Pilots prove a UBI solves and reduces stigma
Redmond et al 22’ [Paul Redmond earned his PhD in Economics from Maynooth University and is a Senior Research Officer at the Economic & Social Research Institute. Seamus McGuinness earned his PhD in Economics from Queens University Belfast and is a Research Professor and the Research Area Co-ordinator for labour market research at the Economic and Social Research Institute. Klavs Ciprikis earned his PhD in Economics from Technological University Dublin and is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Economic Analysis Division of the Economic & Social Research Institute. 12-20-22, ESRI Research Series 146, “A universal basic income for Ireland: Lessons from the international literature,” https://doi.org/10.26504/rs146]
The Finish basic income experiment was carried out from January 2017 to December 2018. A random sample of 7,000 people between 25 and 58 years old were selected from a nationwide group of 173,000 people who were receiving basic unemployment benefits. The sample was separated into a ‘treatment group’ of 2,000 people who received basic income only and a ‘control group’ of 5,000 people who continued to receive basic unemployment benefits only. Participation in the experiment was mandatory. People in the treatment group received a basic monthly income of €560, which was unconditional, tax exempt and not affected by income from work. The net benefit of basic income was similar to the net benefit of basic unemployment benefits (Kangas, 2019). Initially, both groups were identical in terms of sociodemographic characteristics, and any changes in economic status and unemployment at the end of the experiment may be due to the provision of basic income. 5.5.3 Findings and analysis Persons receiving basic income experienced greater life satisfaction and fewer mental health problems than the control group, and felt better about their economic security.34 In general, no significant employment effect was observed in the first year of the experiment; however, for families with children employment rates improved during both years of the experiment.35 Participants were interviewed and surveyed during and after the basic income experiment. The treatment group reported that their trust in other people and social institutions improved compared to the control group, and that they had higher confidence in future possibilities.36 5.6 BARCELONA (SPAIN) 5.6.1 Aims and objectives The aim of Barcelona’s B-MINCOME pilot was to improve incomes and civic engagement, and to mitigate poverty and social exclusion (Colini, 2019). Its objective was to test the effectiveness of a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) in deprived and disadvantaged communities in Barcelona. Therefore, it was not a true UBI experiment. 5.6.2 Scope of the study The B-MINCOME experiment ran from November 2017 to October 2019. A random sample of 1,000 low-income households were selected from potential candidates from ten of Barcelona’s most deprived areas. An additional 383 households participated passively as the control group. Household members had to be registered in Barcelona, at least one household member had to be between 25 and 60 years old, and participants had to avail of municipal social services at the time of the experiment (Riutort et al., 2021). Each household in the treatment group was entitled to GMI between €100 and €1,676 per month. The amount of GMI depended on household maintenance costs and other sources of income. Some of the B-Mincome participants were also required to participate in active policies, such as training and employment, social entrepreneurship programme and community participation. 5.6.3 Findings and analysis The findings of Barcelona’s experiment showed that basic income alleviated the feeling of financial uncertainty and stress, which also contributed to significant improvements in individual wellbeing and life satisfaction when compared to the control group (Riutort et al., 2021). However, B-Mincome’s active policies did not increase willingness for entrepreneurship activities or the need to find quality work. In fact, the project as a whole reduced labour market participation, though those who participated in training and employment programmes and received GMI saw a positive impact on work placements. In terms of financial stability, some households acquired economic independence and were able to plan for the future, while other households did not manage to get out of financial hardship. 5.7 OTHER EXPERIMENTS 5.7.1 The Netherlands A GMI experiment ran from 2018 to 2020 in the city of Utrecht. The aim of the experiment was to restructure social assistance payments to find the best way to guide people on guaranteed basic income towards employment and social participation (Verlaat et al., 2020). A total of 752 participants were divided into four groups: the control group; those receiving the payment but with no obligation to find and accept work; those receiving the payment and extra help and guidance in finding employment; and those receiving the payment while also keeping a large proportion of income from work (Verlaat et al., 2020). Key findings indicate that in all programmes, labour market participation improved, as did recipients’ health and wellbeing and sense of autonomy. 