Chinese dominance in tech is overhyped.
Ding ’23. [ Jeffrey Ding is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Washington University. He received his PhD from the University of Oxford and his bachelors degree from the University of Iowa.] “The U.S. May Be Overstating China’s Technological Prowess.” June 7, 2023. https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/notes-chinafile/us-may-be-overstating-chinas-technological-prowess
China’s technological prowess is frequently invoked by U.S. policymakers hoping to get votes, attention, or enough bipartisan support to pass a bill. Competition with China was a central motivating factor in federal legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, not to mention the work of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. “Beating China”—specifically in science and technology development—is a key driver of U.S. governance and, ahead of the 2024 presidential race, elections. George Washington University Assistant Professor of Political Science Jeffrey Ding published a recent article that explains why measuring a state’s scientific and technological power should include not only how many innovations a country can check off, but also the degree to which new technologies are integrated into the economy and society. Ding spoke with Johanna Costigan about his new paper. The following is an edited transcript of their conversation. —Johanna Costigan Johanna Costigan: Can you explain the distinction between innovation capacity and diffusion capacity? Jeffrey Ding: Innovation capacity refers to a state’s ability to pioneer new-to-the world breakthroughs in science and technology. Diffusion capacity refers to a state’s ability to spread those innovations across a wide range of productive processes in an economy. I argue in my paper that we tend to gravitate toward measures of innovation and pay insufficient attention to diffusion. How did diffusion occur in the second Industrial Revolution in the U.S., and why does that example show diffusion is an essential metric? In the late 19th century, the U.S. was not at the forefront of science and technology—our best and brightest went to Germany to study. Even though other nations were leading the way in fields like chemical engineering, the U.S. was much stronger in terms of diffusion capacity; it was better at applying those uses across a wide range of processes. If you only looked at which countries were winning the most Nobel Prizes or had the most advanced research institutes, you would be underestimating the scientific and technological prowess of the U.S. Assessments that are more oriented around diffusion capacity would have predicted the U.S. to sustain its economic rise and become the preeminent economic power. Back then, there wasn’t a global innovation index, but the case study was to go back and see if we rank different countries based on this, only using the innovation indicators provides an incorrect view. Diffusion is central to a state’s ability to convert science and technology into economic strength. You write that academic research in the U.S. was more closely tied to commerce than it was in Europe, which allowed American breakthroughs to spread more rapidly. Given the close relationship between government and industry in the PRC, why might that not be the case in contemporary China? The government acts as a bottleneck within China’s scitech ecosystem, stifling organic industry-university collaborations. A lot of the research happens at government institutions as opposed to corporate-sponsored R&D [research and development]. The channels between universities and industry are not as robust, so some of that has to do with surrounding legal regimes and whether university research can be translated into a startup company. Unlike China, the U.S. has a really good set of legal rules that enable that to happen. But Chinese companies are trying to address this; more AI companies, for example, are trying to set up labs in universities to foster that. But if you look at co-authorship rates in publications on AI (papers that have at least one author from a university and one from industry), those rates are very low in China compared to countries in Europe and the U.S. A lot of the story here is just the vestiges of central planning that are still in China’s scitech ecosystem and that just don’t foster the organic fast-acting processing that is required for diffusion. How would you characterize American assessments of China’s science and technology power? What’s missing? The consensus significantly overstates China’s scitech capability. One recent example from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), which while it is not American has been used to justify more extreme China policy, says China is leading the U.S. in 37 of 44 considered technologies, all of which were focused on innovation. (I don’t even think that conclusion is accurate based just on innovation.) It reflects the United States’ obsession with innovation capacity when it comes to assessing scitech power. Even if you go back and review Biden’s first remarks to Congress, he argued that China is closing in quickly and that it’s a race to see who can dominate new innovations in these technologies. The contribution of my paper is partly to argue that assumptions about innovation shape the perception that China is improving rapidly and has already taken over the U.S. in some critical technologies. Reorienting ourselves to a diffusion-centric framework is an important first step to having a more balanced understanding of what’s happening in China’s scitech ecosystem. Members of the Biden administration like Jake Sullivan have described moves like export controls