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Carbon emissions would be impossible to estimate – manufactures have strong incentives to report low carbon emissions.

Koester, 21 -- [Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels, "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] // David

Counting Carbon Counting and verifying the carbon content of imported products is extremely difficult, as carbon content varies by method, time, and place. If, for example, the EU wanted to impose a CBAM on imported U.S. steel, it would calculate a tariff that is an average of diverse production processes and regions. While the inputs for steel production are known and largely the same across manufacturers, producers are located in areas that have power grids with different carbon intensities, which change throughout the day and over the year. On-site, producers may also use varied resources such as coal or natural gas with differing carbon intensities. All in, the carbon intensity of steel can range from between 500 kg of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) per ton of steel to up to 2,000 kg of CO2e. Any carbon-counting process that relies on a national average of carbon intensity from the exporting country would thus likely mis-estimate actual emissions, penalize low-carbon producers, and force up their costs. Policymakers would need to determine whether the CBAM applies equally to all plants within a firm or whether it can differentiate between different plants within a single firm. If the CBAM were set at the firm-level, rather than the plant-level, then it would mean that products made at highly polluting plants would face a lower carbon price than would be economically efficient. Those made at cleaner plants would face an unjustly high carbon price. Such a setup could also lessen the incentive for plant managers within a firm to implement inventive ways to reduce emissions. CBAM waivers might be permitted if applicants can prove that their products have fewer embodied emissions than the benchmark average. But such a waiver process would require emissions to be verified, thereby adding even more complexity to the CBAM process. CBAM measurement and verification would likely involve numerous suppliers and vendors, third-party auditors, customs and environmental agencies, and freight and logistics operators, among others. It might be vulnerable to manipulation, with manufacturers having strong incentives to minimize reporting of carbon emissions. It might create the risk of exposing market-sensitive information to untrusted third parties, including in the importing countries. Finally, these processes would have to be updated regularly to account for changes in efficiency and production technologies in order to avoid disincentivizing innovation and diffusion.

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