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Democracy is resilient – populist leaders make mistakes and fail.

Oppenheimer 22 [Daniel M. Oppenheimer is a professor of psychology at Carnegie Mellon University in the Department of Social and Decision Sciences. Previously, he was a professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management. From 2004 to 2012, he worked at Princeton University's Department of Psychology. He won the 2006 Ig Nobel Prize in Literature. He earned his BA at Rice University and his MA and PhD from Stanford University, “How Populism Dies: Political scientist Kurt Weyland sees a bright-ish future for liberal democracy,” 10-21-2022, https://lifeandletters.la.utexas.edu/2022/10/how-populism-dies-political-scientist-kurt-weyland-sees-a-bright-ish-future-for-liberal-democracy/, accessed 7-20-2023, HKR-SWY]

“If you look at the really big picture, what we’ve seen over time is waves of democracy,” said Weyland. “Democracy advances in bursts and then there is a recession. When these waves are underway, some countries move to democracy that aren’t quite ready for it, in terms of the strength of their institutions, and then lo and behold they backslide.”

Weyland says that we are currently in the backsliding phase of what scholar Samuel Huntington called “Democracy’s Third Wave.” This wave began in the mid-1970s, with the demise of authoritarian governments in Portugal, Greece, and Spain. It crested in the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the democratization of countries like South Africa and Kenya in sub-saharan Africa. It then plateaued for a while, and really began receding around 2010.

From this longer-term perspective, says Weyland, the highly visible populist successes of the past six or seven years—the victory of Trump, the continuing consolidation of power by Erdoğan in Turkey, the electoral prowess of Marine Le Pen in France—should be concerning but not terrifying. It feels like something new is going on, but in fact most democracies are persisting. Most that don’t are predictable manifestations of our current phase of democratic recession. And while there are a few outliers, there are always outliers in history.

“The recent fear of populism has gone too far,” he writes in “How Populism Dies: Political Weaknesses of Personalistic Plebiscitarian Leadership,” published last spring in Political Science Quarterly. “Certainly, personalistic leaders seek to establish their unchallenged predominance, which would smother democracy.

But they are far from always succeeding. Instead, many fail. As a result, populism is not nearly as universally damaging to liberal pluralism as it looks in theory.”

Weyland defines populism as a political movement or strategy that is highly dependent on the charismatic leadership of a single figure who acts as a personal embodiment of his (very occasionally her) followers’ hopes. Populist figures tend to run in rhetorical opposition to the elites of a given society, promising to return power to the common folk, and they draw their political and electoral strength from the energies of the masses rather than from the power of political parties or other establishment entities.

What Weyland has found in his research, which looks at the range of populist challenges to European and Latin American democracies since 1985, is that while populist leaders often threaten to erode democracy in various ways, they typically fail to realize those threats. In fact, says Weyland, it is often the same qualities that make populist leaders attractive in the short run—their extreme confidence, their antipathy to elites, and their desire to steamroll bureaucratic structures—that lead to their failure in the medium and long term.

“These movements are all focused on one personality,” says Weyland. “The leader is totally domineering, and the belief is that he incarnates the will of people. But domineering personalism makes populist governance very error prone. It’s really hard for one person to make decisions on such a wide range of things. If they don’t listen much to expertise, if they don’t take advantage of the capacities of the bureaucracies, there is a good likelihood they won’t understand things, and will end up making mistakes.”

In fact it’s much worse than that for these leaders, says Weyland. Because they operate outside of traditional political, legal, and bureaucratic structures, they are not only bad at checking corruption, they are more likely to deploy corrupt means as a means of maintaining power. More corruption leads to worse governmental outcomes and, if publicly exposed, an erosion in mass support. Populists’ hostility to the existing political elites breeds powerful enemies, who often bide their time until the populist leader is vulnerable, at which point they strike back. And overcoming the checks and balances of even flawed democracies is just really hard, particularly when you’ve already compromised your capacity to make good decisions and alienated political elites.

The result, says Weyland, is that even when populists succeed in taking power, as they have in dozens of countries over the last few decades, they tend not to last too long or to inflict much enduring damage to democratic structures. Even in those cases where democracy suffers, it often rebounds after the populist leader is voted or otherwise forced out.

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