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Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan 23 {Jason Hickel is professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) and the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is the author of The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions (Penguin, 2017) and Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World (Penguin, 2020). ICTA-UAB is supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). Dylan Sullivan is adjunct fellow and PhD student in the School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, where he teaches in politics, sociology, and anthropology. His research focuses on global inequality, colonial history, and the economics of socialist planning., } - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023, https://monthlyreview.org/2023/07/01/capitalism-global-poverty-and-the-case-for-democratic-socialism/)//penelope/ Successful Development Requires Public Planning

The existing arrangement of the world economy cannot deliver mean- ingful development in the Global South. As we have seen, imperialist dy- namics and the profit-orientation of national capital and foreign invest- ment militate against this possibility. The anticolonial movements of the mid-twentieth century understood this fact. They knew that achieving development would require directly mobilizing production to increase the output of key products, develop necessary technologies, and deliver essential goods and services.

Most of these movements were inspired by socialist principles, to varying degrees, which they saw as necessary for economic sovereignty and social progress. Many were influenced by the achievements of the Russian Revolution.28 Prior to 1917, Russia had been a low-wage agrar- ian hinterland exporting cheap raw materials (grain, hemp, flax, etc.) to western Europe.29 In 1899, the Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte noted that “The economic relations of Russia with western Europe are fully comparable to the relations of colonial countries with their me- tropolises.”30 The communist revolution, and the transition to planning

in 1928, transformed this arrangement.31 By setting output targets for machinery, factories, and other producer goods, the USSR was able to increase production in sectors that are usually neglected under condi- tions of peripheral capitalism. Soviet industrial output expanded rapidly over the next thirteen years: material output of pig iron increased by 352 percent; electric power by 857 percent; the number of machine tools by 1,997 percent; and the number of motor vehicles by 28,457 percent.32 By the 1950s—within a single generation—the USSR had become a modern industrial economy, and the first country to achieve several major land- marks in aerospace engineering—including putting the first person into space and establishing the first space station.

Several countries in the Global South incorporated similar planning strategies in the mid-twentieth century. Others took a more mixed “de- velopmentalist” approach, relying on industrial policy within a market economy. Most used tariffs and subsidies to support national industry, plus land reform, nationalization, capital controls, and public finance to mobilize investment for neglected sectors and public services. This ap- proach succeeded in delivering rapid development and improvements in social outcomes during the 1950s through the ’70s, overcoming centuries of stagnation or decline. The evidence we reviewed in World Development demonstrates this progress in cases across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and China.

The success of these strategies should not come as a surprise. After all, even under capitalism, the core economies have always relied upon public planning to facilitate technological development. During the so- called first industrial revolution (circa 1750 to circa 1840), England was one of the most strongly interventionist states in the world, using highly protectionist tariffs, high tax rates, and public deficit spending to build and direct industrial capacity.33 Germany, Japan, and the United States used similar interventionist policies to “catch up” with England from the 1850s on.34 More recently, we know that public investment has been re- sponsible for many of the major innovations of the IT revolution, includ- ing the internet, GPS, touch screens, cellular technology, lithium-ion bat- teries, micro hard drives, liquid-crystal display, and Siri, among others.35

For the communist countries in the periphery, the goal was not only to mobilize resources for industrialization, but to organize production around public services and human needs in ways that were neglected or even im- possible under capitalism. Empirical studies demonstrate that they achieved better social outcomes than their capitalist counterparts at any given level of national production, including higher life expectancy, better education attainment, and lower child mortality.36 They also delivered strong progress against extreme poverty: by the 1980s, the prevalence of basic-needs poverty was near zero in both China and Russia.37 As the economist Amartya Sen remarked in his 1981 study of health and literacy achievements around the world: “One thought that is bound to occur is that communism is good for poverty removal.”38 Sen took particular note of the dramatic mortality dif- ferences between China and India, arguing that India suffered more than thirty-one million excess deaths every eight years compared to the mortality rate in China—deaths that could have been prevented with simple policies to ensure universal access to food and health care.39

But of course this approach—and the era of economic sovereignty in the periphery—did not last long. Socialist and state-led development pol- icy constrained Northern access to cheap labor and resources, so the core states intervened, in some cases by deposing progressive and nationalist governments through coups (in the Democratic Republic of Congo, In- donesia, Brazil, Ghana, Chile, and so on), in others by imposing struc- tural adjustment programs that reversed the policies of the anticolonial movements (abolishing protective tariffs and subsidies, cutting public production and public services, and privatizing national assets).40 Data presented in our World Development paper indicates that these neocolonial interventions reversed the progress made during the developmentalist period, with real wages in many cases declining to below the level of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. Structural adjustment in China and Russia in the early 1990s caused a dramatic increase in basic-needs pover- ty, which shot from near zero to 68 percent and 24 percent, respectively.41

