AI reduces the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent—nuclear war
Kallenborn 19[Zachary Kallenborn, Policy Fellow at the Center for Security Policy Studies, "What if the U.S. Military Neglects AI? AI Futures and U.S. Incapacity",9-3-2019, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/what-if-the-u-s-military-neglects-ai-ai-futures-and-u-s-incapacity/, 1LEE]
The year is 2040: AI and robotics threaten nuclear deterrence and dominate the battlefield. Swarms of drones guard national borders with a mixture of advanced air and missile defenses, while massive undersea swarms rove the sea in search of nuclear submarines. Cheap drone-mounted sensors virtually eliminated costly advantages in stealth, made the ocean vastly more transparent, and created significant uncertainty in submarines as reliable second-strike platforms. Other AI capabilities help manage the system, optimize processes to keep costs low, and reduce false positives and negatives. A series of short but bloody conflicts between the United States, China and Russia in the late 2030s raised specters of new great power conflict unconstrained by nuclear weapons.
AI could threaten the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Although constant, real-time tracking of all nuclear submarines is difficult to imagine due to the massive size of the oceans, technology improvements and some luck could allow an adversary to know the locations of second-strike platforms for long enough to eliminate them in a first strike. Swarms of undersea drones and big data analysis offer great potential for new and improved anti-submarine platforms, weapons, and sensor networks. Already, some missile defenses use simple automation that could be improved with AI. Drones can also help track missiles, serve as platforms to defeat them, or simply collide with incoming missiles and aircraft. AI improvements generally enable more advanced robotic weapons, more sophisticated swarms, and better insights into data. Of course, the long history of failed attempts and huge costs of missile defense suggest elimination of nuclear deterrence is highly unlikely, but all of these developments could add up to serious risks to the reliability of nuclear deterrence.
In such a world, a United States without robust military AI capabilities is extremely insecure. The United States has neither conventional superiority nor a reliable nuclear deterrent, and must drastically rethink American grand strategy. U.S. extended deterrence guarantees would be far less effective and some states under the umbrella would likely seek their own nuclear weapons instead. South Korea and Saudi Arabia would likely become nuclear weapons states due to their established civilian nuclear programs, high relative wealth, and proximity to hostile powers in possession or recent pursuit of nuclear weapons. The United States could expand its nuclear arsenal to mitigate the harms of a less reliable deterrent, but that would require abandoning the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and other arms control treaties. Ensuring national security would mean avoiding conflict or focusing on homeland defense — rather than a forward defense posture with forces stationed on the Eurasian landmass — to increase adversary costs. Diplomacy, soft power, and international institutions remain key to national security.