No global follow-on—solve inequality first
Roberts and Parks 6 [Timmons Roberts is Ittleson Professor of Environmental Studies and Sociology at Brown University and the Executive Director of the Climate Social Science Network. He has taught in and directed environmental science and policy programs at Brown, the College of William and Mary, and Tulane University. Timmons was a James Martin 21st Century Professor at Oxford University's Environmental Change Institute in 2006-2007 and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution from 2012-2020. He completed his B.A. in Biology from Kenyon College and his Ph.D. at The Johns Hopkins University in the Sociology Department's Program in Comparative International Development, Dr. Brad Parks is Executive Director of AidData (http://aiddata.org/) and Research Faculty at the College of William and Mary’s Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations. His research on the allocation and impact of international development finance has been published in Science, World Development, the Journal of Development Studies, Global Environmental Politics, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and China Economic Quarterly. His book publications include Greening Aid? Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance (Oxford University Press, 2008) and A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy (MIT Press, 2006). From 2005-2010, Brad was part of the initial team that set up the U.S. Government's Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Brad holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and an M.Sc. in Development Management from the London School of Economics and Political Science. A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy. United Kingdom: MIT Press, 2006.] EAY
In this chapter, we introduce a new causal narrative about the role of global inequality in international environmental politics. We postulate that global inequality makes it more difficult for rich and poor nations to identify socially shared understandings of ‘‘fair’’ solutions, and even when rich and poor countries can agree on general fairness principles, the preference heterogeneity generated by global inequality aggravates disagreements about how to make those principles operational. Global inequality also contributes to conditions of generalized mistrust and weak reciprocity, which in turn makes developing countries—countries that possess strong preferences for ‘‘cheap’’ economic development and weak preferences for stringent environmental policies—more inclined to take self-damaging actions for their emotional satisfaction (e.g., spite or retribution). Southern nations’ suspicion of Northern behavior and their inability to constrain Northern opportunism also promotes risk-averse behavior and defensive negotiating strategies. While we are only beginning to unravel a complex causal web, we believe these factors have particularly negative effects on global efforts to preserve the planet’s environment. Some of the causal linkages described in this chapter have been explored elsewhere. However, to our knowledge no one has yet attempted to pull these disparate arguments together into an integrated, multistep model. Rationalist authors, for example, have hypothesized that ethical norms and principles reduce the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing an international agreement (see Phase V of figure 2.1) by providing tacit or constructed ‘‘focal points’’ that prevent endless haggling, by cementing cooperative solutions that increase the willingness of domestic audiences to support agreements negotiated internationally, by weakening nations’ incentives to hide information and
*Figure 2.1 omitted*
Figure 2.1 A model of international noncooperation: Direct causal pathway (A–B) and indirect causal pathway (C–D–E–F–G). misrepresent behavior, and by reducing the risk-averse and self-damaging emotional behavior of would-be cooperators.7 Conversely, the absence of socially shared understandings of fairness and justice can reinforce zero-sum worldviews and causal beliefs, erode conditions of mutual trust, promote risk aversion, and foster retaliatory attitudes. However, the new institutional solutions that rationalists propose are often ‘‘institutional bandage[s] applied to a structural hemorrhage.’’8 That is, their case-by-case, problem-solving approach to global environmental problems rarely focuses on why highly asymmetric distributions arise in the first place and thus seldom addresses the root causes of North-South conflict. Inequality, in effect, is taken as given.9 Some rationalists, for example, have emphasized the proximate need to address divergent social understandings of fairness without explaining the social production and reproduction of highly asymmetric distributions; others have emphasized the importance of worldviews and causal beliefs without explaining the origin of those ideas.10 We take a different approach by measuring whether Southern worldviews and causal beliefs are based on observable empirical regularities. The extant literature suggests that material and ideational preferences exert an influence on a nation’s negotiating position; however, without understanding the origin of those preferences, it is hard to say how stable they are or under what conditions they might shift. For example, many climate policy analysts dismiss the claims of ‘‘environmental imperialism,’’ ‘‘ecological debt,’’ ‘‘ecologically unequal exchange,’’ and ‘‘climate injustice’’ made by developing country negotiators as empty and distracting rhetoric used as a negotiating tactic. But however irrational and uncooperative these claims may seem, we argue that these are real perceptions and these perceptions shape the way governments view their interests. And importantly, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that Southern worldviews and causal beliefs in some cases cannot be dismissed as false constructs or erroneous mental models used to justify poor performance. By almost any measure, for example, we can say with confidence that ecologically unequal exchange is not just a perception; it is a social reality (see chapter 5). Structuralist mental models—understandings of world events based primarily on perceptions of inequality in global economic and political matters—will therefore likely persist unless Western governments make efforts to reverse this inequality. Much of the quantitative work in this book focuses on causal linkage C in figure 2.1: the determinants of Southern worldviews and causal beliefs. Regression analysis is also used to test the significance and strength of causal explanations G1, G2, G3, and G4, but evaluating the strength of the model as an integrated whole requires mixing methods (case study research, process tracing, etc.). These methods are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and we utilize all of them in the following chapters. However, we acknowledge that there are both observable and unobservable processes and outcomes, and that the evidence in this book supports some causal mechanisms more than others.