You could not cut other programs nearly enough to add up to an emancipatory UBI.
Alex Gourevitch & Lucas Stanczyk 18, Gourevitch teaches political theory at Brown University and writes on strikes, work, and freedom; Stanczyk teaches philosophy at Harvard University, “The Basic Income Illusion,” Catalyst, March 2018, https://catalyst-journal.com/2018/03/the-basic-income-illusion
On close inspection, all of the familiar arguments for the emancipatory rather than the merely ameliorative potential of basic income are at bottom instances of the so-called “exit” argument for basic income. This is the idea that a generous basic income would allow people to exit from the labor market — to take care of family, to be entrepreneurial, or simply to say “no” to an abusive employer — because it would allow people to live without wage income on, at least, a bare subsistence income. Clearly, then, such arguments require extending something approximating at least a bare subsistence income.
Now, what level of payment is required for this purpose will differ widely with geographical differences in purchasing power. We shall focus initially on the United States. As the world’s richest large industrialized country with the single leanest public sector, it is also the country presently most able to afford a universal basic income approximating bare subsistence.
Let us call the bare subsistence level in the United States $15,000 per annum. There are numerous reasons to think that a basic income pitched at this level would not provide most people living in the United States with a genuine “exit” option from the labor market. However, we will proceed as if $15,000 per annum is nonetheless the relevant number because, if our analysis undermines calls to prioritize congressional passage of a basic income pitched at this level, then it will apply with even greater force to proposals for strategically prioritizing the legislative introduction of basic income policies pitched at even higher levels.
Extending a universal basic income of $15,000 per year would mean giving each person roughly $1,300 per month to live on. For a lone individual in the United States, this amount is nowhere near enough to clear the widely accepted poverty line of half the median household income. However, combined with the income of a domestic partner — and therefore with an adieu to claims about liberation from compulsory cohabitation and domestic relations of personal dependence — $1,300 per month is arguably enough to live on, at least in the lowest cost-of-living areas of the country. (We deal with children in a moment.)
How much would such a basic income actually cost? By simple accounting equivalency, we know that gross domestic product (GDP) is the sum of all incomes. Therefore, to extend a basic income to each person that amounts to x percent of the mean individual income, one would need, as a first cut, to raise x percent of GDP in additional tax revenue. However, the current mean individual income in the United States is just under $58,000 per annum. Therefore, to fund a basic income of roughly $15,000 per annum per person — or 26 percent of the mean individual income, still below the poverty line — one would have to nationalize, somehow, an additional 26 percent of GDP.
The current share of all local, state, and federal government spending in the United States as a proportion of GDP is roughly 38 percent. Therefore, to implement the bare subsistence version of the basic income proposal would mean taking the United States economy from a position where government expenditure represents less than two-fihs of GDP to nearly two-thirds. This would be a ratio higher than present-day Finland (57 percent), higher than France (56 percent), and indeed higher that any capitalist industrialized society has ever had. It would put the government share of GDP well above even the US “wartime socialism” levels of 1944-1945. It’s not clear what such an economy would look like in peacetime. And this is only for a bare subsistence income. In our view, these observations already cast doubt on the idea that there is a “capitalist road to communism.” Before we draw our more precise conclusions, however, it is worth reflecting on three important caveats.
I. THE MATTER OF COST SAVINGS
First, with a basic income, one could eliminate some existing welfare transfers. However, existing welfare spending in the United States, excluding spending on health, represents a comparatively small fraction of GDP, on the order of 10 percent. Moreover, of this amount, true social-welfare expenditures — such as unemployment insurance, income assistance, and subsidized housing — amount to less than 4 percent of GDP combined. The other 6 percent represents mostly contributory old age pensions.
These low levels of social spending are precisely why the public sector in the United States represents only about two-fihs of total output, and why there is so much more room for raising government expenditure in the United States than in any other comparably wealthy industrialized country. At the same time, the figures just cited should make it clear that much of the already lean public sector in the United States must not be eliminated. On the contrary, infrastructure, social services, schools, and clinics desperately need greatly increased funding, not to mention research into clean energy and climate change.
More to the point, one cannot give with one hand while taking back an equal amount with the other if the purpose of introducing a basic income is fundamentally to alter the status quo and give workers a genuine exit option that they never really had before. This aspiration, aer all, is what distinguishes left-wing or emancipatory from right-wing or conservative arguments for basic income. The latter are focused not at all on freeing low-paid workers from draconian labor market discipline, but merely on making today’s clumsy welfare state spending more efficient. Accordingly, if to help pay for a basic income of $1,300 per month, one were to eliminate whatever spending keeps down the net monthly cost of the most aordable subsidized housing (for example), then, for the same reason, the introduction of the basic income would not produce a genuine exit option for the minimum-wage worker; from her point of view, it would merely make existing government transfers more direct and less paternalistic.
The general point is that if one wants to fund a basic income as a means of liberating ordinary workers, one cannot do so by eliminating programs that are, in any case, vital for this purpose. In the United States, this imperative precludes cutting back much of the existing, already lean social welfare spending. And no matter where else one looks — whether in plausible cuts to military expenditures (4.5 percent of GDP) or the 15 16 17 18 elimination of tax breaks for homeowners (0.4 percent of GDP) — all of the possible savings combined will not add up to anywhere near a quarter of gross domestic product.
Accordingly, the real question to be asked is whether there are any major savings to be had by explicitly altering the universality of the (so-called) universal basic income, first and foremost by excluding dependent children and elderly people. The answer to this question depends on the purpose of implementing such a transfer program. If the purpose is to liberate ordinary workers from oppressive labor market discipline, rather than to make our tightfisted social spending somewhat more ecient and less paternalistic, then there will be no massive savings to be had by cutting payments to children and elderly people.
Consider children first. Adults with children have higher expenses and therefore require a higher monthly income than the average single person if they are to meet their own basic needs and the basic needs of their dependents. Even if a child’s most basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, education, and medicine can be met with only half of the amount that is necessary to meet the basic needs of an adult — so that each child can safely be provided with only $7,500 per annum instead of $15,000 — the cost reduction would still be minimal, amounting to savings of less than 3 percent of GDP. But note that reducing the basic income payment even a penny further for children would almost certainly undermine the aim of extending a real exit option for the average low-paid worker. In truth, if dependent children were eligible for at most $7,500 per annum, then it seems clear that only people without children would enjoy a real exit option from the labor market. For these reasons, if the purpose of extending a basic income is to liberate workers from capitalist labor discipline, there are no major savings to be had from drastically reducing payments to minor children.
What about generating cost savings by cutting o retirees and elderly people? The problem is that millions of elderly people live in poverty and continue to have work for low wages for survival. Therefore, regardless of whether the elderly are formally disqualified from the basic income or their Social Security income is replaced dollar-for-dollar, cutting o elderly people would again mean abandoning the aim of providing every able adult person with a genuine ability to exit the labor market. And even if elderly people were to be entirely disregarded, the maximum cost savings generated would be only slightly more extensive than cutting in half the payments going to children, for the simple reason that there are some 40 percent fewer elderly people than there are children.
In short, to fund a genuinely liberating basic income of $15,000 per annum — assuming that were enough for this purpose — the United States Treasury would need to raise entirely new tax revenues amounting to likely a quarter of total annual output, and almost certainly no less than 20 percent; the vast bulk of this revenue could not come from cost savings generated by massively cutting existing federal, state, and local government spending.