Congress and the Courts disagree over social security law---the perm fails due to overrides that deck solvency over government programs.
Widiss 20 [Deborah A. Widiss is Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Affairs, and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. “Communication Breakdown: How Courts Do — and Don’t — Respond to Statutory Overrides.” Duke Judicature. Vol. 4. No. 1. 2020. https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/how-courts-do-and-dont-respond-to-statutory-overrides/. Accessed 17-07-2023.]/ISJD
Mistakes in Applying New Statutory Language. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) explicitly repudiated prior Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted the meaning of “disability” in the Americans with Disabilities Act very stringently. The ADAAA’s stated purpose was to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection” under the ADA. It passed with high levels of bipartisan support and was signed by President George W. Bush. Several years after it was enacted, I assessed the degree to which courts were appropriately following the new statutory standards. I found that, with some regularity, courts continued to apply the overridden cases for propositions that were unquestionably superseded by the new statute. The mistakes fell into two categories. First, there were decisions that failed to mention the ADAAA at all, even though the events giving rise to the dispute occurred after the effective date of the ADAAA. These cases simply applied the prior precedent as if the ADAAA had never been enacted. Second, there were many decisions in which courts observed (correctly) that the ADAAA had superseded the pre-ADAAA precedent in some respects but then asserted (incorrectly) that the relevant portion of such precedent still applied, even in contexts where the judicial interpretations at issue were clearly and indisputably incompatible with the new statutory language. Courts also sometimes observed (correctly) that the ADAAA had superseded pre-ADAAA Supreme Court precedent, but then followed circuit court precedent based on the superseded Supreme Court precedent, without acknowledging that the circuit precedent should also be reconsidered in light of the new statutory language. For example, numerous lower courts applied prior Supreme Court and circuit court precedent concerning what was necessary to establish that a plaintiff was “regarded as” having a disability, even though the amended statute established a new, far more flexible standard for “regarded as” claims. Our adversarial system depends primarily on lawyers to identify the relevant law and make arguments that will benefit their clients. I assume that in many of these cases, the lawyers failed to properly use the new statutory standard in their briefs. However, even if lawyers make such mistakes, judges have an independent responsibility to apply the governing statutory law. Additionally, sometimes the party who would have benefited from the new language was pro se, making it even more imperative that judges research the applicable law carefully.
In many instances, the legal mistake may not have affected the outcome of the specific case, as there may have been independent grounds that justified the ultimate decision. However, the error is still problematic. I found several cases in which the flawed reasoning of one court was cited and followed by other courts. In other words, once a court has incorrectly characterized the scope of an override, it can be difficult to stamp out.
Moreover, the ADAAA was an unusually direct override that received significant attention in both the popular media and the legal press. Indeed, in terms of absolute numbers, citations to the precedents overridden by the ADAAA dropped quickly and dramatically. The prevalence of mistakes even in this high-profile context suggests that mistakes likely make up a large portion of ongoing citations to overridden precedents in general, since most overrides are not as clear or prominent as was the ADAAA.