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Capitalism is the main driver of job loss.

Toye 21 [Brent Toye is a PhD candidate in the Politics Department at York University, “Post-Capitalist Futures? Work After Automation,” Socialist Project, 2-26-2021, https://socialistproject.ca/2021/02/post-capitalist-futures-work-after-automation/, accessed 7-18-2023, HKR-SWY]

This ‘automation anxiety’, as economist David Autor has dubbed it, has resurfaced at different moments in the history of capitalism, for a variety of reasons, usually as an explanation for structural shifts in capitalist labour markets. In the early postwar period, high levels of economic growth intertwined with technical changes in the capital-intensive system of Fordist mass production created fears that rising levels of productivity might outstrip the demand for labour. Following the stagflation crisis of the 1970s and the end of the postwar economic boom, social democratic and progressive thinkers maintained that continued economic stagnation in the core capitalist countries was the result of a ‘skills mis-match’ between labour and the technical conditions of production in the emerging new information technologies.

Automation Anxiety

The 2008 Financial Crisis, long-term secular stagnation, the rise of monopolistic tech giants, and the emergence of the gig economy has provided the backdrop for the most recent wave of automation anxiety centred on the disruptive potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. New breakthroughs in AI suggest that not only would 21st century automation augment human labour to a significant degree, as it always has, but self-directed intelligence would have an unprecedented ability to replace labour altogether. This fear was crystallized in in an influential 2013 paper by Oxford economists Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne in which they predicted that AI would lead to the replacement of 47 per cent of jobs in the US labour market in the near future.

In their widely read Second Machine Age (2014), Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee further argued that developments in AI would weaken demand for labour, create widespread technological unemployment, and empower a new rentier class. On the left, writers on the future of capitalism like Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams (2015), as well as Peter Frase (2016), similarly see the destructive tendencies of the new wave of automation, but also see in the digital economy positive transformative potential in transcending the drudgery of work and the constraints of material scarcity under capitalism. Indeed, these authors maintain that automation should be at the centre of socialist strategy as the basis of a new socialist society.

Critique of Automation Theory

It is within this intellectual terrain that Automation and the Future of Work by Aaron Benanav (Verso, 2020) makes its contribution. The book presents a sympathetic critique of automation theory and in particular the notion of widespread technological unemployment resulting from AI-based automation. Automation theorists contend that as productivity continues to rise, induced by technological advancements, there is a decline in long-term employment. This leads to technological unemployment and, in turn, to several knock-on effects: a declining share of income going to labour, reduced consumption, rising inequality, widespread unemployment, and other dislocations. Benanav maintains, however, that this automation narrative fails to adequately distinguish productivity (a ratio of overall production volumes to employment) to the growth rate of real output (how much is produced overall) in its calculations.

From the immediate postwar period until the stagflation crises of the 1970s, rapid rates of productivity were outpaced by growing real output, inducing further investment and employment in a virtuous – often termed Fordist – growth cycle. The cycle broke down in the 1970s when across the advanced capitalist states the pace of productivity declines was exceeded by an even greater drop-off of output growth even while the labour force continued to grow. This might suggest the influence of automation in any particular sector (that is, falling employment volumes while output continues to increase), if it was not for the fact that overall productivity has been declining compared to its postwar heights alongside real output declines suggesting wider structural economic problems beyond automation for labour market insecurities.

The implication Benanav draws is that it could not be rapid advances in productivity causing mass unemployment and economic stagnation. Instead, deteriorating levels of output are causing lagging productivity gains as opposed to the other way around, essentially turning the automation thesis on its head. The real cause of this process of “output-led deindustrialization” stems from increased global competition within the manufacturing sector beginning in the 1970s. In making this argument Benanav draws upon the work of Marxist economist Robert Brenner, who argues in The Economics of Global Turbulence (1998) and elsewhere that contemporary Western economies are experiencing a ‘long downturn’ as a result of ‘overcapacity’ in the manufacturing sector. In short, the contention is that the development of advanced manufacturing capacity first across Western and then developing states led to a decline in output growth among previously dominant US firms who now had to compete with low-cost producers all over the world. This created a situation of competitive bidding down of the prices for manufactured goods. Depressed prices produced falling rates of profit and reduced industrial investment, leading to lower output and, eventually, economic stagnation.

This explains why output growth declined more rapidly than productivity: firms would necessarily have to become more productive in order to survive, but nonetheless their output continued to deteriorate in an environment of intense international competition. This also explains the appearance (at least) of rapidly advancing automation and technological unemployment, as international competition induces firms to adopt the latest productive technology. Crucially, however, this competitive automation is only a symptom of the greater underlying issue of manufacturing overcapacity in the global political economy.

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