its ambitions will lessen, and its perception of external threat will rise. A preventive war might occur if the challenger’s economic and military capabilities begin to catch those of the defender. In that case, there exists the possibility that the defender will decide to fight a preventive war to keep the challenger from catching up, or that the challenger will fight after it catches up.13 However, there are two generic problems in applying the theories to the Korean peninsula. First, the theories predict peace if a small challenger falls farther behind the defender.14 If a nation was deterred from attacking when it was 60 percent the size of the defender, why would it attack after it has fallen to 30 percent, or even less, of the defender’s size? There are only two logical ways in which one can end up with the weaker power attacking the stronger. The first argument is well elucidated by Victor Cha in chapter 1, which I will discuss that at length in chapter 4. The [[GRAPH 2.1 OMITTED]] second way is to assume that the leader is irrational.15 I will show below why the madman theory does not make much sense. Before that, however, I will show how absolutely weak the North actually is. The first calculation compares only North and South Korea, while the second calculation includes likely U.S. actions in these assessments. The typical approach has been to take both North and South Korea and compare them along a range of economic and military measures, and I will show that North Korea’s capabilities were never preeminent over the South. More important, however, is an assessment of relative power that includes the U.S. forces that would be involved on the peninsula in event of a conflict. Scholars rarely consider this balance of forces, but this is a mistake, because any war would certainly involve the United States. Both of these measures show clearly that preventive war and power transition theories are not applicable to the Korean case. [[GRAPH 2.2 OMITTED]] South Korea has always had twice the population of the North. In economic terms, North Korea was never as large as the South, and even at its closest was no more than three-quarters the size of the South. Graph 2.1 shows estimates for the gross national product (GNP) of North and South Korea from 1953 to 2000. It is clear that North Korea was never close to the South in absolute size, and indeed after 1960 rapidly began falling farther and farther behind. North Korea’s GNP in 1960 was $1.52 billion, while South Korea’s GNP was $1.95 billion. By 1970 North Korea had grown to $3.98 billion, while in the South GNP was $7.99 billion. On a per capita income basis the North was never much farther ahead of the South, either. The North and South were roughly equivalent until the mid-1970s, when the South began to rapidly leave the North behind (graph 2.2). In 1960 North Korea’s per capita GNP was $137 as compared to $94 in the South, and in 1970 the North’s per capita income was $286 to $248 in the South. [[GRAPH 2.3 OMITTED]] However, by 1980 the North’s income was $758 per capita, while the South’s was $1,589, and by 1990 $1,065 to $5,569. Furthermore, in terms of preventive war, per capita income is not as important as absolute size, because small nations may be rich on a per capita basis (Singapore, Switzerland) but be militarily insignificant. In terms of defense spending, North Korea quickly fell behind the South, spending less on defense by the mid-1970s (graph 2.3). As far back as 1977 the South was spending more than the North on defense in absolute dollar terms, $1.8 billion in the South opposed to $1 billion by the North.16 The only measure by which the North outspent the South was on a per-capita GNP basis, which is an indicator of weakness, not strength.17 Additionally these numbers do not include military transfers from their respective patrons. Between 1965 and 1982 North Korea received $1.5 billion in military transfers, mostly from the Soviet Union. Over the same time period South Korea received $5.1 billion from the United States.18 [[GRAPH 2.4 OMITTED]] Thus the most common measures of power in international relations—economic size and defense spending—show quite clearly that North Korea was never larger than South Korea, has been smaller on an absolute and per-capita basis than the South for at least thirty years, and continues to fall farther behind. Those who see North Korea as threatening need to explain why North Korea— having waited fifty years—would finally attack now that it is one-twentieth the size of the South. In military capabilities the North and South Korea were in rough parity for the first two decades following the Korean War (1950–1953), and then the North began to fall behind. Graph 2.4 shows the number of men in the armed forces from 1963 to 1998. Most interesting is that North Korea did not begin its massive expansion of its armed forces until well into the 1970s. This is most probably a response to its falling further behind the South. But for the past thirty years, North Korea’s training, equipment, and overall military quality has steadily deteriorated relative to the South. The South Korean military is better-equipped, better-trained, and more versatile with better logistics and support than the North Korean military, and some assessments suggest that this may double combat