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Capitalism can’t solve warming---it’s unsustainable---Earth surface area and thermodynamics prove.

Kolasi 19 [Erald, A research associate at the Income and Benefits Policy Center at the Urban Institute. BA in physics and history from the University of Virginia and earned his MS and PhD from George Mason University, both in physics. " Energy, Economic Growth, and Ecological Crisis.” Monthly Review. 6-1-2019. https://monthlyreview.org/2019/06/01/energy-economic-growth-and-ecological-crisis. Accessed 15-07-2023.]/ISJD

Another major limit to substitution comes from the ecological instabilities associated with excessive levels of economic growth. These instabilities can combine to pump and amplify existing natural phenomena. The amplifier effect works as follows. Economies absorb energy from the natural world and then exploit that energy for cycles of production and consumption. For highly energy-intensive economies, these cycles necessarily yield extensive levels of waste and dissipation, or energy losses that are dumped back out to the environment. These energy losses are not “useless” from the standpoint of physics or ecology. Under the right circumstances, they can power the formation of other natural dynamical systems, including everything from viruses and bacteria to wildfires and hurricanes.24 These highly chaotic effects associated with energy-intensive economies are largely ignored and dismissed by neoclassical theory, even though they have often played a central role in the evolution of human history.25 As a highly dissipative system, capitalism regularly produces very powerful amplifier effects. Collectively, these amplifiers are now creating what Marx called a “metabolic rift” between nature and society, which means that the ecological basis of civilization is steadily eroding under profit-seeking and energy-intensive development that does not care about replacing what it extracts. The natural world has major tipping points that we should not cross, but indefinite economic growth through substitution virtually guarantees that some of those critical thresholds will be breached, threatening the broader ecosphere that supports human civilization. Consider another problem. Substitution can occur quite frequently on small and restricted scales of economic activity. A pizza store can always substitute certain ingredients for others. A homeowner can substitute heating fuel for insulation. A company can replace older light bulbs for more efficient lighting in its offices. And even some countries can substitute various forms of wealth for others, at least temporarily. The Pacific island nation of Nauru provides a classic example that highlights the central themes of the debate. In the twentieth century, Nauru possessed vast deposits of phosphate, which is highly prized as an agricultural fertilizer. These deposits were extensively mined, depleted, and then traded in global markets, allowing Nauru to reach a sky-high standard of living by 1990.28 Nauru converted a portion of its earnings from the phosphate trade into a public trust fund, which invested in manufactured capital through financial markets. However, its impressive standard of living collapsed sharply after the phosphate vanished, along with most of the money in the trust fund. Nauru offers a cautionary tale for the world as a whole. If global civilization runs out of natural resources, we cannot replace them by investing in commodities through financial markets. People cannot eat money. Substitution in the long run may be possible at the microlevel of economic activity, but long-term macrolevel substitution is downright wishful thinking. We can better understand the limits to substitution on a global, macroscopic level by considering a specific example: a global economy meeting its electricity needs through the consumption of solar power. There are fundamental limits to the amount of solar energy absorbed by solar panels that can be converted into useful electrical energy. Most commercial photovoltaics convert less than 30 percent of the solar energy they absorb into electricity; the remaining energy balance is lost as heat and infrared radiation.30 The theoretical efficiency limits for the most advanced photovoltaic designs are just under 90 percent, a number that not even the latest laboratory experiments have come close to matching. But suppose neoclassical theory is right about its eternal commitment to technological progress and that eventually we do manage to produce photovoltaics that are 90 percent efficient at converting solar energy. Once all theoretical efficiency limits are actually realized, boosting electricity production even further would require the construction of new solar panels, which takes up more land. As the earth has a finite surface area, indefinite growth would not be possible even with the proliferation of renewables. This argument underscores the central point that renewable technologies are important, but they cannot solve the global ecological crisis under the economic regime of capitalism, which is completely reliant on the false promise of eternal growth in production and consumption. Substituting fossil fuels for renewables while pushing for more growth would still lead to the total ruin of global civilization in