Expanding social security locks in interparty conflict- results in cuts to other programs
James G. Chappel 23 (Gilhuly Family Associate Professor of History at Duke University; “The Frozen Politics of Social Security”; Boston Review; https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/the-frozen-politics-of-social-security//TMS- Isir)
That moment quickly passed, and in the mid-1970s, thanks to inflation and unemployment, the program entered a fiscal crisis. Social Security has been under assault ever since, with conservatives attacking the system as fundamentally illegitimate and fiscally unsound. The classic clash, and the one we have now, has been between a GOP movement aiming to roll it back and a responsible center seeking to save it. Consider, for an early example, a 1971 debate on Social Security between Cohen and Milton Friedman. The exchange was hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, and it centered on the system’s legitimacy. Friedman was in his element: a happy warrior, making jokes and playing to the audience, even while calling for a form of privatization that would have been a death warrant for many poor and disabled people. It is telling that Cohen served as Friedman’s opponent at all. Friedman was an ideological renegade, leading an insurgent right wing. Leftists had such figures, of course, but none of them cared much about Social Security. Cohen was the best defender the system had at the time. And he’s a good one, too: articulate and well-versed, far more than Friedman, in the minutiae of the program. He was nonetheless outmatched, and any viewer of the debate, knowing nothing about Social Security coming in, would be swayed by the smug charm of Friedman over the disheveled and frustrated bureaucrat. Cohen had nothing to combat Friedman’s rhetorical excesses, and in fact largely accepted the terms of debate. He labored to show that Social Security was compatible with “our free enterprise system.” Social Security, he insisted, “reinforces thrift, reinforces initiative.” And with some tweaks, he insisted, it could remain solvent. The discussion has moved on, some, since the 1970s. Privatization, with some exceptions, has ceased to be a rallying cry for conservatives. George W. Bush tried to do it in his second term with disastrous results. Republicans are more likely, now, to call for benefit cuts and a higher retirement age. Democrats, for their part, are still talking like Cohen: exasperated with Republicans and claiming the moral high ground by fending off Republican cuts. That strategy, fundamentally defensive in nature, may have made sense in an era of bipartisanship and program solvency. It no longer does. Indeed, even as the bipartisan, consensus-seeking spirit of technocracy becomes increasingly irrelevant to U.S. politics, it remains the dominant register for thinking about Social Security. Both Fixing Social Security and The Retirement Challenge exemplify this state of affairs: each presents sensible proposals to reform the retirement system, but each has an air of political unreality about it. Recognizing that Democrats as currently constituted can’t solve the matter on their own, they end up placing the onus of responsibility on the two institutions most incapable of meeting the challenge: congressional Republicans, who have lost touch with legislative reality, and the American family, already ground down by decades of austerity and wage stagnation. The call for Republican action comes from Fixing Social Security, an excellent study of the recent history of Social Security and the reasons for Congressional inaction. Arnold has been thinking and writing about Social Security for decades, and he is a steady guide for anyone seeking to understand the system. He is rightly skeptical of privatization as a workable plan and indeed of the private retirement system as a whole. He clearly believes, too, in the legitimacy of Social Security, and in the idea that robust public support is the only way to create something approaching justice for older Americans. Yet his political analysis remains bound by an outdated pragmatism. He convincingly argues that fixing Social Security, by which he means making it solvent, is not difficult: a series of tweaks to tax rates, retirement ages, and levels of taxable income could do it. The emotional motor of the book is Arnold’s frustration that the U.S. political system can’t deliver these reforms that are so transparently urgent and so transparently popular. (Many of the book’s pages are spent analyzing poll data to this effect.) He does call for a campaign of letter-writing and activism from the AARP. But Arnold is laser-focused on congressional politics, so he gives most of the impetus for solving the problem to Republicans. Because they avoid putting an actual policy on the table, Arnold argues, they have not been forced, as a party, to make the hard choices about taxes and benefits. Once they finally do so, the actual horse-trading with the more reasonable Democrats can begin—and, most likely, end somewhere between the modest expansion of Social Security 2100 and the modest cuts desired by many conservatives. For all of Arnold’s policy expertise, his political analysis remains of a piece with Cohen’s: he sees Social Security as a popular, well-designed policy and is concerned that the American political system is not able to deliver the modest reforms that might keep it solvent. The Retirement Challenge, which is the end result of a star-studded set of conferences on retirement financing, shares much with Arnold’s book. Like Arnold, Baily and Harris believe in incrementalism: “if families, companies, and policymakers all took incremental steps to improve the retirement system,” they insist, “every American could achieve a more secure retirement.” This approach, they conclude, provides “the only realistic path.”