CCS insufficient, and doing it within a paradigm of capitalism guarantees the bad version of it, AND independently it actively defers other vital actions
Wim Carton 19 {Associate Senior Lecturer at the Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies. Carton’s research areas include political ecology, climate change mitigation, carbon forestry, carbon sequestration, perennial agriculture, carbon dioxide removal, negative emissions, political economy, socio-ecological theory, environmental geography, and environmental justice} - ("“Fixing” Climate Change by Mortgaging the Future: Negative Emissions, Spatiotemporal Fixes, and the Political Economy of Delay," Wiley Online Library, published 3-22-2019, accessed 7-19-2023, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12532)//penelope/
This essentially means that vast amounts of fossil fuel assets risk becoming stranded on the road to climate change mitigation (Surprise 2018). This would entail a fixed capital devaluation of epic proportions and can rightly be seen as the capitalist crisis that commentators have described it as. But note that this crisis for capital does not follow directly from the biophysical conditions associated with a changing climate. It is a crisis that first and foremost exists in socially mediated form, meaning that the direct “threat” comes from increasing social demands for mitigation and the political drive towards regulation rather than from increasing temperatures or rising sea levels. This is directly reflected in the way fossil fuel companies articulate the problem. Shell, for example, one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, in its 2017 annual report for the first time acknowledged that climate change poses a risk to its operations (Shell 2018a).Yet it nowhere mentions actual climate change as a problem; rather, it is “rising climate change concerns” that are the issue, because they “have led and could lead to additional legal and/or regulatory measures which could result in project delays or cancellations, a decrease in demand for fossil fuels, potential litigation and additional compliance obligations” (Shell 2018a:13).
As I discussed above, it is well worth taking seriously this distinction between the social articulation of climate change and its biophysical basis, given how it speaks directly to the different fixes that are, and can be pursued. Among others it suggests that one does not necessarily need to mitigate climate change at all in order to fix (i.e. displace and defer) the crisis of legitimacy that it produces. The negative emissions concept illustrates this. Negative emissions take the carbon budget concept to its inevitable conclusion, by accounting not just for carbon “expenditures” (i.e. emissions), but also a range of proposed carbon “incomes”. This idea takes its inspiration from a number of biological (e.g. photosynthesis) and chemical (e.g. weathering of rocks) processes that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, and imagines that these could be deployed at a massive scale in order to make a limited carbon budget stretch further. The aforementioned BECCS is one example of such negative emissions technology (NET), but there are many others, including afforestation, soil carbon sequestration, direct air capture, enhanced weathering of rocks, etc. Because of the scale at which these technologies would need to be implemented, and the fact that their commercial and technological viability is in many cases unknown, models assume that NETs will only be operational at scale in the second half of the century. Essentially, this means that the negative emissions concept acts as a debt mechanism: the carbon budget for the first half of the 21st century can be extended on the basis of the assumption that large amounts of carbon will be removed in the second half (Geden 2016, 2018; Parson 2017). As Geden (2018:381) puts it, integrated assessment modellers have in this way “adopted the standard approach pursued by most governments instead of disciplining them: run huge deficits, betting on payback by future generations”. The significant, negative social and environmental consequences that one could expect with the actual implementation of some NETs have already been alluded to in the introduction. The negative emissions concept—as modelled in IAMs— however has concrete implications already now (Beck and Mahony 2018). By enabling a pathway to the 2°C target in the face of a tight carbon budget, it helps preserve a sense of normality in climate policy, fostering the notion that current policy commitments are appropriate and sufficient, that ambitious climate targets are still within reach and that governments are putting in place adequate measures to achieve them (Anderson and Peters 2016; Beck and Mahony 2017; Geden 2016; Pielke 2018). As Larkin et al. (2018:692) note, “IAM outputs risk delivering overly optimistic, unrealistic and potentially flawed message about future change [in which] challenging, but incremental energy policy is sufficient to deliver on the Paris Agreement”. The negative emissions concept in this way helps in “masking political inaction” (Geden 2016:794) and serves to legitimize mainstream climate policy in the face of 30 years of institutionalised delay. It does this without any NETs actually being implemented, indeed, irrespective of whether they will ever be implemented at all, but merely on the basis of its promised future arrival by climate models (Geden 2016; see also Markusson et al. 2017). Despite their so-far immaterial form, negative emissions help to pre-empt a crisis of political legitimacy by seemingly answering calls for ambitious climate action, all the while deferring the most difficult questions to the future.