a few centuries. Economists love to pretend that technological innovation can yield greater “qualitative growth” without any corresponding “quantitative growth.”32 On the basis of improving knowledge and technological growth, they believe that the monetary value of stuff can keep increasing even as the quantity of stuff itself remains stable. But what they fail to grasp is that technological innovations do not happen magically—they also require energetic conversions. Changes to the production cycle are dependent on the stock of electrical, chemical, and mechanical energy available for research and training. A coder sitting in front of a computer writing a new program needs energy to think and type. The computer itself needs electricity to continue operating. No possible improvement can be made to computer programs without a continuous stream of energetic conversions. Expansions in productivity require energy flows, meaning that all forms of technological change are intertwined with the energetic transformations that facilitate human existence. Technological changes are physically embedded in greater knowledge among people and the development of more productive assets, both of which need energy and material flows to continue operating. Thermodynamic limits also constrain the extent to which these flows can be reduced while sustaining labor and capital. In short, technological changes themselves are subject to hard physical limits, along with the qualitative growth that can be derived from them. Power plants provide one of the most well-known examples of the limits to technological growth. They have been hovering near their peak efficiency ratings for decades and getting them to go much further has proven to be extremely difficult.33 The failure of breeder reactors for nuclear power plants highlights another prominent technological bust, and plenty of other exotic technologies, like fusion reactors, will inevitably end up in the same category. The bloated profit margins of capitalism depend critically on the energy-intensive basis of its entire existence. Take away that basis and there is no more capitalism. How Energy and Growth Relate to Emissions All economic activities, as we have seen, require energy. To better understand what this means, we examine the relationships between energy, growth, and emissions more concretely by looking at the economy of the United States. In recent decades, U.S. economic growth has continued, albeit at a declining rate, even though per-capita primary energy consumption has gone down. In addition, costs associated with primary energy consumption increasingly represent a declining share of U.S. aggregate demand. From these observations, many economists and pundits have concluded that energy use and economic growth have decoupled from one another.35 But even a quick analysis of the underlying energy shifts in the U.S. economy reveals the falsehood of this narrative. An economy that starts using natural resources with higher energy efficiencies and larger power densities can experience growth even as primary energy consumption declines. Understanding this process would be difficult, perhaps even impossible, if we only looked at primary consumption, which totally ignores conversions. But once we consider that burning a smaller quantity of natural gas, for example, can still yield more electricity than burning a larger amount of coal, then the significance of conversions becomes immediately apparent. Resources with larger power densities can convert more useful energy for economic activities, some of which constitute the basic elements measured by GDP. Economists like David Stern and Robert Kaufmann, among others, have clearly shown that growth in U.S. energy consumption is tightly coupled with growth in aggregate demand once differences in energy quality are factored into the analysis.36 The energy crisis of the 1970s motivated the United States to reduce per-capita oil consumption and to focus on efficiency gains by using other natural resources. These efforts resulted in a trajectory of increased natural-gas consumption, which is much cleaner and more efficient as an energy source than coal. Both the switch to natural gas and the increasing proliferation of renewables helped substantially reduce carbon emissions. After peaking in 2005, greenhouse gas emissions in the United States had fallen 14 percent by 2016.37 But the declines gradually stalled and emissions in 2018 actually increased by more than 3 percent, the largest rise in 8 years.38 A hyperactive transportation sector, always critical to economic growth, was the leading culprit behind the latest surge. Recent U.S. experience further reinforces the notion that large-scale reductions in emissions are virtually impossible under an economic system that prioritizes growth above anything else. The unlimited pressure to increase consumption and production can lead to rising emissions even in the context of macrolevel efficiency gains and technological innovations. For the world as a whole, a strong positive relationship exists between primary energy consumption and economic growth, and numerous studies on various countries and regions indicate that this relationship is fundamentally causal.39 Over the last few decades, the rate of global economic growth has started to slow