Only a strong UBI solves any of the case---that kind of UBI would be impossible without first building political support for the program.
Orlando Lazar 21, St. Edmund Hall & Balliol College, University of Oxford, “Work, Domination, and the False Hope of Universal Basic Income,” Res Publica, vol. 27, no. 3, 08/01/2021, pp. 427–446
Taking the broad sweep of academic and non-academic work, criticisms of UBI work across a number of levels of ideality, from ‘a UBI would strip work of dignity and therefore be morally wrong’, to ‘a liveable UBI would not sufciently reduce the domination of workers’, to ‘a UBI of any kind is not politically possible given the current electoral arithmetic’. These are very diferent kinds of critique. Some cut to the very heart of the idea of a UBI, and others merely raise doubts about its implementation. UBI might violate some important principle of reciprocity, or might constitute the exploitation of productive citizens by less productive citizens, for instance.12 Two criticisms are especially relevant for my purposes here, and both are well represented in the work of Alex Gourevitch (2013, 2016) and Lucas Stanczyk (Gourevitch and Stanczyk 2018). Respectively, they claim that an anti-domination UBI would be inefective, and that even a modest UBI would be impractical.
To claim that an anti-domination UBI would be inefective is to deny the mechanisms I describe in the last section, to deny that a UBI could redress power imbalances between workers and employers, transform the labour market, and so on. So for this first criticism, the question of how difficult it would be to win a UBI of this sort is irrelevant—assume that we could click our fingers and implement such a policy. Gourevitch makes two arguments against the transformative potential of that UBI. The first argument denies that a UBI, of whatever level of income, could sufciently meet the costs of leaving a job, and would therefore fail to give workers the power to credibly threaten to do so. He distinguishes between instrumental costs, which include ‘work-related social standing…the needs of family, ties to community, [and the] value of workplace relationships’ (Gourevitch 2016, p. 24), and intrinsic costs of exit, where ‘many [workers] will still validly feel an obligation to work and/or they will seek a creative outlet for their capacities’ (Gourevitch 2016, p. 24). These are things that money cannot buy. You can make leaving a job less costly, but these non-material costs establish a hard foor to the project of giving workers a credible threat of exit.
The second, related argument for the ineffectiveness of a UBI denies that the threat of exit could ever sufciently increase the day-to-day bargaining power of individual workers, even if exit costs were radically reduced. For the purposes of contesting discrete and exceptional managerial decisions, the threat of exit might work well; if your boss threatens to cut your pay in half, you can threaten to leave. But Gourevitch writes that ‘threatening to leave a job is a kind of nuclear option that is simply not credible in many low-level disagreements’ (Gourevitch 2013, p. 608). These low-level disagreements are the norm. You might disagree with your boss on how best to perform some task, in which order to perform a series of tasks, who might best perform that task, or a range of pettier issues: what constitutes appropriate clothing or speech in the workplace, how to keep your workstation or desk, and so on. That each disagreement might be small—even insignificant—means little. The series of disagreements, and the regularity with which the manager can enforce their will in those disagreements, characterise the ongoing relationship with a manager as one of living under the power of another. That series might also be the only obvious expression of that domination, if no individually very consequential decisions need to be taken. But in such cases, reacting to any of those decisions with the threat of exit is not particularly credible. Are you really going to leave your job because your boss told you to organise those files alphabetically, rather than by date? For Gourevitch, this coarse-grained power is not a useful corrective to the fne-grained reality of workplace authority.
Although a response to this frst set of critiques is not the object of this paper, I suspect that Gourevitch somewhat overstates the case against the efectiveness of a UBI here. He is right to say that there are many non-material costs of leaving a job that could not be compensated for, in kind, by any basic income. But in order for the structural efects of a UBI to kick in, leaving one’s job does not need to be costless, but merely low enough and bearable, for that threat to be used as an efective bargaining chip. In order to make those non-material costs bearable, the level of a basic income may well need to be higher than strictly required to compensate for the material costs of exit. But the brute fact that some kinds of costs cannot be eliminated by a basic income does not establish that a basic income would fail to make most workers’ threat of exit credible.13 Birnbaum and De Wispelaere, for example, include a similar list of ‘non-monetary, social values [of employment] that cannot be compensated for by basic income in any immediate way (Birnbaum and De Wispelaere 2020, p. 9)’ as a reason to doubt that partial basic incomes could give workers a credible threat of exit. This is compatible with my suggestion that a suitably generous income may nonetheless make exit a realistic option for many workers. Similarly, Gourevitch’s worry about the unwieldy ‘nuclear option’ of the threat of exit is a real one—employers may well reasonably doubt that workers will quit their jobs over some individually inconsequential managerial decision. But this worry may be overstated for the same reason as it is a worry in the first place—a series of such decisions, and the relationship that results from it, is consequential enough and harmful enough that the threat of exit is a perfectly credible response. ‘I’ll leave unless you reverse your decision to make me sort these files inefficiently’ is not credible; ‘I’ll leave unless you stop enforcing petty decisions, the latest of which is the decision to make me sort these files inefficiently’ is much more credible, and reflects the problem with the failure of the first example. In any case, proponents of a work-oriented14 basic income do not see the threat of exit as primarily an explicit threat, a mechanism to discipline the boss triggered in response to some decision. Instead, they see it as an implicit threat, one attaching risks to the continued exercise of power formally available to managers. This is enough, I think, to establish that we need more than Gourevitch provides in order to show that any basic income will fail to seriously alter the bargaining positions of workers and employers.
The second kind of criticism is that even a modest UBI would be politically impractical—Gourevitch and Stanczyk argue that a ‘bare subsistence’ (2018, p. 5) basic income of $15,000 a year would be almost impossible to achieve. Specifically with reference to the US, the sheer level of taxation and appropriation required to finance a UBI of this level, and the predictable opposition of the classes of owners who stand to lose from it, make even this low income a far-off dream. Their conclusion is that viewing UBI as a relatively easy route to a much stronger working class—a ‘capitalist road to communism’ (2018, p. 2, after Van der Veen & van Parijs 1986)—gets it the wrong way round. Overcoming these obstacles and winning a UBI would require the strong and unifed working class that UBI promises, class power that must be achieved through other, more traditional means. They make the case, we could say, that we would need a communist road to a capitalist road to communism.
Responding to this criticism is much easier: although it does not entail it, my argument below is perfectly compatible with their doubt that even a modest, bare subsistence UBI would be practical or afordable. My goal is diferent—I want to argue that the kind of UBI required for transforming work will demand more than bare subsistence, and be more demanding than UBIs suitable for other purposes. For those convinced by Gourevitch and Stanczyk’s argument, this paper ofers more bad news for defenders of a work-oriented UBI. But it is possible to reject their conclusions and accept mine: to think that a bare, subsistence UBI would be practical and achievable, but that an adequate UBI for the sort of UBI-first strategies I am concerned with would likely face significant additional barriers.