Perm fails, AI dev key to cap – AI enables capitalist dominance; the only path to the alt is to refuse it
Dyer-Witheford 20 [Nick Dyer-Witheford is an author, and associate professor at the University of Western Ontario in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies. His area of study primarily focuses on the rise of technology and the internet, as well as their continuous impact on modern society. Interviewed by Brian Justie who is a PhD student at UCLA, and a researcher at the UCLA Labor Center, “The Rise of AI-Capitalism: An Interview with Nick Dyer-Witheford,” Los Angeles Review of Books, 3-11-2020, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-rise-of-ai-capitalism-an-interview-with-nick-dyer-witheford/, accessed 7-18-2023, HKR-SWY]
I will answer at two levels. The first is simple: there’s a wide acceptance of the idea that while capitalism has a persistent logic — the commodification of everything — it also periodically changes the way that logic is worked through, in terms of the orchestration of dominant technologies, work organization, consumption practices, and so on. So, for example, mid-20th-century Fordism, organized around the assembly line, mass work, and mass consumption, had by the millennium had morphed into a post-Fordism of digital technology, so-called flexibilized labor and niche marketing. In Inhuman Power, we suggest that AI could be an important element in another of these metamorphoses, or, as David Harvey puts it “sea changes,” in how capital operates. So here our proposition is an extension and extrapolation from other periodizations of capital.
However — second level — in postulating an “AI-capitalism,” we are suggesting a transformation that may pose some very deep problems, possibly for capital itself, and if not, certainly for its human subjects, and also, as a small piece of collateral damage, for Marxist theory. This of course has to do with the status of labor in an era of machine intelligence. A few years ago there was widespread alarm about a “robopocalypse,” an abrupt, induced crisis of technological unemployment. These fears of a sudden onset “end of work” are today contradicted, at least in North America, by the post-Recession return to reasonably robust employment levels — however dubious the wages and conditions of that employment. But longer term, there are real prospects that AI adoption will in more gradual, oblique ways attenuate and hollow out the wage labor relation. We see it as a slow tsunami. Waves of sectoral technological unemployment, ratcheting in sync with business cycles and financial crises, will be a part of this, as will various intermediate phases of job replacement, in which truck drivers ride shotgun on convoys of automated vehicles, or diminishing call center staff fill the gaps in banks of algorithmic answering services.
But this is not the whole story. As Jason Smith says, under capitalism people must sell their labor power to avoid total immiseration, so even as automation advances they seek employment and find exploitation, or self-employment and self-exploitation, in increasingly baroque forms of service work. But labor in AI-capitalism will likely be recurrently contingent, deskilled and disposable, controlled by programs opaque and, at a certain level, incomprehensible even by their developers; its human elements will be increasingly peripheral to both production and profit. The issue is perhaps not so much joblessness as powerlessness; a labor force without force, as capital gradually autonomizes itself from the human. In that sense, AI-capitalism might be a period not so much like Fordism or post-Fordism, but more like the process of primitive accumulation in which capital drove populations off the land into factory work — except in reverse. It would be the beginning of a period of futuristic accumulation, in which capital, rather than accumulating its proletarian workforce, gradually, over centuries, marginalizes and then discards it.
Others writing in the Marxist tradition see autonomism or accelerationism as viable responses to AI-capitalism. Why, in your view, are these insufficient?
Left accelerationism sees in the development of AI a promising tool for socialism, freeing people from wage labor and enhancing possibilities for economic planning. And certain lines of autonomist Marxism manifest a similar enthusiasm, based on the belief that AI development will rest on and empower the distributed techno-scientific knowledge of a still-human — even if cyborg — general intellect. These positions retain the high-modernist confidence in the ultimately progressive direction of capitalist technological development that is part of Marxism. I don’t dismiss the possibility of emancipatory uses of AI. But what is being accelerated right now, in the current trajectory of AI, is capital’s command over, and capacity to dispense with, the worker, and what is expanded is not the autonomy of labor from capital, but capital’s autonomization from the human.
These are not questions of an abstract futurism. Leaving aside the question of a long-term crisis of work, we today see the dominant applications of AI intensifying processes in play since capital began its cybernetic offensive against organized labor decades ago. These include the increasing precarity of work in a gig economy, implicated in the very making of AI itself, as well as in the deployment of machine learning by companies such as Uber or Amazon; the polarization of the workforce between an elite techno-managerial strata, charged with job automation, and a racialized and feminized service sector, whose labor is still largely too cheap to automate; the offloading onto individuals of costs for the training and upgrading of skills through which they will supposedly sustain the impacts of the fourth industrial revolution; intensifications of workplace monitoring; the linkage of this surveillance with algorithmically precision-targeted and bot-enabled vital propaganda campaigns from well-funded reactionary interests; and the incorporation of AI into a Big Data security apparatus for the disciplining of the poor, from welfare screening to preemptive policing. This mix of precarity, polarization, panopticism, propaganda, and policing constitutes — to use a phrase from David Noble, the late, great radical historian of digital technology — the “present tense” politics of capitalism’s AI project.
Do you see a path forward?
The political answer is not acceleration but refusal. And this is indeed what is has begun to manifest, in a variety of social rebellions. This includes the strikes of gig economy labor, the protests of Silicon Valley tech workers, anti-surveillance movements, urban protests against the smart city, defections from social media sites, algorithmic-bias busting, and “techlash” against the oligopolistic concentration of digital powers. This is the new composition of class against AI-capital. Such refusals will always be tarred with the label of Luddism, but in our view, this designation is simply irrelevant. The issue is now not the prevention of a nascent techno-capitalism, but a swerve away from its potentially disastrous terminus. This moment of refusal is necessary to break open the foreclosure of the future by AI-capital, to win the space for real collective governance and direction of AI.