down, mirroring the declining rate of growth in global energy consumption. Some major economies, like those of Japan and the European Union, have already entered periods of stagnation associated with very low growth rates and aging populations. Because these economies are currently dominated by corrupt financial sectors, they are generating uneven growth patterns that mostly enrich wealthy capitalists. By contrast, ordinary people are increasingly drowning in debt so they can finance the cycles and crises of capitalism.40 Economic progress for the vast majority of society has come to a screeching halt.41 The global economy may continue to grow at modest rates for the rest of this century, but the signs are already evident that our potential for future growth is limited and constrained by what kinds of energy sources we can collect from the natural world, as well as by the economic irrationalities of today’s financialized capitalism. Capitalism is running out of steam, but not quickly enough to substantially reduce aggregate emissions. Global carbon emissions over the last century have closely followed changes in primary energy consumption. At the start of the decade, optimism about global warming was high. Greenhouse gas emissions flatlined for several years and the upper echelons of the global economy started to believe that economic growth could actually be decoupled from harmful emissions. In 2016, the International Energy Agency triumphantly declared: “Decoupling of global emissions and economic growth confirmed.”42 What a difference two years can make. In 2017, greenhouse gas emissions worldwide saw a sharp spike.43 Against a backdrop of increasingly alarming scientific reports about the dangers of global warming, emissions rose again for 2018, at a faster pace than the previous year.44 Even some advanced economies that had supposedly decoupled growth from pollution witnessed higher carbon emissions in 2018. Detaching emissions from economic growth has turned out to be a vastly more complicated problem than global elites originally believed. A persistent albatross on this issue is the way that most elites talk about carbon emissions. When governments and organizations measure greenhouse gas emissions, they often do so at the point of manufacture and production. If a U.S. company sets up a factory in India to produce commodities that are then sold to U.S. consumers, the emissions coming from that factory are credited to India, not the United States. This basic process of what is referred to as geographic substitution, where corporations from the capitalist core transfer ecologically destructive manufacturing to developing nations with large pools of cheap labor, has been an important source of the observed divergence between carbon emissions and economic growth in the Western world.45 In other words, measuring emissions from the point of consumption hardly reveals any decoupling at all. In any case, multinational corporations can only keep shifting production around so much before they run out of places to go. There are limits to geographic substitution as well. Besides comparing aggregate demand to emissions, another approach for understanding the material foundations of economic growth focuses on the flow of raw materials on their way to the final point of consumption. In a landmark 2012 paper, a group of Australian researchers analyzed the aggregate raw materials exchanged among countries through international trade and introduced the concept of the material footprint, defined as the global allocation of used raw material extraction to the final demand of an economy. They concluded that “with every 10 percent increase in gross domestic product, the average national [material footprint] increases by 6 percent.”46 In their view, “achievements in decoupling in advanced economies are smaller than reported or even nonexistent.” They also estimated that roughly 40 percent of all global raw materials are extracted to facilitate the export of goods and services to other nations, which indicates that reducing the international flows of global capital could be a critical strategy in addressing our intensifying ecological crisis. For another perspective on why claims about decoupling are premature, consider the following fact: life expectancy in the United States has declined for three consecutive years, the first such sustained decline in a century.47 The U.S. economy grew in every one of those years. But the press did not blare the sirens declaring that life expectancy has decoupled from economic growth. Such an admission would raise an unthinkable prospect for the reigning plutocracy: that the lives of common people might actually be getting worse while some billionaires become even richer by selling the rest of us more stuff that does not actually improve our lives. However, when two or three years of mixed and uncertain data suggest that the rise in harmful global emissions has slowed down, the story gets blown out of proportion and becomes a masterful causal narrative about how capitalism can be ecologically sustainable. The collapse of the decoupling delusion offers an important lesson—we should resist the temptation to make grand conclusions about the world when we notice marginal trends over just a few years.

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