Cap is the root cause of populism – the aff cannot solve
EuropeNow 22 [EuropeNow is an online journal that publishes 5-6 issues per year. It also publishes individual articles on a rolling basis via its Daily section. EuropeNow features research, commentaries, book reviews, interviews, and teaching & learning content pertinent to Europe, alongside literary nonfiction, fiction, poetry, translations, and visual art from or concerning Europe. EuropeNow‘s contributors are both established and emerging academics, artists, authors, educators, and journalists from a wide range of countries and disciplines, while the editorial committee members similarly consist of both experienced and emerging editors. EuropeNow is published by the Council for European Studies (CES) at Columbia University, a non-profit organization that recognizes outstanding, multi-disciplinary research on Europe through a wide range of programs and initiatives. These include fellowships, grants, publications, awards, conferences and meetings, public lectures and symposia, as well as direct research and artistic collaboration. CES is particularly committed to supporting research that can play a critical role in understanding and applying the lessons of European history and integration to contemporary problems, including those in the areas of global security, sustainability, environmental stewardship, health, social policy, and democracy. Since 1979, CES has hosted the annual International Conference of Europeanists, one of the world’s most prestigious professional gathering for academics, researchers, and policy specialists focusing on Europe, with more than a thousand scholars attending each year. The Conference alternates location between Europe and North America, “The National-Populist Mutation of Neoliberalism,” Europe Now, 2022/11/02, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2022/11/02/the-national-populist-mutation-of-neoliberalism/, accessed 7-21-2023] EAY
In contrast to the conventional approach to populism, neoliberalism scholars (mostly sociologists, historians, and social anthropologists) have been more skeptical about the supposed clash between right-wing, nationalist populism, and neoliberalism. In a path-breaking piece of research on Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, Kurt Weyland has shown that populism and neoliberalism can cohabit comfortably (Weyland 1999). In another crucial paper, Adam Harmes has distinguished between internationalism and neoliberalism (Harmes 2012). While internationalists embrace all forms of global political cooperation, neoliberals oppose forms of political globalization that would entail a new set of international institutions curtailing capital accumulation. Thus, as Harmes concludes, neoliberalism can depend on nationalist policies if they enhance capital accumulation. Right-wing populism has emerged within neoliberalism in Germany and Austria, not in opposition to it (Slobodian 2018). Several key supporters of Brexit have also argued for a return to the British state not to challenge neoliberalism but to shield it from European regulation and embark on a new export-oriented neoliberal trajectory (Wood and Ausserladscheider 2020). According to this emerging consensus amongst neoliberalism scholars, in many cases, right-wing populism is not a wholesale rejection of neoliberalism but only a variety of it. This new version remains within the neoliberal framework, amounting to a “mutation of neoliberalism” (Callison and Manfredi 2020). In contrast to the conventional approach to populism, this emerging neoliberalism literature also implies that some businesses support right-wing populists (Slobodian 2021). Thus, the two views, two academic discourses separated by disciplinary walls, could be hardly more different. In my recent article published in Socio-Economic Review (Scheiring 2022), I enter this debate by presenting a framework to analyze the national populist mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies. Following theory-testing process tracing, I substantiate this theoretical framework through a detailed mixed-method study of the strategic test case of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Utilizing new empirical material on businesses and policymakers, I show how the polarization of the business class rooted in global dependency structures, in interaction with a rising group of nationalist technocrats, has contributed to the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism. National-populist neoliberalism entails a new power bloc and a new compromise between national and transnational capital. It has preserved the core tenets of neoliberalism while modifying some of its peripheral elements and cutting back on avant-garde excesses to ensure the political viability of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism meets national-populism Neoliberalism has three faces: an intellectual-professional project, a repertoire of policies, and a form of politics (Mudge 2008). As a form of politics, neoliberalism is against the types of capitalism that put temporary shackles on capital accumulation in the name of popular pressures or national development goals. In response to these models, neoliberalism does not dismantle the state but builds new state institutions to improve accumulation conditions. Market-fundamentalism should not be confused with the “proto-neoliberalism” of Hayek, who was critical of laissez-faire and saw much room for an interventionist state. Market-fundamentalism also differs from the “rollout” phase of neoliberalism in the 1990s and 2000s, a period when neoliberalism relied on active state-building and regulatory reform to constitute markets and protect them from democratic intervention (Peck and Tickell 2002). Close to neoliberalism as a form of politics, I regard neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy. As suggested by Bob Jessop, “an ‘accumulation strategy’ defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ complete with its various extra-economic preconditions” (Jessop 1991). Such accumulation strategies represent temporarily stable formations of the capitalist circuit, where various factions of the business class are conjoined, usually under the leadership of a dominant faction. In core capitalist countries, the Keynesian social-democratic configuration was the accumulation strategy of the post-war era. At the same time, import-substitution developmentalism—including state socialism—was the accumulation strategy in semi-peripheral countries. Neoliberalism emerged as the alternative to these strategies. Following Aldo Madariaga (2020) and Cornel Ban (2016), I differentiate