Plan Doesn’t Solve: FJG cuts out private sector entirely
Malley and Moutos ’96 [Jim Malley is a Professor in Economics at the University of Glasgow. Thomas Moutos is Professor of Economics at the Athens University of Economics and Business and a CESifo Research Fellow. Malley, James R., and Thomas Moutos. “Introduction.” Does Government Employment “Crowd-out” Private Employment?: Evidence from Sweden, vol. 98, University of Glasgow, Department of Political Economy, Glasgow, 1996, pp. 289–291. ]
A common feature of most macroeconomic models is their treatment of government expenditure. It is usually assumed that changes in government expenditure have no direct effect on the labour market. But, in fact, a considerable proportion of government expenditure (for some OECD countries more than 50 per cent) goes for wages and salaries to govern- ment employees. Changes in government spending which take the form of increases in government employment will have a direct influence on the labour market. With an upward-sloping aggregate labour supply curve, aggregate employment and the real wage will increase but private employ- ment will fall as a result of an increase in government employment. The degree of crowding-out of private employment by government employ- ment will obviously depend on the slopes of both the aggregate labour demand and supply schedules. If labour supply is perfectly elastic with respect to the real wage, there will be no crowding-out. However, if labour supply is perfectly inelastic with respect to the real wage, then there will complete crowding-out of private employment by government employment.1 The crowding-out of private employment by government employment described in the above paragraph is similar to the crowding-out of private spending by government spending found in traditional macroeconomic models. Both depend on the effects of government actions on prices (i.e., the real wage and the real interest rate) which in turn affect private sector decisions. We term this type of crowding-out "indirect crowding-out". But obviously, increases in government employment can directly displace private employment (e.g., public utilities, railways, etc.). We term this "direct crowding-out". In this paper we contend that once both types of crowding-out are taken into consideration, increases in government employment can result in decreases in aggregate employment. In other words, the crowding-out can be more than complete. We illustrate this case by examining quarterly Swedish data for the period 1964-90. Our focus on Sweden is motivated by the fact that the growth of the public sector was an explicit objective of Swedish economic policy for four decades until the early 1980s; see Lundberg (1985). The growth of govern- ment employment during these years reflected the decision of successive socialist governments to enlarge the role of the public sector in the economy. Figure 1 reflects these developments by contrasting the evolu- tion of the share of government to total employment (less self-employed) since 1960 for Sweden, the United States and Japan. In 1960 the share of government employment to total employment was the same in Sweden and the U.S., and equal to about 15 per cent, whereas in Japan the share was approximately equal to 13 per cent in 1965.2 Although for the U.S. and Japan this share virtually remained constant for the next two decades, in Sweden it rose steadily to about 33 per cent at the end of 1990. On the basis of this we interpret the evolution of government employment in Sweden not as a result of irreversible "leaning-against-the-wind" policies, but as the popular desire of the electorate for "bigger government". In other words, we treat government employment as an exogenous variable. In Section IV, we present econometric evidence which supports this assertion.