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Food insecurity incentivizes people to join terrorist groups and allows them to delegitimize the state

Alexander 22 — [Rayna Alexander, “Food Insecurity and Terrorism: What Famine Means for Somalia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 8-16-2022, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/08/food-insecurity-and-terrorism-what-famine-means-for-somalia/, accessed 12-30-2022] - PG

According to the most recent Global Terrorism Index report, sub-Saharan Africa is the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for 48 percent of terrorism-related/caused deaths worldwide. Somalia ranks first in Africa and third globally as the most impacted by terrorism. Numerous groups in Somalia, including Islamic State-Somalia, Hizb al Islam, and Ahlu Sunna, could exploit the growing food crisis. However, al-Shabaab, Somalia’s largest terrorist threat (responsible for almost 90 percent of Somalia’s terror-related deaths in 2021), is the most worrisome. Al-Shabaab, or “the youth” in Arabic, controls more than 20 percent of the country, primarily in the south and central regions (an area the size of Texas). An estimated 7,000 of al-Shabaab’s members govern rural areas, extort taxes, and provide health, educational, and judicial services, undermining the state government’s legitimacy and emboldening the group as a source of de facto authority. Throughout Somalia, al-Shabaab exploits businesses, real estate, and construction, as well as local schools, clinics, mobile courts, and police departments. According to one business owner who pays the militants $4,000 annually, “the Shabab are like a mafia group. You either have to obey them or close your business. There’s no freedom.” Food and water inaccessibility and increased commodity prices are related to insurgent activity and the potential for a social uprising. In 2011, for example, food prices were related to the mobilization of farmers in Tunisia that ignited the Arab Spring. The drought in the Horn of Africa and subsequent drinking water shortages may increase competition and lead to communal violence. In turn, militant groups will have an opportunity to provide resources and further legitimize their intervention, undermining state actions (or lack thereof). Acute food insecurity may also increase social grievances and mobilize disaffected individuals to join terrorist organizations. In one study, the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers found more than half of former al-Shabaab members cite economic factors as their primary motivation to join (see below). One recruit concluded, “all one had to do was carry around a gun and patrol the streets. It was an easy job compared to other jobs such as construction work.” Disadvantaged Somalis may see al-Shabaab membership as a source of income. Recruits are offered a monthly salary and financial benefits. Given the current socio-economic status of many Somalis and the lack of economic opportunity in the agricultural sector, al-Shabaab may become more enticing for individuals with limited opportunities. Al-Shabaab recruits are as young as fourteen, and 70 percent are younger than 24 years old. In Somalia, where the median age is 17 years old, recruitment trends are a cause for concern. In May 2022, the UN Refugee Agency reported a total of 2.97 million were displaced Somalis due to drought, food shortages, and violence. Mass internal migration has resulted in overcrowded refugee sites where many lack adequate shelter and water. Overcrowded sites can also be used as safe havens, as they are commonly isolated from authorities, allowing terrorists to operate undetected. Terrorist training networks are also common in refugee communities where displaced peoples are directly or involuntarily recruited. Worsening conditions force internally displaced peoples to turn to all sources of aid. Attacks and aid worker kidnappings deter agencies from reaching communities in occupied territories (some 900,000 Somalis). However, trained militants are able to exploit government grievances and impose order in disorganized camps. For al-Shabaab, control of camps is viable and demand for compensation and recruits is opportune. Conversely, the Somali government’s inability to provide physical and economic security delegitimizes the political establishment, contributing to a vicious cycle of weak governance and militant influence and insurgence. Propaganda further legitimizes terrorist activity. Al-Shabaab argues international humanitarian aid weakens the country and results in dependency on “infidels.” News and radio outlets that distribute pro-al-Shabaab propaganda claim militants are the superior authority alternative to international intervention and failed state governance.

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