the core tenets of neoliberalism from its peripheral aspects. Peripheral institutions can change without jeopardizing core institutions. This distinction is crucial for “neoliberal resilience,” a process whereby neoliberalism dynamically adapts to external shocks to ensure its survival. The resilience of neoliberalism depends on the ability of dominant social groups to “defend those aspects of a neoliberal policy regime that—in their view—better serve their interests while allowing degrees of freedom in those aspects that they view as less relevant” (Amable and Palombarini 2009). According to Cornel Ban, at the core of neoliberalism are institutions designed to serve three primary goals: 1) credibility with financial markets, 2) trade and financial openness, and 3) competitiveness (Ban 2016). Neoliberalism is constantly evolving, negotiated by local actors filtered through domestic power struggles and ideologies, relying on different instruments to secure popular legitimacy, leading to different hybrids. However, as long as politics adheres to these core institutions, the accumulation strategy remains neoliberal. In the real world, neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy and as a form of politics never presents itself as a pure ideology, or a set of internally coherent policies. It is embedded in social relations. Neoliberalism must ensure its political survival by forging coalitions that carry neoliberalism through the forest of governance. Neoliberalism must meet the needs of these social coalitions. Furthermore, in democratic societies, neoliberalism must secure an electoral majority to survive. Reagan and Thatcher relied on moral panics and a revival of traditional values to legitimate neoliberalism. Blair and Clinton fetishized globalism, and the spread of liberal democracy, while shifting some resources back to redistribution and human capital development to smooth the tensions inherent to neoliberalism. Some of these political instruments are at odds with economic textbook definitions of pure neoliberalism. Nevertheless, all these versions of neoliberalism remained committed to ensuring credibility with financial markets, trade and financial openness, and international competitiveness. The political instruments used to build social coalitions and to secure an electoral majority did not lead to a fundamental change in the accumulation strategy; there was no reversal back to Keynesian social democracy or a shift to a new alternative economic model. Combining Weyland’s notion of “neoliberal populism” and Harmes’s notion of “neoliberal nationalism,” I regard national-populism as a “legitimation strategy” that can contribute to the political sustainability of neoliberalism. Populism as a legitimation strategy appeals to a mass public using a Manichean logic that opposes the virtuous people to corrupt elites and affiliated out-groups (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). National-populist neoliberalism is thus a compromise between the core of neoliberalism and the political imperatives of advancing national interests, relying on populism as a legitimation strategy. National-populist neoliberalism emerged as an alternative to globalist neoliberalism. Globalist neoliberalism corresponds to what Nancy Fraser called ‘progressive neoliberalism’ (Fraser 2017) in core countries and what Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits labeled ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (Bohle and Greskovits 2012) in the foreign-investment-dependent economies of Central Europe. Globalist neoliberalism differs from the radical neoliberalism exemplified by Chile or the Baltic states in dependent semi-peripheral countries (Madariaga 2020) or the early “roll back” phase of neoliberalism in core countries, which relied on an authoritarian-conservative populist legitimation strategy opposed to later progressive globalism (Hall 1985) The mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies In semi-peripheral, dependent economies, such as Hungary, or most countries in Latin America and Europe’s eastern periphery, the business class is polarized based on access to international markets and technology. Compared to transnational capitalists, national capitalists have less access to the most successful sectors of the global economy. Therefore, the national bourgeoisie of peripheral states is structurally prone to rely directly on its political connections to compete with transnational companies. However, transnational capital must also compromise with domestic political and economic elites to secure the conditions of accumulation. Economic crises act as historical contingencies that throw the class compromise between the segments of the power bloc into question, thus jeopardizing the hegemony of neoliberalism. In these situations, elites need to reach a new consensus and reconstitute the power bloc. The balance of power determines whether the response to these crises leads to a new accumulation strategy or a modification of peripheral aspects of the prevailing accumulation strategy. If the national capitalist class is strong enough to mobilize but weak to dominate transnational capital, and if populists can mobilize disillusionment with neoliberalism, then the resolution of the crisis of the neoliberal accumulation strategy will be the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism. In Hungary specifically, globalist neoliberalism was an accumulation strategy maintained by the class compromise of transnational corporations (TNCs), technocrats, and politicians. It institutionalized industrial policy based on economic openness and a strict preference for transnational capital. Taxation became increasingly less progressive, with a race to the bottom on corporate tax. Globalist neoliberalism also relied on redistribution to pacify the victims of neoliberalism, which led to a combination of austerity to maintain fiscal balance and recurring deficits and cycles of indebtedness. Discursively, globalist neoliberalism offered economic modernization, a cosmopolitan ideology of human rights, democratization, and European integration as a source of mass legitimation. It also attempted to depoliticize economic questions to prevent the political mobilization of economic anger. The exhaustion of this globalist neoliberal accumulation strategy in the 2000s led to the polarization of the business class and the growing influence of nationalist technocrats. Facilitated by national-populist politicians, national capitalists reached a new compromise with transnational capital, retaining the core aspects of neoliberalism. Figure 1 presents a summary of this process.