There were exceptions, of course. The United States and its allies al- lowed and indeed actively supported Taiwan and South Korea to continue using state-led development policy, building them up as a cordon sanitaire around revolutionary China. China, despite the basic-needs deprivation induced by structural adjustment, has managed to continue investing in public objectives with considerable success.42 Cuba avoided structural ad- justment altogether, maintained a socialist economy, and today outper- forms most of the periphery in terms of welfare ratios, life expectancy, infant mortality, and nutrition.43 Cuba’s government has also fostered a thriving public biotech industry, which has developed cutting-edge med- ical innovations including drugs for diabetic foot ulcers and at least two vaccines against COVID-19, despite being subject to an illegal U.S.-imposed blockade that prevents the import of medical technologies.44

This history illuminates possibilities for escaping underdevelopment within the imperialist world economy. But it also comes with warnings. Developmentalism without socialist policy may fail to address basic prob- lems of inequality and precarity, as the South Korea case makes clear.

Continued capital accumulation may create pressures for cheapening labour, including through subimperialist appropriation, which works against the goals of human development. This approach cannot deliver economic democracy and well-being for all. Top-down planning, as in the Soviet Union and China in the Mao Zedong period, may allow managers to pursue policies that run against the interests of the population—for instance, the agricultural policies that caused the Soviet famine of 1932– 33.45 This is at odds with the socialist goals of workers’ self-management and democratic control over production.46 To overcome these problems, we need a socialist strategy in the twenty-first century that is radically democratic, extending democracy to production itself.47

2NC AT: Perm - Imperial extraction link: welfare state concessions like the plan necessitate imperial extraction. Historically, revolutionary movements have posed a real threat to the capitalist core; the reason they have not succeeded is because of the ability to make limited reformist concessions to working-class demands in the core while employing a spatial fix by sourcing cheap labor and resources from the periphery.

Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan 23 {Jason Hickel is professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) and the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is the author of The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions (Penguin, 2017) and Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World (Penguin, 2020). ICTA-UAB is supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). Dylan Sullivan is adjunct fellow and PhD student in the School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, where he teaches in politics, sociology, and anthropology. His research focuses on global inequality, colonial history, and the economics of socialist planning., } - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023,

Within Capitalism, Progress in the North Has Depended on Imperialism

The historical record demonstrates that dramatic progress on welfare indicators occurred in the core economies after 1880, with the rise of the labor movement, social democratic parties, and movements that secured suffrage for working men and, later, for women. These gains accelerat- ed in the early/mid-twentieth century, delivering extremely high welfare ratios. It is crucial to understand that the gains during this latter period were due not only to progressive movements within the core, but also to socialist movements in the periphery, which were (especially in the case of the USSR) demonstrating that socialist and communist alternatives were possible. The rise of socialism in the East inspired socialist movements in the West (most famously in Germany, which came to the brink of a socialist revolution during the Spartacist and Ruhr uprisings of 1919–20). These revolutionary movements posed a real threat to capitalism in the core. Capitalism survived in part by crushing these movements—quite of- ten violently, but also by making concessions to working-class demands, including wage improvements and some public services, although never conceding to the core demands for decommodification and economic de- mocracy. Thus, the rise of the social democratic welfare state.

Capital accumulation requires cheap labor, however, and these conces- sions would have brought capitalism in the core to its knees were it not for the fact that capitalists were able to obtain cheap labor instead in the periphery, through colonial and neocolonial forms of appropriation, which continue to this day.10 The unique privilege of imperialism allowed capital in the core to maintain accumulation despite concessions to its working classes—a privilege that is not available to most states in the periphery.11 This is what explains the extreme disparity that persists be- tween social indicators in the capitalist core (where the average welfare ratio of an unskilled laborer is 10–20) versus those in the capitalist periph- ery, where the average welfare ratio is less than 2, and where in many cases wages and/or heights have not recovered from the immiseration caused during the period of capitalist integration.12 To understand the relationship between capitalism and human welfare today, we must look at living conditions in the capitalist periphery.

Of course, the core could have taken a different direction. It could have accepted the demands of workers and anti-imperialist movements, abandoned the imperatives of capital accumulation, and transitioned to a postcapitalist system—thus achieving social progress without imperial- ism. Social progress does not require imperialism. Capitalism does.

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