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BCA would violate WTO rules. Even if the plan gets passed, it would lead to retaliation from other countries.

Koester, 21 -- [Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels, "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] // David

Compatibility with the WTO A well-designed trading system would clearly allow nations to impose discriminatory tariffs based on global negative externalities such as climate change. Unfortunately, the WTO is not so well designed. Many trade scholars believe that CBAMs are incompatible with key WTO rules—most notably, the principle of nondiscrimination among a country’s trading partners.23 While WTO member states are supposed to be allowed to adopt policies that are inconsistent with standard trade rules for environmental reasons, these policies may not be “a means of arbitrary/unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”24 Many trade scholars believe that CBAMs are incompatible with key WTO rules. This vague clause is already the subject of litigation within the WTO’s dispute settlement process, which may have a bearing on cases brought against CBAMs.25 To date, countries seeking to defend policies that have the effect of discriminating on environmental grounds have lost their cases, so those hoping to defend a CBAM may find themselves in an uphill battle.26 No matter what the final outcome, the legal ambiguity such cases create, and the slow pace with which they are adjudicated (exacerbated by vacancies that paralyze the WTO Appellate Body), would muddy CBAM implementation.27 Even if a CBAM is successfully negotiated and applied, further risks persist. The burden of administrative compliance may reduce overall trade. Solutions that seek to avoid weakening the economies of developing countries by exempting their products or gradually implementing a CBAM for them could prompt a WTO challenge based on this differential treatment.28 Impacted countries could retaliate unilaterally or multilaterally. Such trade wars could spiral far beyond the initial sectoral confines and into non-related products as nations ratchet up tariffs on a wide swath of products.

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