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Fears of populism are overhyped – no democratic backsliding

Weyland 21 [Kurt Weyland is professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin. He has published Assault on Democracy: Communism, Fascism, and Authoritarianism During the Interwar Years (2021) and several earlier books and many articles. He has drawn on a range of theoretical and methodological approaches, including insights from cognitive psychology, and has done extensive field research in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela. After receiving a Staatsexamen from Johannes-Gutenberg Universitat Mainz in 1984, a M.A. from UT in 1986, and a Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1991. He has received research support from the SSRC and NEH and was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, “How Populism Dies: Political Weaknesses of Personalistic Plebiscitarian Leadership,” Political Science Quarterly, 12-22-2021, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.13277, accessed 7-20-2023, HKR-SWY]

But although it has important justifications, the recent fear of populism has gone too far. Certainly, personalistic leaders seek to establish their unchallenged predominance, which would smother democracy. But they are far from always succeeding. Instead, many fail. As a result, populism is not nearly as universally damaging to liberal pluralism as it looks in theory. Fortunately, recent concerns overestimate the danger posed by personalistic plebiscitarian leadership. Thorough investigations suggest a decidedly mixed picture: populism seems to destroy democracy only under specific, restrictive conditions.9 To avoid unnecessary panic—never a good guide for theoretical reflection, empirical examination, and defensive and remedial political action—it is crucial to arrive at a realistic assessment of populism that recognizes and elucidates the threat but does not overrate it either.

After all, theoretical analysis shows that populism is a high-risk political strategy. While some charismatic leaders can gain amazing preeminence and asphyxiate democracy, this dangerous quest also holds many pitfalls and carries substantial probabilities of failure. In the high-wire act of pursuing political hegemony based on unorganized mass support and in confrontation with established elites, it is easy to fall. Therefore, many populist leaders do not succeed in undermining democracy. Moreover, quite a few of them refrain from initiating a serious attack on liberal pluralism, especially after a prior effort in their country has failed.

Indeed, statistical analyses find that only “24 per cent of populist leaders who assume office in a democratic country initiate democratic backsliding,”10 and only one-third of populist governments effect significant democratic deterioration.11 Wide-ranging comparative case studies confirm that populist chief executives suffocate democracy with such low frequency, only when fairly stringent conditions happen to coincide.12 Interestingly, the emblematic instances of populist destruction of democracy, Fujimori, Chávez, Orbán, and Erdoğan—the only populist chief executives examined in Levitsky and Ziblatt's book and Robert Kaufman and Stephan Haggard's article13—constitute outliers to the statistical regularity that “most countries survive populist governments without experiencing democratic backsliding.”14 By considering only the few noteworthy cases of populist leaders who managed to smother democracy, a problematic “selection on the dependent variable,” extant analyses paint too dark a picture. In reality, democracy often persists despite populist strangulation attempts, or it recovers quickly (albeit with blemishes) after their perpetrator's rule ends.

Thus, populism does not have the overwhelming power that recent observers have seen. The electoral victory of a personalistic plebiscitarian leader, while troublesome, is far from dooming liberal democracy. Fortunately, the intense concern that has erupted in recent years is not fully justified. To substantiate this point and thus complement recent studies that have investigated the conditions under which populist leaders do strangle democracy,15 I examine “the other side,” namely, the many problems and risks that populist chief executives face. After Levitsky and Ziblatt's book analyzed how democracies die, I conversely probe how, and how easily, populism can “die.” For this purpose, the present article elucidates the mechanisms and pathways through which populist leaders prematurely fall from office and fail to asphyxiate democracy. After systematically examining a variety of cases that exemplify populism's weaknesses, I document the frequency of these troubles and risks by assessing all populist governments in Latin America and Europe since 1985 (see Table 1).16 While the multiplicity of cases and the complex interweaving of causal factors preclude determining the probability of these different types of populist downfall, the following analysis of the number and cumulation of—often self-inflicted—problems shows why many populist chief executives do not command the sustained and overwhelming clout required for destroying democracy.

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