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No, cap does not “solve poverty” – that is just what you are trained to believe – means reject such damaging ideological misconceptions and vote neg

Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan 23 {Jason Hickel is professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) and the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is the author of The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions (Penguin, 2017) and Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World (Penguin, 2020). ICTA-UAB is supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). Dylan Sullivan is adjunct fellow and PhD student in the School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, where he teaches in politics, sociology, and anthropology. His research focuses on global inequality, colonial history, and the economics of socialist planning., } - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023, https://monthlyreview.org/2023/07/01/capitalism-global-poverty-and-the-case-for-democratic-socialism/)//penelope/ Progress Today Should Be Measured Against Decent Living Standards

Noting that extreme poverty was not the normal condition of human- ity prior to the rise of capitalism is not to say that life was great at that time. Clearly nobody then had access to the higher welfare standards that are available today. This is where industrialization and technologi- cal development become so important. Industrialization has brought the capacity to produce new goods that did not exist in the past: electricity, modern health care, public transit, clean cooking fuel, higher education, communication technology, household durables, and so on, which make it possible to achieve high life expectancies and decent lives for all. By these standards, obviously most everyone was poor prior to industrializa- tion, as these goods did not exist or were very rare.

We have already established that extreme poverty is not a legitimate benchmark against which to measure progress at any time. But it certainly should not be used as a threshold for human welfare today. The higher-or- der goods that exist today are essential to decent living and should be available to everyone. As a share of global productive capacity, this does not require much (as with basic goods like food and shelter in the pre-in- dustrial period). Yet the scale of decent-living poverty is astonishing: 2.4 billion people lack food security; 3.2 billion cannot afford a healthy diet; 3.2 billion do not have a clean cooking stove; 3.6 billion do not have safely managed sanitation facilities; 3.8 to 5 billion people do not have access to essential health services.13

This is not because there is a deficit of productive capacity (on the con- trary, these goods could be provided for everyone on the planet quite eas- ily), but because production remains overwhelmingly organized around capital accumulation and profit maximization rather than around hu- man needs and well-being. Even the core economies have decent-living deprivation, despite high levels of production, with millions unable to access decent housing, health care, and nutrition. While progressive so- cial movements have won a great deal over the past century, in terms of securing fair wages, public services, and economic rights, the struggle must continue to deliver a truly just economy.

The massive prevalence of decent-living deprivation in the twenty-first century underscores an important fact: industrialization does not guar- antee that the living standards of ordinary people will improve. As al- ways, the key questions are: How is industrial capacity used? Is it used to secure decent lives for all, or to service capital accumulation? How is the division of labor organized? Are all regions given an equal role in industrial production, or are some regions made to play the role of sub- servient suppliers in global commodity chains? How are workers treated? Do they have control over the means of production, and secure access to essential goods and services? All of this depends on the political system, the provisioning system, and the balance of class power. Industrialization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving decent lives for all. Human development depends on the strength of progressive social movements that push to organize production around human needs rath- er than elite accumulation.

independently link-turns any Aff offense about why development is good--e.g. "world getting better," "inequality bad," "decarbonization good," "tech innovation good," and so on--because imperial extractivism forecloses development in the Global South. At the same time, it necessitates and sanctions hyper-exploitation and massive violence--such as forced tunneling at gunpoint by U.S.-backed militias so that Microsoft has cheap minerals for their next battery.

Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan 23 {Jason Hickel is professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) and the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is the author of The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions (Penguin, 2017) and Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World (Penguin, 2020). ICTA-UAB is supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). Dylan Sullivan is adjunct fellow and PhD student in the School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, where he teaches in politics, sociology, and anthropology. His research focuses on global inequality, colonial history, and the economics of socialist planning., } - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023,

In the global South, Capitalism Constrains Technological Development

This raises the question: if industrial production is necessary to meet decent-living standards today, then perhaps capitalism—notwithstand- ing its negative impact on social indicators over the past five hundred years—is necessary to develop the industrial capacity to meet these high- er-order goals. This has been the dominant assumption in development economics for the past half century. But it does not withstand empirical scrutiny. For the majority of the world, capitalism has historically con- strained, rather than enabled, technological development—and this dy- namic remains a major problem today.

