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2NC AT: "degrowth bad bc tech is good" - Our arg is not "tech bad"

Jason Hickel 23 {Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy} - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023, https://monthlyreview.org/2023/07/01/on-technology-and-degrowth/)//penelope/

Degrowth does not call for all forms of production to be reduced. Rather, it calls for reducing ecologically destructive and socially less necessary forms of production, like sport utility vehicles, private jets, mansions, fast fash- ion, arms, industrial beef, cruises, commercial air travel, etc., while cutting advertising, extending product lifespans (banning planned obsolescence and introducing mandatory long-term warranties and rights to repair), and dramatically reducing the purchasing power of the rich. In other words, it targets forms of production that are organized mostly around capital accu- mulation and elite consumption. In the middle of an ecological emergency, should we be producing sport utility vehicles and mansions? Should we be diverting energy to support the obscene consumption and accumulation of the ruling class? No. That is an irrationality that only capitalism can love.

At the same time, degrowth scholarship insists on strong social policy to secure human needs and well-being, with universal public services, living wages, a public job guarantee, working time reduction, economic democracy, and radically reduced inequality.8 These measures abolish un- employment and economic insecurity and ensure the material conditions for a universal decent living—again, basic socialist principles. This schol- arship calls for efficiency improvements, yes, but also a transition toward sufficiency, equity, and a democratic postcapitalist economy, where pro- duction is organized around well-being for all, as Peter Kropotkin famous- ly put it, rather than around capital accumulation.

The virtue of this approach should be immediately clear to socialists. So- cialism insists on grounding its analysis in the material reality of the world economy. It insists on science and justice. Yes, socialism embraces technolo- gy—and credibly promises to manage technology better than capitalism— but socialist visions of technology should be empirically grounded, eco- logically coherent, and socially just. They should emphatically not rely on speculation or magical thinking, much less the perpetuation of colonial inequalities. Green growth visions fall foul of these core socialist values.

We can see the double movement of efficiency plus sufficiency clear- ly in the published postgrowth and degrowth macro-economic scenarios. The Eurogreen degrowth model, for example, starts with a baseline busi- ness-as-usual scenario, and then first adds efficiency measures (including things like carbon pricing, efficiency improvements, innovation, electrifi- cation, renewable energy transition, and so on), and then on top of this adds transformative economic and social policies (reduction in less necessary production, shorter working week, a job guarantee, wealth taxes, etc.), to deliver the results.9 This same two-part approach is taken by the LowGrow model.10 In fact, this is true even of the original MIT World3 “stabilization scenario” from the 1970s: it first deploys the measures from the “compre- hensive technology” scenario and then adds output stabilization on top.

We can see the same principles in a recent study on transport-sector decar- bonization in high-income countries published in Nature. The authors write: “We conclude that, as well as implementation of emission-reducing changes in vehicle design, a rapid and large-scale reduction in car use is necessary to

meet stringent carbon budgets and avoid high energy demand.”11 In other words, yes we need to transition to electric vehicles—but we also need to scale down the automobile industry at the same time, while improving and expanding public transit options to ensure mobility for all. Efficiency, yes. Technological innovation, yes. But sufficiency and equity too.

This approach is also taken in the recent “decent living energy” mod- el scenarios, which have become a touchstone in degrowth research.12 These scenarios assume strong efficiency improvements and advanced technology, while also organizing production around sufficiency and hu- man needs, and dramatically reducing inequality.13 The results indicate that if we take this two-part approach (technological innovation and suffi- ciency), it would be possible to ensure decent living standards for a global population of ten billion people—more than the projected midcentury peak—while reducing energy use and decarbonizing fast enough to lim- it temperature rise to less than 1.5°C by the end of the century. A brief note: all of these models have their weaknesses, and researchers are de- veloping a new generation to account for a more comprehensive range of degrowth policies, including strategies of decolonization and radical North-South convergence in the world economy.14

So, the public debate about degrowth founders on a false dichotomy. The real conflict is not between technology and anti-technology. It is about how technology is imagined and the conditions under which it is deployed. Degrowth research makes a strong claim to having a more scientific (and more just) approach to technological visions.

Even if they are right, it CANNOT happen fast enough – green growth is only attempting to reduce our catastrophic damage on the planet, claims that tech can undo harms are unsubstantiated – we are simply not there yet and we will not be in time Allwood 18 (Julian, Professor of Engineering and the Environment at University of Cambridge, “Unrealistic techno-optimism is holding back progress on resource efficiency,” 23 November 2018, Nature Materials Volume 17, )//penelope/

To the Editor — The recent rate of growth in publications on resource efficiency1–4 seems to be matched only by the rate at which our use of materials keeps growing: political interest in discussing the topic is not translating to meaningful action. Yet resource efficiency matters. It does not matter because we are running out of key resources — critical minerals become ‘critical’ due to a short-term misalignment of supply and demand that can be resolved following investment or political realignment. But it does matter because of climate change. Already, most industrial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which contribute a third of the world’s non-agricultural emissions, arise in the extraction and production of bulk materials5 . However, as our response to resource shortages is to use more energy — whether in desalinating and moving water, processing lower grade ores or in more intensive agriculture — and as, on a global scale, most energy comes from fossil fuels, this response acts to accelerate climate change.

Figure 1 illustrates the flow of resources from mine to use and its consequences for industrial energy and emissions. Political and corporate rhetoric about delivering resource efficiency is primarily focused on the four comfortable options in the upper half of the figure that apparently allow economic growth to continue unhindered by the environmental inconvenience of climate change. However, these techno-optimistic options cannot deliver rapidly enough and at sufficient scale to provide the levels of mitigation agreed by national laws and international declarations.

Reviewing the four options in turn, we currently produce ~1,500 Mt yr–1 of steel and ~4,200 Mt yr–1 of cement and there are no plausible substitutes available at this scale (option 1). Global competition for biomass excludes the replacement of steel with timber and stone does not deliver the advantages of concrete. Substituting gas for coal (option 2) reduces electricity emissions by 50% but renewable generation scales badly as it must be deployed over massive areas6 . Furthermore, deployment rates for renewables are constrained by legal, contracting and infrastructural issues. For example, the maximum rate at which new renewable generation has been added to the UK grid (expansion of wind and solar power from 2003–2016) is 0.5 GW yr–1 against a total UK power requirement (across all energy sources) of around 260 GW (ref. 7 ). Carbon capture and storage or utilization (option 3) has long been hailed as the technology to allow continued use of fossil fuels without emissions, yet total global capacity (meaning the potential for storage, not actual storage) is currently 37 MtCO2e yr–1 (ref. 8) against total anthropogenic emissions of ~50,000 MtCO2e yr–1. Finally, recycling end-of-life materials in a ‘circular economy’ (option 4) receives powerful marketing attention. However, as shown in Table 1, only a few materials can be recycled. Doing so remains energy intensive and currently leads to downgrading of material quality.

The dream that new technologies will eliminate the harms of climate change is infinitely seductive, and conforms with existing political, economic, commercial and innovation models, but the dream cannot be realized. Technical development in these areas may in future allow demand to expand within environmentally acceptable limits. However, we cannot constrain the total atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases to what are predicted to be safe levels9 by deploying new technologies because they cannot have a large enough effect rapidly enough.

The implementation of resource efficiency must therefore be about the efficient use of material resources and not their manner of production. The lower half of Fig. 1 illustrates that today’s demand for services from our stock of resource-intensive capital goods could, in reality, be delivered with a greatly reduced annual production of new materials without requiring significant technical innovation.

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