Positing UBI as the necessary and sufficient solution to automation depoliticizes what is fundamentally a political choice. Instead, vote Neg to interrogate and grapple with the real issues that are giving rise to automation anxiety in the first place.
Kelly ’22. [ Lauren Kelly is a policy advisor for the United Workers Union in Melbourne, Australia.] “Re-politicizing the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism.” October 9, 2022. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14407833221128999
The contested terrain of automation and UBI Following 's (1980) important provocation that technology has a politics, one can now consider how technology has a political economy. Placing workplace automation in its political economic context highlights the mutual constitution of technological and social relations that shape how, why, and under what conditions new technologies come into being. Understanding technology as a socio-technical process, rather than a benign or neutral tool, helps to explain why automation functions in the workplace as it does. Empirical studies have demonstrated how automation is more likely to be used as a tool of work intensification and surveillance, rather than as a labor-saving device that reduces the physical burden for workers. The resulting decline in techno-optimism has reignited important ontological considerations of technology. Doing so shifts the analysis of automation from simplistic binaries of job loss or creation towards ‘questions of balance, coordination, contestation, and negotiation’ (, p. 2). In the context of economic stagnation and constrained worker power, technology can be conceptualized as ‘contested terrain’ () and a ‘site of struggle’ (). Feenberg argues that: technology is not a thing in the ordinary sense of the term, but an ‘ambivalent’ process of development suspended between different possibilities…. On this view technology is not a destiny but a scene of struggle. It is a social battlefield, or perhaps a better metaphor would be ‘parliament of things’ in which civilizational alternatives contend. (Feenberg, , p. 15) The techno-optimistic vision of a future wherein technology serves a broad public good is entirely possible. The reason this has not become reality is because without significant struggle over the design and implementation of automation, workplace technologies will reproduce and reinforce capitalist logics of extraction and control. In other words, they will serve the preferences of employers, not workers. As , p. 27) notes: ‘It is not technology that determines employment patterns of organizational design but the other way around. The specific use of machinery is informed by socio-organizational forces, with power being a particularly salient factor.’ 's (1984) path-breaking study of computer-based automation showed how a particular model of ‘numerical control’ was selected and put into industrial use over equally promising alternatives. The prevailing model was chosen not for its superior productivity or efficiency, but because it shifted control over the labour process from skilled workers to managers and engineers. Understanding technological change as an ‘ambivalent yet biased’ socio-technical process also offers a way of thinking through the tensions of attendant UBI proposals. Support for UBI across the political spectrum highlights the contested nature of UBI. Just as technological design and implementation is not neutral, but reflects the interests of the dominant class, so too does policy. Policy is not a-political but is itself a site of contested ideas and proposals for the future (). In turn, how the future is talked about and imagined can ‘structure how firms are advised to reorganize their workplaces and workforces, how investors are advised to allocate their wealth, and how governments create policies and incentives to regulate and promote the desired outcomes’ (, p. 19). Economic policy that seeks to uncouple incomes from work is especially charged. For automation theorists across the political spectrum, UBI smooths the transition from a reliance on wages, to an era of technological unemployment in which human labour is largely obsolete. Even if such assumptions are unfounded, the UBI proposals advanced by progressive automation theorists are worthy of consideration. They highlight the urgent need to provide baseline security for all workers (both employed and unemployed), to ensure one's ability to live a decent life is not determined by employment status, and to weaken the coercive wage labour relationship. However, by understanding UBI as ‘ambivalent yet biased’ towards the preferences of the dominant class, and a site of ‘contested terrain’, it becomes clear that radical UBI proposals put the cart before the horse. That is, to obtain the kind of UBI capable of fundamentally transforming the balance of power between workers and employers would require a degree of bargaining power and collective organising among progressive coalitions that does not currently exist. Instead, many progressive UBI proposals are put forward precisely because, it is argued, collective action is no longer able to deliver transformative change for workers. From this weakened position of desperation, a socially transformative UBI will not be gifted from conservative governments. Such a gain can only be collectively fought for and won by broad community and worker movements. Just as actually existing workplace automation reproduces capitalist imperatives, so too will UBI reflect the political context of its implementation. That is, it is more likely to serve the interests of anti-welfare, anti-worker neoliberal states, and a market logic wherein essential basic services are privatized and often unaffordable. The central issue is that just as the politics of technology are overlooked, UBI is often conceived of as a value-neutral policy instrument. As Benanav writes: There is an inner affinity between technological determinism, which is the core of automation discourse, and its recourse to technocratic solutions. Both positions elide difficult social and political questions by transforming them into putatively objective facts. Such technocratic neutrality is a fantasy: depending on the manner in which it is implemented, UBI will lead in radically different directions, most of which will not bring us closer to a world of human flourishing. (, p. 73) Moreover, UBI proposals redirect attention away from the root causes of automation anxiety towards technical solutions for problems that are fundamentally political in nature. The issues of work that give rise to automation anxiety to begin with demand greater consideration of power, institutions, and the ownership of production. Even the most generous UBI proposals amount to a transfer payment that leaves the basic logic of capitalism and widening power asymmetries between workers and employers unchallenged. Wage labour is not the only social relation of capitalism that causes harm. Issues of asset wealth inequality, property ownership, and financialization are arguably more harmful than income inequalities alone, yet these relations are left untouched by a UBI. It is possible that UBI, in the current political economic context, could strengthen the logics of financialization through private market capture and price rises for essential basic services such as childcare, housing, and education. UBI does not challenge capital's control over production or the threat of capital strike – thereby limiting the development of productive technologies that could make UBI more sustainable. As has been argued by Marxist feminists, although the wage relation is often reified by the left, transcending capitalism will require class struggle beyond the workplace into the sphere of social reproduction (). In the context of recurring crises and ever-widening inequalities, automation discourse fixated on humanoid robots ‘stealing jobs’ should be abandoned in favour of thoughtful critique of tech monopolies, the anti-democratic practices of data harvesting, workplace surveillance, and work intensification. The problems of work will not, and can not, be addressed through technological or policy changes alone, but must grapple with the need for changes in ownership to democratise production (). This is not a call to abandon radical visions of automation or UBI. Rather, it signals the need to re-politicise future-of-work debates to avoid technocracy or reductive economic analysis of employment. Work is more than unemployment figures to be celebrated or criticised by politicians, it is fundamentally a collective and social endeavour. If technology and policy is to serve a broad public good, there is a need to centre collective struggle in its achievement.