Theorizing the gift radically reconceptualizes the idea of debt: the Aff, by enacting deficit spending—buying credit by taking out a debt it has no intention of returning in service of its gift-giving—rethinks economics outside of restrictive frames and frees the gift from the implicit expectation of reciprocity as an act of deliberate waste.
McGoey ‘18 – Linsey McGoey is a Canadian sociologist and academic based in England. She is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. “Bataille and the Sociology of Abundance: Reassessing Gifts, Debt and Economic Excess” in Theory, Culture & Society: Special Issue: Bataille and Heterology, Vol. 35(4–5), 07/28/2017, pg. 81-84; DOI: 10.1177/0263276416637905 | RN *Modified for problematic language **4pt text is just a critique of certain readings of Mauss—no Neg cards hidden
What is less known today is that Mauss, like Keynes, was preoccupied with challenging the imposition of war reparations. He published numerous financial journalism articles underscoring the negative economic repercussions of debt repayment efforts. A recent body of scholarship has even suggested that Mauss may have written The Gift in order in part to emphasize the importance of debt forgiveness by sovereign states (see, in particular, Mallard, 2011).
Why is Mauss’s writing on debt relief largely overlooked today? The problem rests partly with Mauss. During his career, he endeavoured to keep his political and financial journalism separate from his anthropological writing. Keith Hart suggests that this separation has been entrenched and exaggerated by his followers since then, many of whom treat The Gift as a masterful synthesis of earlier ethnographic studies (Mauss himself did not conduct primary research for it), with much to say about the social implications of reciprocity as a means of exchange, but with less relevance for understanding the geopolitics of sovereign states (Hart, 2014: 34).
In line with Hart, I suggest that reconciling Mauss’s writing on sovereign debts with his writing on gifts is vital for understanding the contribution that both Mauss and Bataille make to theories of economic surplus. So, what were Mauss’s views on war reparations? And how integral are they to understanding gift-giving and sacrifice, in both Mauss’s and Bataille’s work?
To date, scholarship on Mauss has often rested in polar camps. In one camp, there are, to summarize them crudely, the economic reductionists who read The Gift as evidence of the universality of homo economicus. Pierre Bourdieu and Mary Douglas are two exemplars of this group. However much Mauss tried to distance himself from what he saw as the narrow utilitarian precepts of neoclassical economics, The Gift is littered with examples of the personal and communal rewards that stem from gift-giving. These examples provide ample ammunition for the reductionists. Bourdieu takes the line that gifts are simply self-maximizing economic transactions by another name. Gifts, he suggests, can be even more financially crippling for recipients than economic loans, as the latter carry explicit interest rates, re-payment criteria and so on, while the former engender unspoken expectations. A gift’s power lies in the wordlessness it evokes, its establishment of a debt that has not been voiced and may, therefore, be harder to dispel (Bourdieu, 1997).
In many ways, Douglas is even more reductionist than Bourdieu. Though she takes pains to detail Mauss’s opposition to British utilitarian thought, she also manages to bring him into that camp, suggesting compatibility between Mauss and Adam Smith that betrays the nuance in Mauss’s analysis. ‘The gift cycle echoes Adam Smith’s invisible hand’, Douglas writes. ‘Gift complements market in so far as it operates where the latter is absent’ (Douglas, 1990: xiv).
Mauss would likely have resented the comparison. Smith is not mentioned by name in the essay, but the legacy of the invisible hand metaphor is clearly one that Mauss wishes to overturn. He laments the all-pervasive influence of self-interest as an explanatory device for human action, an ascension that he traces to the early 18th century: ‘One can almost date – since Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees – the triumph of the notion of individual interest’ (Mauss, 1990: 76). For Mauss, this triumph is clearly a destructive one, obscuring attention to the fact that individual interest is always interspersed with communal constraints and goals. What often drives economic decision-making, he argues, is not narrow calculation, but ‘other, purer sentiments: charity, social service, and solidarity. The themes of the gift, of generosity and self-interest that are linked in giving, are reappearing in French society, as a dominant motif too long forgotten’ (Mauss, 1990: 87).
David Graeber is, perhaps, the best exemplar of the second camp: those who, contra Bourdieu and Douglas, stress Mauss’s emphasis on the social rather than self-interested nature of gift-giving (see Graeber, 2001, 2011). Graeber’s reading of Mauss is likely the most faithful to Mauss’s intended meaning, capturing Mauss’s inheritance from Durkheim and their joint efforts to challenge the conventional opposition of the social and the individual. Mauss criticized that opposition: the meta-separation of society and subject that begets numerous sub-separations: economy and politics; freedom and constraint; change and continuation. As Mauss writes: ‘These concepts of law and economics that it pleases us to contrast: liberty and obligation; liberality, generosity, and luxury, as against savings, interest, and utility – it would be good to put them into the melting pot once more’ (1990: 93).
The problem is, how can one describe the melting pot except with reference to its constituent parts? The challenge that Mauss faces is almost identical to the terminological difficulties that Bataille describes in his introduction to The Accursed Share and in earlier writings on heterology. Both Mauss and Bataille sought to subvert the opposition of gifts and debt, of excess and parsimony. Today, the parallel between gifts and modern debts is better recognized, in large degree thanks to Graeber’s recent work on debt. But what of the second pairing: excess and parsimony?
Since the 1940s, when Keynes and Bataille advanced separate proposals for the deliberate dissipation of surplus wealth, their injunctions to states and populaces have been mostly ignored. Today, the idea that states should wilfully restrain their trade surpluses strikes most as absurd and even blasphemous. Certainly the suggestion that Germany should be compelled to invest in debtor nations in order to salvage a poorer neighbour’s economy strikes many as an unfair imposition at best, and an inexcusable affront to German independence at worst. This is not dissimilar to the climate post-First World War, when popular sentiment in Britain, the US and France sided with retribution rather than debt forgiveness.
It was in this climate that Mauss first developed his theories on sovereign debt forgiveness. A compelling analysis by Grégoire Mallard is particularly instructive here. Initially, as Mallard writes, Mauss was less critical of the terms of the Versailles Treaty than Keynes. Along with other influential ‘solidarist’ intellectuals, including Charles Gide, a leader of the cooperatist movement and professor of political economy, Mauss believed that Europe as whole, both allied and axis powers, owed a debt to the civilian victims of the catastrophic war, including Belgians and Frenchmen who lost private wealth. In Mallard’s words, the solidarists ‘saw in the principle of reparations a formidable advance for civilization precisely because the Treaty clearly distinguished reparations from indemnities’. In the words of one solidarist, Le ́ on Blum, the payments ‘where neither a punitive sanction, nor a war bounty, but a reparations for damages caused . . . this notion of reparation is a new right, a rule of collective solidarity, a principle of national insurance’ (Mallard, 2011: 230).
Mallard points out that there was strong tension between how the solidarists conceived of reparations and how the French government perceived them. Mauss and his colleagues saw the payments as a shared responsibility, one that necessitated sacrifice among both German and French taxpayers. The government and their nationalist supporters, on the other hand, wanted Germany punished. As cash-strapped Germany struggled to meet its reparation debts, the British government suggested postponing repayments to a later date. France refused to back a moratorium. ‘The main cause of the deadlock’, Mallard suggests, ‘was temporal: prefiguring Mauss’s reflection in The Gift, no nation wanted to be the first to give, as a gift would be perceived as a sign of weakness, not strength’ (2011: 236).