effectiveness.19 Although the military has continued to hold pride of place in the North Korean economy, there have been increasing reports of reduced training due to the economic problems. Joong-Ang Ilbo, one of South Korea’s major daily newspapers, quoted an unidentified Defense Ministry official as saying that North Korea’s air force had made one hundred training sorties per day in 1996, down from three hundred to four hundred before the end of 1995, and that the training maneuvers of ground troops had also been reduced to a “minimum level.”20 American military officials have noted that individual North Korean pilots take one training flight per month, compared with the ten flights per month that U.S. pilots take.21 This drastically degrades combat readiness. Table 2.1 shows a comparison of weaponry in North and South Korea in 1997. The bulk of North Korea’s main battle tanks are of 1950s vintage, and most of its combat aircraft were introduced before 1956. Evaluations after the Gulf War concluded that Western weaponry is at least twice, or even four-times, better than older Soviet-vintage systems.22 By the 1990s North Korea’s military was large in absolute numbers but the quality of their forces was severely degraded relative to South Korea’s and the U.S. military. Michael O’Hanlon notes that: “Given the obsolescence of most North Korean equipment, however, actual capabilities of most forces would be notably less than raw numbers suggest. About half of North Korea’s major weapons are of roughly 1960s design; the other half are even older.”23 To view the North as superior in military terms is a mistake. But even more surprising about many of these accounts is that they measure the strength of the North Korean military only against that of the ROK, without including the U.S. forces, either present in Korea or those potential reinforcements. North Korea knows that it would fight the United States as well as the South, and it is wishful thinking to hope that the North Korean military [[TABLE 2.1 OMITTED]] planners are so naïve as to ignore the U.S. military presence in South Korea, expecting the U.S. to pack up and go home if the North invaded. Comparisons between the South and the North that ignore the role of the United States are seriously misleading as to the real balance of power on the peninsula.24 In event of a full-scale conflict, the United States could reinforce the peninsula with overwhelming power. Currently 36,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Korea, including the U.S. Second Infantry Division and 90 combat aircraft including 72 F-16s. In addition, 36,000 troops are stationed in Japan, including the headquarters of the Seventh fleet at Yokosuka naval base, 14,000 Marines, and 90 combat aircraft. This is only the beginning, as more would soon arrive from within the United States.25 This economic and military comparison of North and South Korea shows that North Korea never had a lead over the South, and after the 1960s quickly began falling behind. The end of the cold war marked the beginning of a major change in North Korea’s fortunes, as North Korea continued to have economic difficulties, while its allies deserted it. This situation has only become more grave in the new millennium. North Korea is not a threat to start an unprovoked war. North Korea was never in a preeminent position relative to the South, and the real question for the pessimists is why they continue to believe that a nation that is far behind and falling farther behind might still attack. The weak may attack the strong—but the conditions under which we expect that to happen do not exist on the peninsula. Yet many people still see the situation as tense and threatening. This is true, but it is true because deterrence at its heart requires both sides to know that the other side can severely damage it. DETERRENCE AND THE CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER North Korea has not attacked for fifty years because deterrence works. Despite the tension that has existed on the peninsula, the balance of power has held. For more than fifty years neither side has attempted to mount a major military operation, nor has either side attempted to challenge deterrence on the peninsula.26 Any war on the peninsula would have disastrous consequences for both sides. The tightly constricted geographic situation intensifies an already acute security dilemma between the two sides.27 The capitals of Seoul and Pyongyang are less than 150 miles apart—closer than New York and Baltimore. Seoul is 30 miles from the de-militarized zone that separates the North and the South (DMZ), and easily within reach of North Korea’s artillery tubes. One estimate calculates that a war on the Korean peninsula would cost the United States more than $60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties. The North, although it has numerically larger armed forces, faces a much more highly trained and capable U.S.-ROK armed forces. This led to stalemate: there was little room for barter or bargaining. The result has not been surprising: although tension is high, the balance of power has been stable. Far from being a tinderbox, both sides have moved cautiously and avoided major military mobilizations that could spiral out of control.

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