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Economic predictions fail

Krugman 18 (Paul Krugman - an American economist who is the Distinguished Professor of Economics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and a columnist for The New York Times.[7] In 2008, Krugman was the winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to New Trade Theory and New Economic Geography.[8] The Prize Committee cited Krugman's work explaining the patterns of international trade and the geographic distribution of economic activity, by examining the effects of economies of scale and of consumer preferences for diverse goods and services., “Good enough for government work? Macroeconomics since the crisis”, pg 158-159) // AHK

First, was the failure of prediction a consequence of failures in the economic framework that can be fixed by adopting a radically different framework? It’s true that a significant wing of both macroeconomists and financial economists were in the thrall of the efficient markets hypothesis, believing that financial overreach simply cannot happen—or at any rate that it can only be discovered after the fact, because markets know what they are doing better than any observer. But many macroeconomists, especially in policy institutions, knew better than to trust markets to always get it right—especially those who had studied or been involved with the Asian crisis of the 1990s. Yet they (we) also missed some or all of the signs of overreach. Why? My answer may seem unsatisfying, but I believe it to be true: for the most part what happened was a demonstration of the old line that predictions are hard, especially about the future. It’s a complicated world out there, and one’s ability to track potential threats is limited. Almost nobody saw the Asian crisis coming, either. For that matter, how many people worried about political disruption of oil supplies before 1973? And so on. At any given time there tends to be a set of conventional indicators everyone looks at, determined less by fundamental theory than by recent events, and big, surprise crises almost by definition happen due to factors not on that list. If you like, it’s as if meteorologists with limited resources concentrated those resources in places that had helped track previous storms, leading to the occasional surprise when a storm comes from an unusual direction. A different question is whether, now that we know whence the 2008 crisis came, it points to a need for deep changes in macroeconomic thinking. As I’ve already noted, bank runs have been fairly well understood for a long time; we just failed to note the changing definition of banks. The bursting of the housing bubble, with its effects on residential investment and wealth, was conceptually just a negative shock to aggregate demand. The role of household leverage and forced deleveraging is a bigger break from conventional macroeconomics, even as done by saltwater economists who never bought into efficient markets and were aware of the risk of financial crises. That said, despite the impressive empirical work of Mian and Sufi (2011) and my own intellectual investment in the subject, I don’t think we can consider incorporating debt and leverage a fundamental new idea, as opposed to a refinement at the margin.

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