It has long been recognized by liberals and Marxists alike that the rise of capitalism in the core economies was associated with rapid industrial expansion, on a scale with no precedent under feudalism or other precap- italist class structures.14 What is less widely understood is that this very same system produced the opposite effect in the periphery and semi-pe- riphery. Indeed, the forced integration of peripheral regions into the capi- talist world-system during the period circa 1492 to 1914 was characterized by widespread deindustrialization and agrarianization, with countries compelled to specialize in agricultural and other primary commodities, often under “pre-modern” and ostensibly “feudal” conditions.

In Eastern Europe, for instance, the number of people living in cities declined by almost one-third during the seventeenth century, as the re- gion became an agrarian serf-economy exporting cheap grain and timber to Western Europe.15 At the same time, Spanish and Portuguese coloniz- ers were transforming the American continents into suppliers of precious metals and agricultural goods, with urban manufacturing suppressed by the state.16 When the capitalist world-system expanded into Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, imports of British cloth and steel destroyed Indigenous textile production and iron smelting, while Africans were instead made to specialize in palm oil, peanuts, and other cheap cash crops produced with enslaved labor.17 India—once the great manufacturing hub of the world—suffered a similar fate after coloni- zation by Britain in 1757.18 By 1840, British colonizers boasted that they had “succeeded in converting India from a manufacturing country into a country exporting raw produce.”19 Much the same story unfolded in

China after it was forced to open its domestic economy to capitalist trade during the British invasion of 1839–42. According to historians, the influx of European textiles, soap, and other manufactured goods “destroyed ru- ral handicraft industries in the villages, causing unemployment and hard- ship for the Chinese peasantry.”20

The great deindustrialization of the periphery was achieved in part through policy interventions by the core states, such as through the im- position of colonial prohibitions on manufacturing and through “unequal treaties,” which were intended to destroy industrial competition from Southern producers, establish captive markets for Western industrial out- put, and position Southern economies as providers of cheap labor and re- sources. But these dynamics were also reinforced by structural features of profit-oriented markets. Capitalists only employ new technologies to the extent that it is profitable for them to do so. This can present an obstacle to economic development if there is little demand for domestic industrial production (due to low incomes, foreign competition, etc.), or if the costs of innovation are high.

Capitalists in the Global North overcame these problems because the state intervened extensively in the economy by setting high tariffs, provid- ing public subsidies, assuming the costs of research and development, and ensuring adequate consumer demand through government spending.21 But in the Global South, where state support for industry was foreclosed by centuries of formal and informal colonialism, it has been more prof- itable for capitalists to export cheap agricultural goods than to invest in high-technology manufacturing.22 The profitability of new technologies also depends on the cost of labor. In the North, where wages are com- paratively high, capitalists have historically found it profitable to employ labor-saving technologies.23 But in the peripheral economies, where wages have been heavily compressed, it has often been cheaper to use labor-in- tensive production techniques than to pay for expensive machinery.24

Of course, the global division of labor has changed since the late nine- teenth century. Many of the leading industries of that time, including textiles, steel, and assembly line processes, have now been outsourced to low-wage peripheral economies like India and China, while the core states have moved to innovation activities, high-technology aerospace and biotech engineering, information technology, and capital-intensive agriculture.25 Yet still the basic problem remains. Under neoliberal global- ization (structural adjustment programs and WTO rules), governments in the periphery are generally precluded from using tariffs, subsidies, and other forms of industrial policy to achieve meaningful development and economic sovereignty, while labor market deregulation and global labor arbitrage have kept wages extremely low. In this context, the drive to maximize profit leads Southern capitalists and foreign investors to pour resources into relatively low-technology export sectors, at the expense of more modern lines of industry.

Moreover, for those parts of the periphery that occupy the lowest rungs in global commodity chains, production continues to be organized along so-called pre-modern lines, even under the new division of labor. In the Congo, for instance, workers are sent into dangerous mineshafts with- out any modern safety equipment, tunneling deep into the ground with nothing but shovels, often coerced at gunpoint by U.S.-backed militias, so that Microsoft and Apple can secure cheap coltan for their electronics devices.26 Pre-modern production processes predicated on the “technol- ogy” of labor coercion are also found in the cocoa plantations of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, where enslaved children labor in brutal conditions for corporations like Cadbury, or Colombia’s banana export sector, where a hyper-exploited peasantry is kept in line by a regime of rural terror and extrajudicial killings overseen by private death squads.27

Uneven global development, including the endurance of ostensibly “feudal” relations of production, is not inevitable. It is an effect of capital- ist dynamics. Capitalists in the periphery find it more profitable to employ cheap labor subject to conditions of slavery or other forms of coercion than they do to invest in modern industry.

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