5.7.2 Alaska (US) In 1982, the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend was introduced to redistribute profits from the oil industry to all citizens of Alaska in a form of UBI. Dividend payments are affected by company performance, which means that cash transfers are not consistent over time. The payment started at $331 in 1984, but had increased to $2,072 by 2015 (Marinescu, 2019). Jones and Marinescu (2018) found no effect of the dividend payment on employment but observed an increase in part-time work. 5.7.3 North Carolina (US) Since 1997, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina, the US, have used dividend transfers to redistribute profits from a casino on tribal land to every tribal member without condition (Marinescu, 2019). The basic income guarantee in 2016 was $12,000 per adult (CSJ, 2018). There are approximately 14,000 tribal members entitled to basic income. Over the years, guaranteed basic-income recipients were more likely to be lifted out of poverty than those without basic income, less likely to develop psychological problems, such as depression and anxiety, and children were more likely to stay in school longer (CSJ, 2018). Marinescu (2019) also found that basic-income recipients work the same number of hours as those who do not receive guaranteed income. The level of basic income is linked to business performance and profits, which may not provide a stable and reliable basic income for recipients. 5.7.4 Brazil In Marica, Brazil, approximately one-quarter, or 42,000, of that city’s citizens are enrolled in a GMI programme, which has been operating since 2015 (JFI, 2020). Initially, each recipient received the equivalent of US$58 in mumbuca, Marica’s digital currency, per month. This is approximately 30 per cent of Brazil’s minimum monthly income. Since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the payment temporarily increased to US$130 in mumbuca currency. Those who have lived in Marica for at least three years and are part of a household earning less than three times Brazil’s minimum monthly income are entitled to the payment. The main objective of the programme is to alleviate poverty, address economic inequality and improve job security. Although more people receiving the payment are lifted out of poverty, there is little research estimating the long-term effects of Marica’s programme. 5.8 MINIMUM-INCOME SCHEMES IN THE EU AND OECD Immervoll (2009) provides a useful, and comprehensive, overview of general minimum-income schemes in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In developing a typology of minimumincome benefits, Immervoll (2009) describes them as, ‘cash or in-kind transfers that aim at preventing extreme hardship and employ a low-income criterion as the central entitlement condition’. Examples include payments such as unemployment benefits that are not related to social insurance contributions and means-tested lone parent/family benefits. It is important that such benefits are accompanied by activation measures to allow individuals re-enter employment, where possible. However, Immervoll (2009) notes that the most immediate priority of minimumincome benefits is to prevent individuals from going without minimum safety nets at a time when they are most needed. Within the EU, the right to an adequate minimum income is stated explicitly in Principle 14 of the European Pillar of Social Rights: Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum-income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services. For those who can work, minimum-income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market. Konle-Seidl (2021) assesses the adequacy of minimum-income support in the EU, where adequacy is based on the at-risk-of-poverty rate. Konle-Seidl (2021) notes that while levels of minimum income vary considerably across the EU, Ireland is the only country where benefit levels for a single member household are close to the poverty threshold. In other countries, minimum-income supports often fall far below the poverty threshold. This is especially true in Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Slovakia.37 Therefore, even in the absence of a UBI, Ireland appears to perform better than other EU countries at providing a minimum income for those that need it most. The estimated cost of a UBI for Ireland This section examines four possible universal basic income (UBI) policies in Ireland. The ‘baseline UBI’, the option that most closely resembles a true UBI, involves a non-means-tested, universal payment to every adult in the State that is equivalent to the 2019 at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which amounts to 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable household income (€1,200 per month). The second example applies a lower UBI, equivalent to 50 per cent of median equivalised disposable household income (€1,000 per month). In the third example, we examine a UBI equivalent to the current social welfare rate of €208 per week. Finally, in the fourth example, we examine the type of UBI that could be paid for a given fixed gross amount, equivalent to €10 billion per year. 6.1 A UNIVERSAL, NON-MEANS-TESTED UBI EQUAL TO 60 PER CENT OF MEDIAN INCOME According to the 2016 Census of Population, there were 3,424,935 individuals aged over 18 years of age in Ireland.38 A true UBI, as defined