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They didn’t specify their agent---reject the team!

Ben Laurence 20, Philosophy, University of Chicago, “The Question of the Agent of Change,” Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 4, 2020, pp. 355–377

This naturally raises the question of who the agent of change is that Anderson thinks might bring about the substantial policy reorientation required to dismantle residential segregation. Although she once again could be more explicit, her answer appears to be that hope lies with an African-American-led social movement that renews the aspiration for integration that (she believes) was central to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. This is why her extended discussion of the epistemology of social movements occupies center stage in her crowning chapter on democratic theory.36 In keeping with her Deweyan epistemological conception of democracy as the collective exercise of our practical intelligence to solve social problems, she views social movements as engaged in democratic acts of teaching and learning, under conditions where the epistemological functions of ordinary democratic politics have been disabled by political pathologies. Through targeted disruption of business as usual, collective agents with certain special properties are capable of breaking through the clubby and exclusionary routines that insulate us epistemically and morally from the legitimate claims of others. If such a social movement aimed at racial integration, then targeted gains could be won that would help to undermine the psychological underpinnings of a politics of white resentment, allowing for further egalitarian transformations down the road.

In short, Anderson argues from views about the plausible agent of change to views about what remedies to pursue.37 [FOOTNOTE 37 BEGINS] 37 Other recent arguments that take this direction include Tommie Shelby’s critique of the political proposals of the Black Power movement—on the grounds that class divisions in the black community pose a significant challenge to the formation of an all-black agent of change—and Alex Gourevitch and Lucas Stanczyk’s argument against basic income as a replacement for the efforts of a flagging labor movement—given the organized obstacles that face an ambitious basic income, the only plausible potential agent of change is a mobilized and vastly empowered labor movement. Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 101–35; Alex Gourevitch and Lucas Stanczyk, “The Basic Income Illusion,” Catalyst, 4 (2018), 22–43. [FOOTNOTE 37 ENDS] Her diagnosis of the problem of black/white inequality in the US has implications for identifying the plausible agents of change, and she uses these implications to support one set of remedies (policies fostering integration) over another set of remedies (policies that directly address inequality). What this shows is that in nonideal theory the problem of the agent of change is tightly connected with the other core tasks of diagnosing a problem and proposing a set of remedies. To diagnose a problem is already to identify various political actors harmed or benefited by, or otherwise implicated in, the perpetuation of an injustice, and to specify structural obstacles to the formation of political agents capable of addressing the problem. Views about the plausible potential agent of change can have consequences for what remedies should be pursued to overcome the problem identified. Entailments thus run in multiple directions, and these questions must be thought through together.

Given the multiple directions of entailment, one can come at the problem from multiple directions. In some cases, having made a diagnosis, we may work from above, first specifying remedies and only reconsidering our policy recommendations when we find at the end that there is no plausible agent of change. In other cases, having made a diagnosis, we may work upwards from the plausible agents of change this diagnosis suggests to a specification of promising remedies. The point is not to mandate one direction of argument or the other, but only to emphasize that the question of the agent is entangled with the question of what policies to recommend whatever direction one argues, so that one must think through both together. This shows another problem with a technocratic posture of neutral policy recommendation to unspecified agents in nonideal theory: it wrongly treats intelligent policy recommendation as though it were independent from the identification of an agent of change.

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