aimed at China as “narrowly focused on technology that could tilt the military balance.” What do you think of that depiction, and how do judgments of relative military strength fit into the diffusion/innovation breakdown? When it comes to competition with China over military AI applications, I think the Biden administration’s approach is overly preoccupied with maintaining a lead in innovation capacity. Their theory of victory, in my view, seems to be all about preventing China from building the biggest and baddest autonomous weapon, trained on the largest amount of data using the most amount of computing power. If the history of military electrification is a useful guide for how AI will affect the military balance of power, as I argue in a recent article, then AI’s most substantial impact on military power will take decades as advances diffuse across a broad range of applications in logistics, decryption, targeting, and intelligence. Ensuring that the military is able to tap into a broad base of AI engineering talent is a more effective route to ensuring that AI’s effect on the military balance will favor the U.S. You write: “A rebalanced evaluation of China’s potential for S&T leadership requires looking beyond multinational corporations like Huawei, first-tier cities like Beijing, and flashy R&D numbers to the humble undertaking of diffusion.” Why do you think such limited analyses are tempting? Why are they dangerous? Firstly, it’s just a lot harder to get diffusion capacity indicators. Many metrics of innovation, like government R&D funding indicators, patent rates, and publication numbers are all tracked, whereas it takes more work to get indicators of diffusion capacity. Finding systematic and reliable numbers of diffusion capacity is crucial. And misleading assessments carry a few dangers. Having an accurate sense of where you stand provides a solid foundation for science and technology policy. There is something to be said about having a true—or truer—understanding of the world. Additionally, overestimating China’s scitech capabilities may lead the U.S. to engage in more reckless policies and provide more momentum for containment-type measures that backfire on both sides. It could lead to the mentality we saw in the Cold War where the U.S. was concerned about the missile gap with the Soviet Union that turned out to be illusory and resulted in wasted expenditures, spiraling fears, and an arms race that put the two superpowers on a path toward conflict. There are people in the U.S. government who probably agree with me in that a lot of assessments on China’s tech development are overhyped, but they think it’s necessary to pump up China’s prowess in order to motivate certain policies. But that could easily backfire and is a dangerous precedent to set. While that justification might in some cases be used to make sound decisions, in other cases it could be used to enact dangerous policies.
Chinese technological innovation good—spurs competition and economic growth. Jin ’23. [ Keyu Jin is an associate professor at the London School of Economics.] “The U.S. Tech Industry Needs China.” May 16, 2023. https://time.com/6280004/us-tech-china/
The U.S. economy of the 1970s was, in certain ways, quite similar to the U.S. economy today: rising inflation, a population broadly pessimistic about the future of the market, and persistent declines in overall productivity. There was also, back then, a growing economic threat from across the Pacific. Only, in the 1970s, the threat came from Japan, which was the subject of dozens of books, and even a handful of movies, as fears of it overtaking the U.S. as the world’s economic superpower loomed large. Today, the competition isn’t coming from Japan, but from China. Still, there is a lesson in history, for that period of Japanese innovation and economic growth did not turn out to be any great tragedy for the U.S. Indeed, certain sectors in the U.S. were so spurred on by the perceived Japanese threat that they ended up, by the 1980s and 1990s, dominating the global market. China might play a similar role today, not as a juggernaut to be feared, but as a competitor; one that can—as Japan once did—accelerate the pace of innovation and even bring boom times to the U.S. economy. Today, part of the fear of China’s rise has to do with the uniqueness of its model: a politically centralized system of power, coupled with a rigorously decentralized economy, wherein local governments compete to build up their own mini ‘Silicon Valleys’ all over the country. One example of this structure comes from the municipal government of Hefei, a city in eastern China of 5 million, which took a chance as early as 2008 in staking the company BOE Technology Group Co. with billions of yuan—or hundreds of millions of dollars—helping the LCD maker overtake Samsung in becoming the world’s largest manufacturer of LCD screens. The city also plays host to mega projects in quantum computing, and backed companies in the sector like CIQTEK when no private investors deemed it commercially viable. Today, Hefei has built the globally renowned “quantum avenue,” which is home to many of the world’s leading quantum companies. The Hefei government also recently saved Nio, an EV company that was on the verge of bankruptcy, by coordinating an entire supply chain—from battery makers to manufacturers—around it. Within a year of that supply chain effort, Nio’s production grew by 81%, and its market value went from $4 billion to $100 billion. Hefei is not the only city making such moves. Second-tier cities such as Shenzhen, Wuhan, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Tianjin each have their own focal areas, whether it is in autonomous