Policies of full employment cannot be meaningfully secured without building political support ahead of time.
Alex Gourevitch & Lucas Stanczyk 18, Gourevitch teaches political theory at Brown University and writes on strikes, work, and freedom; Stanczyk teaches philosophy at Harvard University, “The Basic Income Illusion,” Catalyst, March 2018, https://catalyst-journal.com/2018/03/the-basic-income-illusion
To see this, consider the long-standing opposition of business to a policy of full employment. As the economist Michal Kalecki long ago pointed out, it should at first glance be puzzling why profit-seeking businesses normally do not support a policy of full employment. “Clearly, higher output and employment benefit not only workers but entrepreneurs as well, because the latter’s profits rise. And the policy of full employment [need] not encroach upon profits because it [need] not involve any additional taxation. The entrepreneurs in the slump are longing for a boom; why do they not gladly accept the synthetic boom which the government is able to offer them?” Kalecki’s answer had three parts.
First, when the level of unemployment depends on the state of investor confidence, this gives businesses and investors extensive power over economic policy: “everything which may shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause an economic crisis.” Yet once the government learns the trick of alleviating unemployment through direct public investment, “this powerful controlling device loses its effectiveness.” Second, a government policy of subsidizing mass consumption is normally even “more violently opposed than public investment. For here a moral principle of the highest importance is at stake… ‘You shall earn your bread in sweat ’— unless you happen to have private means.” Finally, even if the opposition to temporary Keynesianism and active industrial policy were entirely overcome, “the maintenance of full employment would cause social and political changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the 28 29 30 business leaders.” Why? Because “under a regime of permanent full employment, the ‘sack’ would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure.” Accordingly, “[t]he social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class would grow.” To be sure, “profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under laissez-faire; and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus adversely affects only the rentier interests. But ‘discipline in the factories’ and ‘political stability’ are more appreciated than profits by business leaders.”
There is abundant evidence that big businesses today continue to think exactly this way, not only about the appropriateness of public investment and costly programs for subsidizing mass consumption, but also about the appropriate structure of corporate governance and the critical importance of maintaining the threat of the sack. If this is their view, however, then they have all the more reason to respond with massive opposition and resistance to any credible effort to implement a livable basic income. For compared to a policy of mere full employment, the legislative introduction of a livable basic income would magnify each of the stated effects immensely — above all by curtailing the disciplinary power of the sack. Indeed, as David Calnitsky notes, the central economic and political implications of generous basic income have long been understood.
It is sometimes suggested that a UBI could operate as an inexhaustible strike fund; indeed, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) was the first to recognize this in their Congressional testimony on Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan.… In Congressional hearings the NAM insisted that they would support the plan only ‘if the basic allowance is a realistic minimum, and the earnings disregard provides a true incentive to work and advancement and the work requirement is strong.’ Finally, they expressed concern about the link between the guaranteed income and labor upheaval: ‘We suggest that anyone directly involved in a labor dispute should be ineligible for benefits.’
We are now in a position to state the preliminary upshot of our discussion. Because a livable basic income would be a truly massive redistributive program, ultimately to be paid for out of existing and potential business profits, it will come only when there is a working class organized and powerful enough to be able to extract it, in spite of the inevitable fierce opposition of the owners of capital. Consequently, efforts to secure broad consensus on the virtues of legislating a livable basic income cannot plausibly be prioritized over what is needed to organize the working class as a political force and reinvigorate the labor movement. The alternative strategy at bottom reduces to the hope that the business class will eventually agree to expropriate themselves out of the goodness of their hearts.