Companies are incentivized to go to low-regulatory areas to produce dirty, cheap goods.
Koester, 21 -- [Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels, "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] // David
Toward a Climate-Innovation-Friendly Global Trade Regime Free trade agreements, while effective in advancing IT innovation, will not necessarily accelerate climate innovation. The reason is the costs of GHGs to the global environment are not incorporated into market prices. More open international competition may well drive down prices by allowing dirty-but-cheap producers in one country to undercut clean-but-expensive innovators in another. To avert the worst consequences of climate change, a global trade regime must be created that is sufficiently open to drive innovation through as many trade channels set forth as possible, but also constrained so that traded sectors move in climate-friendly directions. Carbon pricing on a global scale is, on the surface, an appealing basis for such a regime. It seems relatively simple, particularly since a small number of traded sectors are responsible for the bulk of traded emissions. But appearances can be deceiving. The problem is that global carbon pricing, implemented through CBAMs around the world, would be devilishly difficult to negotiate and, even if it were implemented, would be unlikely to spur innovation at the scale and pace the global climate needs. CARBON PRICING, CARBON LEAKAGE, AND BORDER ADJUSTMENTS Carbon pricing is premised on the core economic principle that consumers prefer lower prices. An effective carbon price, whether imposed through a tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, raises the cost of carbon-intensive energy. Producers might respond by passing along the increase to consumers. But, knowing that consumers may cut back their purchases in response, producers have an incentive to find ways to cut their emissions and thereby minimize the cost increase. The incentive is even stronger when producers compete with one another.10 Innovation is the most important way they might do this. “Induced innovation,” which is spurred by the relative increase in the cost of one factor of production (in this case, carbon-intensive energy), is a well-established phenomenon.11 A recent review of the literature led by Michael Grubb concludes that “the case for carbon pricing is enhanced … in light of the push it may give to low carbon innovation.”12 Induced innovation has an important role to play in driving incremental change, but it will not lead to the more-radical breakthroughs “However,” Grubb and his co-authors continued, “carbon pricing alone may be a very blunt way of stimulating innovation.”13 As the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) has long argued, induced innovation has an important role to play in driving incremental change when low-carbon technologies are close to cost-competitiveness with “dirty” incumbents. But it will not lead to the more-radical breakthroughs needed in sectors wherein the incremental cost of cutting emissions is far greater than any plausible carbon price. The push of public RD&D investment, along with a range of other policies, must complement the pull of carbon pricing to drive rapid innovation in these sectors.14 Carbon Leakage Even induced innovation will be undermined if carbon pricing merely shifts emissions from within one set of borders to another location. “Carbon leakage,” as such shifting has become known, is a likely result in the real world, since there is no global government to impose a global carbon price. Firms that emit GHGs located outside jurisdictions that impose a price gain a competitive advantage by exporting to them, while exporters that are subject to the price but seek to sell in jurisdictions that do not impose one are put at a competitive disadvantage. The fear of industrial production shifting to jurisdictions without a carbon price is a persistent concern for climate policymakers. (The same issue also impacts regulatory approaches to climate policy; low-regulation jurisdictions are more attractive to high-emitting sectors than high-regulation ones.) It is not an idle fear. Research by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that up to 25 percent of global GHG emissions are embodied in goods traded across borders. Emissions-intensive trade is concentrated in a handful of sectors, including chemicals, metals, and electronics, as seen in figure 1.15 Many of these sectors are poised for growth and expanded trade, particularly involving producers based in developing countries, which could dramatically increase global emissions. As table 1 shows, export-intensive nations such as China account for a large fraction of emissions embodied in trade flows (leading to the negative numbers on the table), while import-intensive nations such as the United States tend to receive emissions-intensive goods. Emissions from goods produced in China and shipped elsewhere made up 10 percent of that nation’s total. The countries that imported these goods avoided those emissions—in the case of the United States, to the tune of 6.3 percent of its national total. The more emissions-intensive and trade-exposed a nation’s domestic industry is, the more vulnerable it is to carbon leakage. Some have speculated that carbon-importing nations such as Germany and the United Kingdom have already become victims of direct carbon leakage as a result of the EU’s carbon pricing policy, since they import 14 and 42 percent, respectively, of their overall emissions in the form of products from other countries. While research suggests that this effect was blunted by the large allocation of free ETS allowances to EITE industries, they may well become vulnerable when these allowances are eliminated, giving the ETS real teeth in these sectors.17 How a CBAM works CBAMs seek to solve the problem of carbon leakage and free-ridership by adding a tariff to imports. The tariff equalizes the carbon price paid by importers with that paid by domestic producers, taking into account any carbon price paid by the importer in the production location. CBAMs may also provide export rebates for domestic manufacturers, allowing them to be competitive in international markets that do not have a comparable carbon price. For example, a steel manufacturer located in a jurisdiction with a carbon price of $40 per ton must pay an extra cost for fossil fuel and other inputs. A CBAM would adjust for this extra cost by imposing a tariff on each ton of imported steel that is equivalent to the carbon price the importer would have paid if the steel had been produced domestically. Domestic manufacturers that export steel to a jurisdiction that does not have a carbon price would receive an equivalent rebate. Steel imported from a jurisdiction that has a carbon price of $15 per ton would be credited for that amount but would have to pay the remaining $25 per ton of imported emissions for the CBAM. CBAMs seek to solve the problem of carbon leakage and free-ridership by adding a tariff to imports. The revenue raised by a CBAM can be used to support the associated export rebates or for any other purpose, such as funding clean-energy RD&D. To be effective, a CBAM would have to be product-specific. The carbon content across steel industry segments, (e.g., flat hot-rolled products and long products, such as rebar and wire) differs greatly due to diverse manufacturing methods. A national or regionally-specific carbon intensity benchmark for each of these specific products would need to be determined on a life-cycle basis that accounts for upstream emissions and uses transparent and verifiable data from the source country. Ironically, the threat of carbon leakage may grow if CBAMs are restricted to only EITE sectors, as some have proposed. In addition to direct carbon leakage, in which producers in sectors facing the carbon price depart or expand abroad to avoid having to pay, a sector-limited CBAM may lead to indirect carbon leakage. In such a setup, imports of final goods-producing sectors (e.g., cars that use EITE inputs such as steel) are exempted from the CBAM. The importers gain an advantage because their input costs are lower, since domestic producers must pay for inputs that are subject to the carbon price if made domestically or the CBAM if imported. Imported cars that use cheap, dirty steel could outcompete domestically made cars that must pay highe r prices for clean steel. Whether emissions embodied in international trade are associated with direct or indirect carbon leakage, they weaken incentives for climate innovation. The fact that EITE industries such as steel, aluminum, and cement, are also generally sectors for which few viable technological options to abate emissions exist—and therefore have the greatest need for innovation—makes the challenge to climate policy more acute.