Pilot programs are terrible at enabling performance improvements
Beryl A. Radin 2k, American public administration author, researcher, and academic, elected member of the National Academy of Public Administration, Managing Editor of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, “The Government Performance and Results Act and the Tradition of Federal Management Reform: Square Pegs in Round Holes?,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol. 10, no. 1, 01/01/2000, pp. 111–135
At the same time, there are differences between GPRA and earlier efforts. Its enactment as legislation (rather than as executive orders) has built in a role for Congress that is relatively unusual in government reform efforts. David Rosenbloom (1998) has noted that GPRA's "[d]eep legislative involvement in agency strategic planning ... fits the institutional role Congress designed for itself in 1946." Rosenbloom has noted that public administration reformers in the United States have a tradition of looking past the separation of powers when they design reforms. GPRA, however, was different. In addition, GPRA's inclusion of pilot projects and provision of a number of years for start-up are not the usual way to conceptualize reform efforts. Although GPRA was enacted in 1993, its real requirements did not take effect until 1997.
To some degree, the passage of GPRA and the interest in its implementation reflect the public attention to management that has been a characteristic of the 1990s. Embraced by the Clinton administration and viewed as complementary to the Gore reinvention effort, GPRA's focus on performance of government agencies is an example of the interest in this topic throughout various levels of government. The multiple aspects of legislation— particularly its emphasis on the relationship between budgeting and performance—can be viewed as an attempt to respond to public concerns about the ways that public monies have been expended. The report from the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs attached to the legislation noted that u[p]ublic confidence in the institutions of American government is suffering from a perception that those institutions are not working well. ... the public believes that it is not getting the level and quality of government service for which it is paying."6
John Mercer, the acknowledged "father" of GPRA, brought his local-level management reform experience in Sunnyvale, California, to the legislative development process within the U.S. Congress. Advising the Republican members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Mercer's agenda was to craft a piece of legislation that provided the mechanism for performance budgeting. He believed that the efforts in Sunnyvale could inform the federal government, leading to tightly constructed cost accounting systems that would lead to technically driven budget decisions. Although his proposals were modified by some of the Democrats on the committee, the legislation that was enacted did accentuate the belief that "congressional policymaking, spending decisions, and oversight are all seriously handicapped by the lack both of sufficiently precise program goals and of adequate program performance information. . . . The legislation will provide the information necessary to strengthen program management, to make objective evaluations of program performance, and to set realistic, measurable goals for future performance."7
The Senate Committee made a number of assumptions about the GPRA requirements. First, it argued that past and current attempts at performance measurement and reporting had been successful. Second, the report reflected a belief that GPRA would not impose a major additional cost or paperwork burden on federal programs. Third, it argued that at least some federal agencies were already moving toward the development of performance measure systems for results-oriented decision making.
The only cautionary note that was sounded in the Senate report came from Senator David Pryor, a Democrat from Arkansas. He wrote: "My concern is that by mandating yet another very specific layer of internal management controls, performance measures and strategic plans, we are building in even more rigidity. I realize that the legislation seeks to allow flexibility in some pilot programs, but after years of watching these well intended reforms transform into routine reports written by contractors using largely boilerplate language, I am not convinced that this legislation will actually enable federal agencies to improve their performance."8 Pryor cited the work of Harold Seidman, pointing to the fundamental difference between state and local governments and the federal government.