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The aff reproduces capitalist narratives - by ignoring the political economy of automation, the aff masks the social forces underlying automation - that undermines humanity's ability to shape and respond to the negative impacts of automation on workers

Kelly 22 [Lauren Kelly is a PhD candidate located within the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society at RMIT University, Melbourne Australia. Her research investigates automation in Australia's supermarket warehouses and considers what technological change means for workers, “Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism,” Journal of Sociology, 0(0), 10-9-2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/14407833221128999, accessed 7-19-2023, HKR-SWY]

Technological change does not however spring into being, driven by its own endogenous force of inevitability. As Fleming (2019) shows, technology is bounded by social-organisational forces which mediate whether a job or task is automated or not. Considerations such as the price of labour; power relations within the firm, including levels of unionisation; and the nature of the task are important factors that outweigh intrinsic qualities of the technology itself. This is not necessarily a good thing for 4 Journal of Sociology 0(0) workers, as it results in an unwillingness on the part of capital to invest in new technology and machinery, particularly when wages are low (Stanford, 2020). Through an economic historical approach to automation, Benanav (2020a) shows that automation is not accelerating but has in fact slowed down in recent decades. The persistent low demand for labour is not the result of productivity gains from new technology but rather decades of secular stagnation attributable to low growth and manufacturing overcapacity in industrialised countries. Benanav (2020b) writes:

Our collective sense that the pace of labor-saving technological change is accelerating is an illusion. It’s like the feeling you get when looking out of the window of a train car as it slows down at a station: passing cars on the other side of the tracks appear to speed up. Labor-saving technical change appears to be happening at a faster pace than before only when viewed from across the tracks – that is, from the standpoint of our ever more slow-growing economies.

In this context, low-wage, low-growth, and low-productivity jobs have proliferated, particularly in the service economy (Smith, 2020). Reflecting on key innovations of the 21st century, Smith highlights how these technologies are far from ground-breaking. The smartphone, for instance, may have reorganised social life and consumption, but it does not significantly impact productivity, particularly when compared to 20th-century discoveries such as petroleum and electricity. He writes: ‘The technologies characteristic of the past two decades – since the dotcom crash of 2000 – have been concentrated in entertainment and leisure: toys, not tools’ (Smith, 2020, p. 43). Mason’s (2015) prediction of an ‘exponential’ take-off in productive technologies is yet to be seen and, as argued by Moody (2017), productivity gains are more often extracted through work intensification rather than productivity technologies per se. Both Benanav and Smith seek to reorient Marxist thinking on automation through a political economic lens attuned to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The almost simultaneous appearance of these two books in late 2020 during the pandemic signals another shift in automation discourse. The timing reflects an historical moment during which the working conditions of essential industries, and other workplaces typically overlooked by academic literature were in the spotlight. An analysis of work as it really exists became crucial as many discovered how working conditions were of consequence for collective public health.

Placing workplace automation in its political economic context shows that the introduction of labour-saving technologies is far from inevitable. In the current age of stagnation, firms are more likely to redistribute profit to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks rather than towards investment in productive technologies (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2021). Many firms are risk averse and favour extractive rent-seeking strategies rather than expensive innovation (Mazzucato, 2018). In some contexts, low-cost and informalised labour is actually displacing technology, particularly when the exploitation of migrant labour and regulatory grey areas is more profitable than investing in automation (Clark, 2018). As Spencer highlights, automation theorists often overlook:

the scope for capitalism to reproduce work and prevent the move to a future of less work. The other problem is that they ignore or understate the threat to the quality of work posed by technology and the capacity for low-quality work to persist and even multiply alongside technological progress. The rhetoric of the ‘rise of the robots’ in this respect can become a distraction from other pressing problems created by technology as it evolves within capitalist society. (2018, p. 8)

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