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Cultural changes are the leading cause of populism, not economic factors like job loss – best studies prove.

Margalit 19 [Yotam Margalit is the Brian Mulroney Chair in Government at the School of Political Science and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University and a Professor in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London. He is also a non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Governance and Economics at the Israel Democracy Institute. He graduated with honors from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, receiving his B.A. in Economics and History. He received his PhD in 2009 from Stanford University, “Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered on JSTOR,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 33, no. 4, 2918, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26796840, accessed 7-20-2023, HKR-SWY]

The explanatory weakness of measures of personal economic circumstances is also evident in recent analyses of support for populist parties. As Gidron and Hall (2017) report in a study of vote choice in 20 developed democracies, even after throwing into the regression a wide array of economic predictors, the share of the variation explained is 0.07.3 Another study of individual-level support for populist parties in six western European countries (Oesch 2008) finds that employment characteristics and sociodemographics exhibited a similarly weak empirical relationship with the populist vote (R2 ranging from 0.019 in Switzerland to 0.078 in Norway). Some of the low explanatory power is probably due to attenuation bias resulting from measurement error. But this result is not merely an artifact of survey design. It reflects a broader point, which is that people’s understanding of issues such as immigration, trade openness, or EU market integration—frequent targets of populist ire—are shaped by more than just their economic impact on individuals. Specifically, public disaffection about those issues also reflects concerns related to their social and cultural consequences.

Indeed, an alternative explanation for widespread populist support views it as a backlash against cultural change (for a comprehensive discussion, see Inglehart and Norris 2016). On this view, long-term structural social developments— increased access to higher education, growing ethnic diversity, urbanization, more equal gender roles—have led to greater acceptance of diverse lifestyles, religions, and cultures. These changes, and the perceived displacement of traditional social values, have caused a sense of resentment among segments of the population in the West, particularly among white men, older people, conservatives, and those with less formal qualifications. Increased exposure to foreign influences that comes with globalization, and even more so the effects of waves of immigration, has exacerbated the sense of a cultural and demographic threat. As a result, formerly predominant majorities have felt their social standing erode and have become increasingly receptive to populist charges against a disconnected, cosmopolitan elite that has turned its back on them. They have also bought into the populist nostalgia for a “golden age” of cultural homogeneity, traditional values, and a strong national identity. Hard economic times undermine the perceived competence of the economic and political elites and thus help fuel the populist distrust in them. Yet by this account, adverse economic change is a contributing factor and possibly a trigger. However, is not the root cause of widespread populist support.

There’s an obvious, and understandable, reluctance to accept such “soft” explanations. A cultural explanation of populism is hard to test quantitatively, let alone to identify causally. Yet that doesn’t mean that a cultural explanation is incorrect. Indeed, some of the economics-centered studies cited above acknowledge the potential role of cultural concerns in explaining the populist vote but treat them as outside the purview of their analysis. Others contend that cultural concerns are simply a by-product of adverse economic changes. As one recent study put it: “Populism does not have a cultural cause, but rather an economic insecurity cause, with an important and traceable cultural channel” (Guiso et al. 2017, emphasis in original). I disagree. Subsuming of cultural concerns as part of an economic reaction wrongly dismisses the independent impact of cultural factors in driving support for populism. Moreover, it ignores evidence of a causal relationship that runs also in the opposite direction: namely, that cultural concerns and grievances shape people’s beliefs about economic change and its adverse impact on their standing. Some of the economic issues that populists rail against reflect this process.

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