Backlash that destroys the project can only be overcome by building political support, starting with a pilot program.
Alex Gourevitch & Lucas Stanczyk 18, Gourevitch teaches political theory at Brown University and writes on strikes, work, and freedom; Stanczyk teaches philosophy at Harvard University, “The Basic Income Illusion,” Catalyst, March 2018, https://catalyst-journal.com/2018/03/the-basic-income-illusion
II. THE QUESTION OF CAPITAL FLIGHT AND INVESTMENT STRIKE 19 20 21 22
This brings us to our second caveat. Our oversimplified observations assume that there would be zero negative effects on GDP from the requisite massive increase in taxes. If there were a substantial drop in GDP — because of, say, extensive capital flight or investment strike — then financing a $15,000 per person annual basic income would cost proportionately more than a quarter of total output. Anyone who claims it would cost much less is claiming, in effect, that enabling millions of people not to work would substantially grow our existing capitalist economy. There are no strong reasons, theoretical or empirical, to support this speculative conclusion.
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR TAXING CAPITAL ASSETS
Finally, it’s true that a basic income payment can be funded without drawing on revenues from ongoing income taxation. The Alaska Permanent Fund has been paying out oil dividends for decades, and the contribution of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund to public coffers is even bigger. Why not, then, set up a sovereign wealth fund and use it to finance a livable basic income out of investment returns on the capital? The answer is that it is simply impossible. A bare subsistence income in the United States would require the government to cut people checks summing, annually, to roughly a quarter of GDP. The annual GDP of the United States is roughly $18.75 trillion. If the long-run real return to capital is assumed to be 4-5 percent per annum (a standard long-run estimate), this means that one would need around $100 trillion to capitalize the sovereign wealth fund. However, $100 trillion is approximately the sum of all real and financial assets held in the United States today. Therefore, if we forsake ongoing income taxation and go the sovereign wealth fund route, nationalizing all housing and financial wealth in the United States would not be enough to finance a basic income of even merely $1,300 per month per head. After all, the rest of the government’s budget would still need to be paid for somehow, and yet there would be no private capital assets — and hence also no capitalist economic activity — le over to serve as a tax base.
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These observations are, we believe, already enough to reveal the main strategic miscalculation at the core of the familiar realistic-cum-emancipatory approach to basic income criticized in this essay. According to this approach, progressives should concentrate their efforts not so much on organizing, unifying, and radicalizing ordinary workers, but on finding broad political consensus on a legislative policy issue. The implicit assumption is that advocates of a truly generous basic income will eventually be able to find common ground with the business class and its political representatives because, allegedly, the legislative introduction of a livable basic income is in everyone’s long-run interest: to do better for everyone, we could leave the entire capitalist apparatus more or less in place, and simply provide every worker with a regular cash payment that is enough to live on.
In a word, this assumption strikes us as deeply implausible. Why would the business class agree to such an enormous shift in their share of total national income? How are progressive leaders and thinkers to find common ground with them on this issue? After all, a subsistence-level basic income is straightforwardly a form of communism, extended to cover roughly a quarter of total annual output: were the government unconditionally obliged to send everyone a check for $1,300 a month, then, to the tune of roughly a quarter of GDP, everyone would be entitled to the exact same purchasing power no matter what anyone did.
At the same time, the cost of this entitlement clearly could not be financed by raising taxes on the bottom half of workers: the bottom half owns less than 1 percent of US wealth, and their combined wage share is less than 6 percent of GDP. What is more, the wages of the next best-earning 30 percent of workers together amount to only about 22 percent of GDP. Thus, unless we wish to eliminate all state and local governments, the federal government, education, and all other public services, the pretax wages of the bottom 80 percent of the population are, as it were, already spoken for.
In short, there is simply no way to finance anything close to a liberating subsistence-level basic income without taxing the business profits and salary incomes of people in the top 20 percent of the income distribution. Indeed, given that the revenue needed for this policy approaches a quarter of total annual output, the tax increases on the wealthiest 20 percent would have to be enormous.
Now, it is true that the net cost of the policy to the wealthiest 20 percent would be considerably less than the gross dollar value of the hundreds of millions of checks sent out by the government each month. This is because, even though the wealthiest 20 percent would inevitably have to pay for the entirety of the basic income payments sent to lower-income beneficiaries, everyone belonging to the wealthiest 20 percent would equally be entitled to the monthly basic income payment. In this way, 20 percent of the gross monthly cost of a universal basic income program would be returned to the wealthiest 20 percent each month, thereby reducing the net cost of the program, to them, by an equivalent amount. Moreover, a basic income payment of $1,300 per month could be designed not to increase the incomes of, say, the next wealthiest 30 percent minus one, simply by raising taxes on this group by an exactly offsetting amount 26 [FOOTNOTE 26 BEGINS] It is worth noting, however, that with any such more concentrated redistributive design, one should expect substantial opposition not only from the wealthy but also from people squarely in the middle and upper-middle of the income distribution. [FOOTNOTE 26 ENDS]. In that case, the net cost of a subsistence-level basic income policy to the wealthiest 20 percent would fall to roughly half of the gross dollar value of all monthly basic income payments made, or approximately 10-13 percent of GDP.
