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The regulatory state must build flexibility in response to existential risk.

Dr. Tom Pegram & Julia Kreienkamp 19, Pegram is Associate Professor in Global Governance and the Deputy Director of the Global Governance Institute; Kreienkamp is a researcher at the UCL Global Governance Institute, where she also works on the Horizon 2020 project Global Governance and the European Union: Future Trends and Scenarios (GLOBE), “Governing Complexity: Design Principles for Improving the Governance of Global Catastrophic Risks,” Global Governance Institute, November 2019, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global-governance/sites/global-governance/files/governing_complex_global_catastrophic_risks_ggi_policy_brief_nov2019.pdf

Articles in the New York Magazine might ask, ‘why we don’t seem able to imagine climate catastrophe?’ (Wallace-Wells 2017). But increasingly the prospect of possible catastrophe and, in the extreme, human extinction, is informing policymaking at the highest levels, as well as society at large (Castelloe 2018). And, many would argue, with good reason. From climate change and ecosystem collapse, to parasitic artificial general intelligence (AGI), the misuse of advanced biotechnologies and nuclear weapons, we confront daunting challenges within an increasingly interconnected globalised civilization, where catastrophic failure anywhere could mean failure everywhere. As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times suggests, humanity’s efforts to overcome the tragedy of the global commons ‘could prove to be the defining story of the century’ (Wolf 2012). Martin Rees agrees, suggesting that existential risks make it unlikely that humanity will reach the end of this century without major changes (Rees 2014). Governance scholars predict a rocky road ahead, observing a move from conventional distributional politics (who gets what, when and how) to existential politics which ‘is like distributional politics on steroids: the stakes are whose way of life gets to survive’ (Green, Hale and Colgan 2019).

Of course, global catastrophic risks (GCRs) are nothing new to scholars and practitioners working in the well-established areas of climatology, risk management, resilience, and cognate fields.3 The scholarship is replete with typologies of ‘wicked’ (and less wicked) problems and classifications of GCRs (Alford and Head 2017; Avin et al 2018). Although rarely addressed explicitly (Harrington 2016; Levin et al 2012), a focus on GCRs in global politics scholarship is also apparent in the subdomains of environmental and resilience governance (e.g. Galaz 2014). There is also a substantial policy and practitioner literature which provides sophisticated mapping, taxonomies, rolling assessments of global risks (WEF 2019), slow-developing risks (IRGC 2013), and, increasingly, what policymakers might do about them (CSER 2019).

The challenges posed by uncertainty pervade GCR assessments. 4 Other frequently invoked attributes include ‘scale, complexity and severity’ (CSER 2019, p. 2). This scoping paper drills down on the governance implications of one of those attributes: complexity. Why is a deeper appreciation of GCRs as complex phenomena vital to an effective governance response? In addressing the question, this paper highlights the value of complexity theory (or perhaps, more accurately, thinking), not simply as a contextual descriptor, but as a conceptual toolkit and mental model to inform effective GCR governance. We explore the plausibility of classifying GCRs along a continuum of complexity. Some GCRs are highly complex along a series of dimensions, including levels of connectivity, nonlinear dynamics, rapidly changing circumstance, and emergent properties which produce frequent surprises (Young 2017). Chief examples include climate change, ecological collapse and artificial general intelligence (AGI). We contend that such super-complex GCRs plausibly present a qualitatively different set of governance challenges to other GCRs, such as weapons of mass destruction or pandemics.

This paper suggests that the sheer complexity of GCRs is overwhelming the organisational logic of the postwar multilateral order. Operating within a Weberian mechanisation-bureaucratisation paradigm, its architects engineered institutions according to certain design principles, including role definition, bureaucratic chains of command, expert specialisation, and legal hierarchies, thus building up capacities to manage and determine complicated outcomes. This top-down command and control approach delivered some notable successes, such as the eradication of smallpox by the World Health Organization and control of ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol. Those core design principles persist today, but are now increasingly rendered obsolete in the face of harder problems playing out in complex technological, economic, ecological and social assemblages.

When it comes to preventing GCRs, inadequate governance models are also coupled to problematic structural constraints, above all the fact that, as Weiss and Wilkinson (2014, p. 213) lament, ‘[e]verything is globalized – that is, everything except politics’. Buckminster Fuller (1981, p. 218) captured this troubling predicament almost 40 years ago:

We have today, in fact, 150 supreme admirals and only one ship – Spaceship Earth. We have the 150 admirals in their 150 staterooms each trying to run their respective stateroom as if it were a separate ship. We have the starboard side admirals’ league trying to sink the port side admirals’ league. If either is successful in careening the ship to drown the “enemy” side, the whole ship will be lost.

Unfortunately, we do not currently have global governance structures predominantly built to manage collective action problems, let alone complex GCRs. Designed to also preserve the status quo and reproduce unequal power, existing multilateral structures are increasingly criticised as overly centralised, politicised, bureaucratic and unresponsive to the pressing needs of the global populace (Kennedy 2016). The political lock on “rapid and far-reaching” measures is nowhere more apparent than in preventing catastrophic global warming. As the Co-Chair of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III acknowledges, “limiting warming to 1.5°C is possible within the laws of chemistry and physics but doing so would require unprecedented changes” (IPCC 2018). Rockström and colleagues (2009) find that three out of nine boundaries for maintaining the sustainable ecosystems required to support human civilisation may already have been breached. Our future governance system will have to contend with intensifying natural and social boundaries for the preservation of human civilisation, from biosphere fragility points, to increasing asymmetric power of individuals to affect disruption,5 exponential technology, hyper-concentration of wealth – and all within imminently shorter timescales than most people can intuit.

Whether or not existing governance configurations and practice can be repurposed to address super-complex GCRs is an open question. This paper presents a knowledge overview of scholarship and practice directed towards identifying pathways to effective GCR governance. This body of work contends that policymakers, practitioners and scholars must throw off the shackles of old ways of thinking and embrace a complexity paradigm. Such a shift involves both revisiting the design logics underlying how we build global governance structures, as well as adopting a complex sensibility more capable of responding adequately to instability, surprise and extraordinary change.6 Understanding GCRs as complex – as opposed to complicated – problems, characterised by emergent properties, unpredictability, and non-linearity, is vital to this task. We survey an emergent governance scholarship beginning to grapple with the immense complexity of the global system. We also draw on policy scholarship which takes seriously the implications of nonlinear system dynamics for rethinking conventional governance practices and decision-making heuristics. According to complexity leadership theory, while there is a residual role for traditional ‘managerial’ responses, attempts to address complex drivers of GCRs ‘are often ineffective and sometimes even counterproductive’ (Homer-Dixon 2007, p. 30). This paper will explore why these scholars believe that we need new ways of thinking about and understanding governance in a complex, interconnected and rapidly changing world.

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