vehicles, AI, semiconductor design or manufacturing. Each city has a unique approach to help companies arrange for loans, attract talent, and build up complimentary business hubs. These efforts and approaches help distribute the talent, and the wealth. China’s unicorns, second only to the U.S. in sheer numbers, are spread throughout China, not clustered in coastal cities as they are in the U.S. By the end of 2022, there were 1,500 of these municipal level government funds, totalling 2.7 trillion yuan (about $340 billion) for investing in companies. While U.S. cities and municipal governments award grants to businesses too, it is nothing on this scale, and it is usually in response to a crisis, as when Houston awarded $15 million in grants to help prop-up small businesses during the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many in the U.S. have looked on China’s astonishing rise with consternation, which again echoes how Japan was viewed in the 1970s and ’80s. The seminal moment came when the Japanese semiconductor industry began to leap ahead of the U.S. in the late 1970s—despite the U.S. being the birthplace of the microchip. The U.S. reaction then was also not too dissimilar to the skirmishes with China today: it raised 100% tariffs on Japanese products, put in place voluntary export controls, and sued Japanese manufacturers for patent infringement. But more importantly, and lastingly, the reaction from the U.S. wasn’t purely negative. Both U.S. companies and the U.S. government took inspiration from Japan’s novel innovation ecosystem that integrated its national labs and universities with its industries. Japan’s ascent spurred the U.S. to pass the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act in 1980, to facilitate collaboration between researchers in national labs and academia with industry. The same year, the Bayh-Dole Act and the Small Business Patent Act incentivized professors to patent and universities to license breakthroughs, which encouraged an active transfer of technology from the ivory tower into private industry. As a result of these changes, productivity growth soared throughout the 1990s and 2000s thanks to lab-grown innovations like the world wide web, the digital camera, and the smartphone. The contemporary parallel of leapfrogging a homegrown U.S. industry is now happening with China, which has for more than a decade now completely dominated solar panel manufacturing, and is also currently the biggest player in the electric vehicle market—two industries that were pioneered in the U.S.. Here, too, lessons from the past abound: In the 1980s, U.S. firms folded in aspects of Japanese manufacturing to aggressively innovate with their competitors across the Pacific. As a result of these changes, manufacturing capacity rose; American companies focused on a narrower set of products and differentiated; microchips got faster, better, and cheaper. By the mid 1990’s, the U.S. firms were surging to dominate markets such as micro components, with a 72% market share. Much of the world today, where chips are in everything from our coffee makers to our cars, is owed to this period of fierce competition and innovation between Japan and the U.S. This is, at its essence, why this moment of Chinese competition with the U.S. is so crucial—not simply because it would lead to more innovation by each of these nations, but because, in the end, this sort of competition benefits consumers the world over. We see this firsthand with solar, where the cost of solar panels has declined by 80% since 2010; it is now the cheapest source of energy in the world. This can also be seen in the ongoing competition between the Chinese EV maker BYD and U.S.-based Tesla, where more affordable and better-quality cars are the result of their competition. It can even be seen in Big Tech: Facebook took inspiration from WeChat’s payment option in its chat functions, and Amazon’s Prime Day echoes China’s Singles day. China’s new “juguo” system of governmental management, which takes a whole of nation approach, is inspired by both the Japanese system of integration of its public universities and private businesses, as well as the sort of sweeping government projects in the U.S.—such as the Apollo Program or the Manhattan Project—that have had such world shifting results. Rather than turn away from China, or force China to turn away from the U.S., evidence and history has shown that greater competition leads to greater innovation, which will inevitably lead to more growth. It is not as though China and the U.S. have no collaboration already. In fact, the two nations have generated the largest amount of cross-national published research in AI than any other two nations (the second most productive pair is the U.S. and the U.K.) There are plenty of good models for collaborative competition happening at this very essential moment, when the world is embarking on a green transition. The German government, for example, is ramping up its battery manufacturing sector, and building it atop Chinese technology. Major car manufacturers such as Ford and Toyota have been investing in Chinese electric vehicle companies so that they can incorporate Chinese tech in their cars, and bring that tech to the American, Japanese, and European markets. Tesla opted for a Chinese battery maker Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. (CATL), which has factories in Germany. Any nation that chooses to develop its technologies in isolation is likely to see its technological advancement slow down. The lesson of the past is not to run from international competition and cede the field in certain sectors, but to learn from your competitor, rise to the occasion, and innovate to win.