Nonetheless, it should be clear that even this smaller net cost to the affluent would represent an enormous downward redistributive transfer. For, even in the context of the highly unequal United States, the combined 23 24 25 26 annual salaries of the best-paid 20 percent of employees add up to only roughly 29 percent of GDP. Thus, a basic income program with a net cost, to them, of 10-13 percent of GDP would require the best-paid 20 percent of employees to give up somewhere between an additional one-third to nearly one-half of their existing pretax salary incomes. Realistically, then, a subsistence-level basic income could not be funded through new tax increases on their salary incomes alone. Instead, massive new tax increases on both the salary incomes and the capital gains of the wealthiest 20 percent would be needed to fund anything remotely resembling a livable universal basic income program.
Using analyses far more sophisticated than ours, other commentators have suggested that a livable basic income should be seen as economically infeasible for the foreseeable future. We would like to make clear that this is not our contention in this essay. For our purposes, we are happy to assume that massive tax increases on the highest labor incomes would not produce any offsetting negative effects on the tax yield. Indeed, we are happy to assume that very large increases in corporate and capital taxation would occasion no significant capital flight, perhaps because effective capital and investment controls could be implemented in the very same legislation putting in place a livable basic income 27 [FOOTNOTE 27 BEGINS] Three decades ago, Erik Olin Wright expressed skepticism about a capitalist road to communism for this reason. He noted that if ever the owners of capital were made to face confiscatory levels of redistributive taxation, the continued operation of a private property economy going forward would require implementing not only a) strict controls on the ability of capital to relocate to lesser taxed shores, but, in addition, b) enforceable requirements on private owners to continue to invest productive resources at prior rates rather than consume. In other words, the continued operation of a private property economy with a generous basic income would require the capital and investment controls characteristic of state socialism. We agree with Erik Olin Wright on this point but wish to note that a far more basic question has been widely overlooked: why on earth would the business class sign up for confiscatory taxes in the first place? Alternatively, who is going to “make” them face such taxes if a generous basic income is envisioned a means to class politics and not its happy outcome? For Olin Wright’s analysis, see Erik Olin Wright, “Why Something Like Socialism Is Necessary For The Transition To Something Like Communism,” Theory & Society 15, (1986): 657-72. [FOOTNOTE 27 ENDS]. Even under these assumptions, there remains the question of why the business class would ever agree to expropriate itself. Aer all, a genuinely liberating subsistence-level basic income is at bottom just a massive redistributive program, larger than anything that has ever been attempted, and ultimately to be paid for out of existing and potential business profits. What reason is there to think that, once its many virtues are made clear, the business class will be prepared to get on board with this idea?
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In fact, a rather different response is predictable. If the basic income proposal ever really gets going — by which we mean, outside of proposals for geographically circumscribed and therefore comparatively inexpensive pilot projects — the world’s biggest employers and their owners can be expected to use every means of resistance at their disposal. There are numerous reasons to expect a less than supportive response. 27
For one, the wealthy as a group already oppose even modest forms of downward redistribution. For example, fewer than half of wealthy Americans (43 percent) endorse the view that government should see to it that no one is without food, clothing, or shelter, even when the support in question is fully means-tested and work-conditional. Moreover, according to a supermajority (60 percent) of the wealthy, it is not the case that the minimum wage should be raised to ensure that no family with a full-time worker falls below the (already stingy) official US poverty line. Clearly, these political attitudes do not bode well. However, there is even more direct evidence that the wealthy will not support anything like a livable basic income. Less than a quarter of wealthy Americans (23 percent) believe that the government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, while nearly 90 percent oppose raising the Earned Income Tax Credit — even though this policy functions simply as a wage subsidy to employers operating at the bottom end of the highly stratified US labor market. At the same time, a huge majority (81 percent) of the wealthy are opposed to the state pursuing a policy of full employment, while practically everyone among the rich (92 percent) thinks that the state itself should never act as the employer of last resort. On every one of these telling policy questions, then, the wealthy are already overwhelmingly opposed to greater downward re- and pre-distribution. There is no reason to expect this to change once they are told precisely how much more costly it would be to fund a subsistence-level basic income through massive new taxes on their labor incomes and business profits.
On the contrary, if the livable basic income idea ever truly gets going, we can expect opposition from the business class to harden long before there is scholarly consensus on the policy’s fully allocated price tag. To the above empirical reasons for this prediction as based on opinion surveys, let us now add a basic strategic reason. Not being stupid, big businesses and their wealthy owners will easily anticipate the very same emancipatory aspects of basic income that its proponents count in its favor. But in light of their strong personal and financial interests, we can expect them to draw exactly the opposite political conclusion.