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Previous social security pilot programs show the usefulness of pilot programs on insight into the process

Neeraj Sood et al 11[9-1-2011. Neeraj Sood (nsood@healthpolicy.usc.edu) is director of international programs at the Leonard D. Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics and an associate professor in the Titus Family Department of Clinical Pharmacy, Pharmaceutical Economics, and Policy, both at the University of Southern California, in Los Angeles. Peter J. Huckfeldt is an associate economist at RAND, in Santa Monica, California. José J. Escarce is a professor of medicine in the David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles. David C. Grabowski is an associate professor in the Department of Health Care Policy at Harvard Medical School, in Boston, Massachusetts. Joseph P. Newhouse is the John D. MacArthur Professor of Health Policy and Management at Harvard University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts., . "Medicare’s Bundled Payment Pilot For Acute And Postacute Care: Analysis And Recommendations On Where To Begin". https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0394. 7-13-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

Bundled payments are increasingly seen as a way to reduce Medicare costs, increase coordination of care, and improve quality of care. Bundling could mitigate some of the negative incentives of the current system—which result in a lack of care coordination, movement of patients among care sites for the purposes of maximizing reimbursement, and other effects that raise costs and probably produce worse outcomes for patients. However, bundling may also have unintended adverse consequences, such as restricting patients’ choice of postacute care providers and stinting on care.

Fortunately, it may be possible to design mechanisms that reduce the impact of these consequences. As the national pilot program for payment bundling moves forward, Medicare should consider including in it pay-for-performance—a quality monitoring and regulation system—to alleviate incentives to skimp. 1 Applying an outlier system of payments to a substantial number of patients, or even to all patients, could also reduce skimping, as well as providers’ financial risk and limitations on patients’ choice of postacute care providers. The general idea would be to have some additional payment—however small—over and above the payment bundle, to be paid in the event of a particularly high-cost case. Finally, contracts that allow for gain and loss sharing could balance the need to achieve savings with the amount of risk placed on providers.

In addition to learning from experience with similar payment systems in other domains, analyzing existing data from Medicare itself can provide insights about how best to design the pilot program on bundled payment. These data can be useful in determining the optimal length for an episode of care and the number and type of conditions to be included in the program.

Our findings on how financial risk and opportunities to reduce cost differ among conditions point toward lower extremity joint replacement and hip fracture as good candidates for conditions to include. Our findings also suggest that increasing the episode length would capture more costs and readmissions, without adding unduly to providers’ financial risk.

The most useful pilot program would not only provide information about the costs and benefits of bundled payments but would also give us evidence on the effects of alternative design features. The recent Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative offers another important avenue for studying the effects of alternative bundled payment designs. Such evidence would be of value not only to Medicare, but also to Medicaid and private insurers, as payment innovation spreads throughout the health care system.

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