above, would involve a sufficiently large payment to each individual to allow them to live on. While we discuss different thresholds and payments in greater detail below, a reasonable estimate of the minimum income required to ensure a person is not in poverty is the ‘at risk of poverty’ threshold. This is defined as 60 per cent of median annual equivalised income, which amounted to €14,387 in 2019.39 This indicates that a single person would need to earn in excess of this amount to exceed the poverty threshold, which is equivalent to a monthly payment of €1,200 per person. A UBI set at this level would have a gross cost of just under €50 billion per annum.40 To put this in context, total expenditure on all social welfare programmes in 2019 was €20.9 billion (DEASP, 2019). While we base the rate of UBI on the at risk of poverty threshold, it is important to note that this would not represent a viable basis for calculating a UBI on a continuous basis. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is 60 per cent of median income. Therefore, implementing a UBI would increase the at-risk-of-poverty threshold by altering the income distribution. As such, the at-risk-of-poverty threshold could not be used to re-calculate the UBI going forward, as it would lead to a scenario where the UBI is constantly increasing in response to increases in the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which itself was caused by a higher UBI. Nonetheless, the 2019 threshold provides a useful starting point for thinking about a UBI rate that would enable individuals to achieve an acceptable standard of living. 6.2 A UNIVERSAL, NON-MEANS-TESTED UBI EQUAL TO 50 PER CENT OF MEDIAN INCOME A UBI equivalent to 50 per cent of 2019 median equivalised annual income amounts to a monthly payment of €1,000 per person, or €12,000 per year. The gross cost of such a UBI would amount to €41 billion.41 This is approximately double the total social welfare expenditure in 2019. 6.3 A UNIVERSAL, NON-MEANS-TESTED UBI EQUAL TO CURRENT SOCIAL WELFARE RATE (€208 PER WEEK) A UBI set at the current social welfare payment rate of €208 per week amounts to a yearly payment of €10,816. The gross cost of such a UBI paid to 3,424,935 individuals would amount to €37 billion. However, a UBI payment equal to the prevailing social welfare rate has received the following recent criticism by Green Party (2019) as being too low: As the aim of a UBI is to lift the greatest proportion of the populace out of poverty it is assumed that current levels of welfare payments are not sufficient to do so or do not represent a fair redistribution of national income to achieve lower levels of poverty within the state. The Green Party believes that the UBI should be benchmarked to the most recent data on poverty rates and minimum disposable incomes with an ongoing review process that resets rates on a five year basis. 6.4 A UBI COSTING A TOTAL OF €10 BILLION PER YEAR (GROSS) The costs associated with implementing a UBI similar to those outlined above (Sections 6.1–6.3) are high in gross terms. A more feasible approach may be to initially designate an appropriate and realistic cost that could be allocated to a UBI, and then calculate what could be achieved given this outlay. For example, what could be achieved for a total gross cost of €10 billion per year? Assuming again a population consisting of 3,424,935 individuals aged over 18 years of age, this would amount to €2,920 per year, or €243 per month, per person. These examples underline the inherent trade-off facing all proposed UBI policies. While a key feature of a true UBI is that it provides an adequate level of income to achieve an acceptable standard of living, the practical costs of implementing such a policy may be large. We stress that we are providing basic calculations of gross cost. Any UBI policy would likely involve significant changes to the tax and benefit system. Earlier work has indicated that financing a UBI through income tax could require a high tax rate, in the order of 50 or 60 per cent (see Callan et al., 1994; Callan et al., 2000; Honohan, 1987). More recently, Green Party (2019) suggests alternative financing through a tax on pension funds, a site-value tax, a speculative transaction tax, an increase in stamp duty for property trades that do not relate to the principal private residence, and the replacement of the 20 per cent tax rate with the higher (40 per cent) rate. A more detailed analysis of the impacts of such funding mechanisms could be explored through microsimulation analysis. One of the core advantages of a UBI is that it could potentially replace some, or all, existing social welfare payments. Having one unconditional payment could greatly reduce administrative costs associated with means tests, while also removing any stigma of benefit receipt among recipients. Ultimately, the decision as to which of the existing benefits that could be replaced is a task for policymakers. To inform this decision, we show the payment amounts associated with specific social welfare payments in appendix Tables B.1 and B.2. For example, in 2019, spending on Jobseeker’s Allowance and Jobseeker’s Benefit was €1.6 billion and €350 million respectively. When weighing up the cost of a UBI, it is important to factor in the savings on any benefits that it may replace.